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Abstract 
Recently, the advances in Ubiquitous Computing networks and the increased computational 
power of network devices have led designers to create more flexible distributed network 
models using decentralised network management systems. Security, resilience and privacy 
issues within such distributed systems become more complicated while important tasks such 
as routing, service access and state management become increasingly challenging. Low-level 
protocols over ubiquitous decentralised systems, which provide autonomy to network nodes, 
have replaced the traditional client-server arrangements in centralised systems. 
Small World networks represent a model that addresses many existing challenges within 
Ubiquitous Computing networks. Therefore, it is imperative to study the properties of Small 
World networks to help understanding, modelling and improving the performance, usability 
and resiliency of Ubiquitous Computing networks. Using the network infrastructure and 
trusted relationships in the Small World networks, this work proposes a framework to enhance 
security, resilience and trust within scalable Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks. The proposed 
framework consists of three major components namely network-aware topology construction, 
anonymous global communication using community trust, and efficient search and 
broadcasting based on granularity and pro-active membership management. 
We utilise the clustering co-efficient and conditional preferential attachment to propose a 
novel topology construction scheme that organises nodes into groups of trusted users to 
improve scalability. Network nodes communicate locally without advertising node identity at 
a global scale, which ensures user anonymity. The global communication is organised and 
facilitated by Service Centres to maintain security, privacy and integrity of member nodes. 
Service Centres are allocated using a novel leader election mechanism within unstructured 
scalable P2P networks. This allows providing fair and equitable access for existing and new 
nodes without having to make complex changes to the network topology. Moreover, the scale-
free and clustering co-efficient characteristics of Small World networks help organising the 
network layout to maintain its balance in terms of the nodes distribution. 
Simulation results show that the proposed framework ensures better scalability and 
membership management in unstructured P2P networks, and improves the performance of the 
search and broadcasting in terms of the average shortest path and control overhead while 
maintaining user anonymity and system resiliency.  
  
III 
List of Publications 
Journal Articles 
 B. Bazli, D. Llewellyn-Jones, M. Merabti, (2014) ‘Privacy Observation using 
Resource Allocation within Scalable P2P Systems’, International Journal of 
Information Security. 
 B. Bazli, D. Llewellyn-Jones, M. Anil, (2014), ‘Data Encryption Using Bio-Molecular 
Information’, International Journal on Cryptography and Information Security. 
 B. Bazli, D. Llewellyn-Jones, M. Merabti, (2013) ‘Efficient Routing within Scalable 
Distributed Networks’, Scientific and Practical Journal of Problems of Information 
Society. 
Conferences 
 B. Bazli, D. Llewellyn-Jones, M. Merabti, (2014). ‘Privacy Concerns within Scalable 
P2P Systems’, Proceeding of World Symposium on Computer and Network & 
Information Security, Tunisia, 2014. 
 B. Alselwi, B. Bazli, B. Askwith, M. Merabti, (2014). ‘Wireless Security using DNA 
Inspired Networks’, 15th Symposium on the Convergence of Telecommunications, 
Networking and Broadcasting PGNET, Liverpool, UK. 
 B. Bazli, D. Llewellyn-Jones, M. Merabti, (2014). ‘Data Encryption in 
Communication Using DNA Sequences’, 15th Symposium on the Convergence of 
Telecommunications, Networking and Broadcasting PGNET, Liverpool, UK.  
 B. Bazli, D. Llewellyn-Jones, M. Merabti, (2011), ‘Using Network Infrastructure to 
enhance Security and Trust within Ubiquitous Computing Networks’, 13th Symposium 
on the Convergence of Telecommunications, Networking and Broadcasting PGNET, 
Liverpool, UK. 
  
  
IV 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................................................... II 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS ............................................................................................................................ III 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................ IV 
TABLE OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... VII 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................................... IX 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................................... X 
LIST OF SYMBOLS ....................................................................................................................................... XI 
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. DISTRIBUTED NETWORKS ................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2. SMALL WORLD NETWORKS ................................................................................................................ 4 
1.3. MOTIVATION ....................................................................................................................................... 8 
1.4. OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................................... 12 
1.4.1. Network-aware Topology Construction ................................................................................... 12 
1.4.2. Secure Communication ............................................................................................................ 13 
1.4.3. Privacy Preservation ............................................................................................................... 14 
1.5. APPROACH ........................................................................................................................................ 14 
1.6. SCOPE ............................................................................................................................................... 16 
1.7. CONTRIBUTIONS ................................................................................................................................ 17 
1.8. STRUCTURE ....................................................................................................................................... 18 
2. UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING & SMALL WORLD NETWORKS ................................................... 20 
2.1. DEVELOPMENT OF UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING .................................................................................... 20 
2.1.1. Challenges ............................................................................................................................... 20 
2.2. SMALL WORLD NETWORKS .............................................................................................................. 31 
2.2.1. History ..................................................................................................................................... 32 
2.2.2. Applications ............................................................................................................................. 33 
2.2.3. Scale-free Networks ................................................................................................................. 36 
2.2.4. Preferential Attachment ........................................................................................................... 41 
2.2.5. Power-law Distribution ........................................................................................................... 43 
2.2.6. Clustering Coefficient (CC) ..................................................................................................... 44 
2.2.7. The Average Shortest Path ...................................................................................................... 47 
2.3. NETWORK OVERLAY ......................................................................................................................... 48 
2.3.1. P2P Overlays ........................................................................................................................... 49 
2.4. SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 56 
3. SEP SYSTEM DESIGN .......................................................................................................................... 58 
3.1. TOPOLOGY CONSTRUCTION ALGORITHM .......................................................................................... 59 
3.1.1. Leader Election ....................................................................................................................... 63 
3.1.2. Node Join ................................................................................................................................. 66 
3.1.3. Node Leave .............................................................................................................................. 69 
3.1.4. Group Split .............................................................................................................................. 69 
3.1.5. Group Merge ........................................................................................................................... 70 
3.1.6. Naming Table .......................................................................................................................... 70 
3.2. NETWORK-AWARE MESSAGE-FORWARDING .................................................................................... 71 
3.3. SCALABILITY .................................................................................................................................... 78 
3.4. PRIVACY ........................................................................................................................................... 79 
  
V 
3.5. SECURITY & RESILIENCE .................................................................................................................. 80 
3.6. TRUST ............................................................................................................................................... 81 
3.7. SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 82 
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF SEP FRAMEWORK ................................................................................. 83 
4.1. IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................... 83 
4.2. NETWORK SIMULATOR ..................................................................................................................... 83 
4.3. OVERSIM .......................................................................................................................................... 84 
4.4. SEP SYSTEM DESIGN RATIONALE ..................................................................................................... 86 
4.4.1. Stability .................................................................................................................................... 87 
4.4.2. Scalability ................................................................................................................................ 88 
4.4.3. The Average Shortest Path ...................................................................................................... 89 
4.4.4. Control Overhead .................................................................................................................... 89 
4.4.5. Security & Resiliency ............................................................................................................... 90 
4.5. SEP TOPOLOGY STRUCTURE ............................................................................................................. 90 
4.6. SIMULATION STRATEGY AND CONSTRAINTS ..................................................................................... 93 
4.6.1. Number of Runs ....................................................................................................................... 93 
4.6.2. Simulation Time ....................................................................................................................... 93 
4.6.3. Number of nodes ...................................................................................................................... 94 
4.6.4. Experimental Platform ............................................................................................................ 94 
4.6.5. Simulation Settings .................................................................................................................. 95 
4.7. SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 95 
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF SEP FRAMEWORK ............................................................ 97 
5.1. PERFORMANCE METRICS................................................................................................................... 98 
5.1.1. Membership Change ................................................................................................................ 98 
5.1.2. Topology Recovery Time ......................................................................................................... 98 
5.1.3. Node Distribution .................................................................................................................... 98 
5.1.4. Forwarded Message Maintenance........................................................................................... 99 
5.1.5. Hop Count ............................................................................................................................... 99 
5.1.6. One-way-latency ...................................................................................................................... 99 
5.1.7. Application Forwarding Maintenance ..................................................................................... 99 
5.1.8. Packet Drop Rate................................................................................................................... 100 
5.1.9. Join Request Byte Count ........................................................................................................ 100 
5.1.10. Average Response Count ....................................................................................................... 100 
5.1.11. Disconnection Ratio .............................................................................................................. 100 
5.2. CONFIDENCE INTERVALS ................................................................................................................ 101 
5.3. SIMULATION RESULTS AND EVALUATION ....................................................................................... 103 
5.4. TOPOLOGY STABILITY .................................................................................................................... 103 
5.4.1. Experiment 1 (A): Membership Change ................................................................................ 103 
5.4.2. Experiment 1 (B): Topology Recovery Time .......................................................................... 106 
5.5. TOPOLOGY SCALABILITY ................................................................................................................ 113 
5.5.1. Experiment 2 (A): Node Distribution..................................................................................... 114 
5.6. AVERAGE SHORTEST PATH ............................................................................................................. 123 
5.6.1. Experiment 3 (A): Hop Count ................................................................................................ 123 
5.7. CONTROL OVERHEAD ..................................................................................................................... 126 
5.7.1. Experiment 4 (A): Join Request Cost ..................................................................................... 126 
5.7.2. Experiment 4 (B): Message-forwarding Cost ........................................................................ 129 
5.7.3. Experiment 4 (C): The Effect of Topology Management on Maintenance ............................ 131 
5.8. SECURITY & SYSTEM RESILIENCY .................................................................................................. 134 
5.8.1. Experiment 5 (A): Reliability – Average Response Count ..................................................... 134 
5.8.2. Experiment 5 (B): Resiliency - Packet Drop Rate ................................................................. 137 
5.8.3. Experiment 5 (C): Disconnection Ratio ................................................................................. 142 
  
VI 
5.9. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................... 144 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK ............................................................................................. 145 
6.1. TOPOLOGY CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................................................ 148 
6.2. TOPOLOGY STABILITY AND LOAD BALANCING ............................................................................... 149 
6.3. TOPOLOGY SCALABILITY ................................................................................................................ 150 
6.4. MEMBERSHIP MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEM RESILIENCE ................................................................. 151 
6.5. FUTURE WORKS .............................................................................................................................. 153 
6.5.1. Multiple Groups Membership ................................................................................................ 153 
6.5.2. Efficient Cryptography & Misbehaving Nodes Solutions ...................................................... 154 
6.5.3. Real World Overlay Protocol Deployment ............................................................................ 154 
6.5.4. Unicast Protocols with Cache Replacement .......................................................................... 154 
6.6. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................... 155 
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................................. 156 
  
  
VII 
Table of Figures 
Figure 1.1 Three Possible Routes in the Milgram's Small World Experience ..................................................... 5 
Figure 1.2 Navigation Using Local Information within Clustering Exponent ..................................................... 7 
Figure 2.1 Internet Privacy (Nikiforakis & Acar, 2014) .................................................................................... 26 
Figure 2.2 Linear Trusted Communication (Chen and Yeager, 2001) ............................................................... 34 
Figure 2.3 Diagram of World Wide Web, Captured by Barabási-Albert (Barabási-Albert, 2002) .................... 35 
Figure 2.4 Random Network where a is the hub ............................................................................................... 37 
Figure 2.5 Power-law Degree Distribution of Nodes (Hayrynen, 2005) ........................................................... 38 
Figure 2.6 Scale-free Networks ......................................................................................................................... 39 
Figure 2.7 A Random Network .......................................................................................................................... 39 
Figure 2.8 Random networks - Accidental Node Failure (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003). ................................. 40 
Figure 2.9 Accidental Node Failure in a Scale-free network (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003)............................. 40 
Figure 2.10 Scale-free Networks - the Effect of Targeted Attacks (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003) .................... 41 
Figure 2.11 Role of Preferential Attachment in Scale-Free Growth (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003).................. 42 
Figure 2.12 Local clustering coefficient of 1 ..................................................................................................... 45 
Figure 2.13 A Graph with Clustering Coefficient of 0 ...................................................................................... 45 
Figure 2.14 Typical Network Overlay ............................................................................................................... 48 
Figure 2.15 Chord DHT Routing ....................................................................................................................... 50 
Figure 2.16 Search in Freenet – Node A Searches for Key 8, Located at E (Zhang & Goel, 2004) .................. 51 
Figure 3.1 Illustration of Node Degree Distribution (Fotouhi and Rabbat, 2013) ............................................. 61 
Figure 3.2 SEP Topology Construction ............................................................................................................. 63 
Figure 3.3 Sequence Diagram for the Node Join Process .................................................................................. 66 
Figure 3.4 Flow chart - Add Node Function ...................................................................................................... 68 
Figure 3.5 Data Transmission at the Host Level in NICE ................................................................................. 72 
Figure 3.6 Data Transmission in SEP ................................................................................................................ 73 
Figure 3.7 Data transmission within different overlays ..................................................................................... 74 
Figure 3.8 Look up within the Same Overlay .................................................................................................... 74 
Figure 3.9 Privacy-aware Communication over Different Overlays ................................................................. 75 
Figure 3.10 Class Diagram of Node Handler ..................................................................................................... 76 
Figure 3.11 Extension of Network Overlay to Accommodate New Members .................................................. 78 
Figure 4.1 OverSim Architecture (Baumgart et al, 2007) .................................................................................. 91 
Figure 4.2 Layered Architecture of the SEP Design .......................................................................................... 92 
Figure 5.1 Average Membership Change in SEP ............................................................................................ 104 
Figure 5.2 Average Membership Change in NICE .......................................................................................... 105 
Figure 5.3 Topology Stability - Membership Change ..................................................................................... 106 
Figure 5.4 SEP Topology Recovery under Pareto Churn of Service Centres .................................................. 107 
Figure 5.5 Network Stability in NICE – Cluster Leader Recovery.................................................................. 108 
Figure 5.6 System Reliability – SEP Topology Recovery ............................................................................... 108 
Figure 5.7 System Reliability – NICE Topology Recovery ............................................................................. 109 
Figure 5.8 Topology Free Arrangement of Member Nodes ............................................................................. 110 
Figure 5.9 Grouping Node Members using Service Centre ............................................................................. 111 
Figure 5.10 Topology with Clustering Co-efficient of Zero ............................................................................ 111 
Figure 5.11 GIA Super Node Topology........................................................................................................... 112 
Figure 5.12 - NICE Hierarchy-Tree Topology ................................................................................................ 113 
Figure 5.13 Power-law Distribution is SEP ..................................................................................................... 114 
Figure 5.14 Node Stress in SEP ....................................................................................................................... 115 
Figure 5.15 The Relationship between Nodes and Service Centres................................................................. 116 
Figure 5.16 – The ‘Goodness of Fit’ for Node Distribution Prediction in SEP ............................................... 117 
Figure 5.17 Power-law Distribution in SEP ..................................................................................................... 118 
Figure 5.18  NICE Node Distribution .............................................................................................................. 119 
Figure 5.19 NICE Node Distribution Residual Plot......................................................................................... 119 
Figure 5.20 NICE Node Distribution Trend line ............................................................................................. 120 
Figure 5.21 Scale-Free Distribution of Nodes in SEP ..................................................................................... 122 
Figure 5.22 Overlay Path Length ..................................................................................................................... 123 
Figure 5.23 - Line Fit Plot for Hop Counts ...................................................................................................... 124 
Figure 5.24 Residual Plot of Hop Count .......................................................................................................... 124 
Figure 5.25 Hop Count Trend line ................................................................................................................... 125 
Figure 5.26 Join Request Cost ......................................................................................................................... 127 
  
VIII 
Figure 5.27 Comparison of Join Request Cost in SEP & NICE ...................................................................... 128 
Figure 5.28 Maintenance Cost on Message-forwarding .................................................................................. 130 
Figure 5.29 Maintenance Cost Trend line ........................................................................................................ 131 
Figure 5.30 Maintenance Cost for Application Forwarding with Pareto Churn .............................................. 132 
Figure 5.31 Maintenance Cost Forecast ........................................................................................................... 133 
Figure 5.32 Average Query Response Count ................................................................................................... 135 
Figure 5.33 Residual Plot - Average Response Count ..................................................................................... 136 
Figure 5.34 Trend line of Average Response Count ........................................................................................ 136 
Figure 5.35 Average Number of Packet Drop Rate with No Churn ................................................................ 138 
Figure 5.36 The Trend line for Packet Drop Ratio .......................................................................................... 139 
Figure 5.37 The Effect of Service Centre Failure on Packet Drops – Pareto Churn ........................................ 140 
Figure 5.38 One-way Latency Time in seconds for Multicasting .................................................................... 141 
Figure 5.39 Trend line for Maximum delay ..................................................................................................... 141 
Figure 5.40 Topology Aggressiveness – Average Node Disconnection Ratio ................................................ 142 
  
  
IX 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Average Shortest Path for different Scale-free Networks .................................................................. 46 
Table 3.1 Pseudo Code for Leader Election Process ......................................................................................... 65 
Table 3.2 Pseudo Code for Node Join Process .................................................................................................. 67 
Table 3.3 Pseudo Code for Packet Routing ....................................................................................................... 77 
Table 4.1 Survey of the Most Used Network Simulators .................................................................................. 84 
Table 5.1 Performance Metrics ........................................................................................................................ 101 
Table 5.2 Common Confidence Intervals to determine the ‘Margins of Error’. .............................................. 102 
Table 5.3 Simulation Settings .......................................................................................................................... 103 
Table 5.4 The Residual Output - Prediction of the Node Distribution Trend .................................................. 115 
Table 5.5 Regression Statistics ........................................................................................................................ 121 
Table 5.6 The Effect of Service Centre Failure on Packet Delivery Ratio ...................................................... 140 
 
  
  
X 
List of Abbreviations  
ALM Application Layer Multicast 
AP Access Point 
CC Clustering co-efficient  
CI Confidence Interval  
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service 
DHT Distributed Hash Table 
GSM Global System for Mobile communications 
ID Identification Number 
IEEE Institution of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IETF Internet engineering Task Force 
IoT Internet of Things 
IP Internet Protocol 
KBR Key Based Routing 
LAN Local Area Network 
Mb Mega Byte 
MSC Mobile Switching Centre 
NT Naming Table 
OBA Online Behavioural Advertising 
P2P Peer to Peer 
PDA Personal Digital Assistant 
QoS Quality of Service 
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service 
RF  Radio Frequency 
RFID Radio Frequency Identification 
RPC Remote Procedure Call 
SC Service Centre 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
TTL  Time to Live 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
UML Unified Modelling Language 
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System 
URL  Universal Resource Locator 
USB Universal Serial Bus 
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network 
VoIP Voice over IP 
WAN Wireless Area Network 
WWW World Wide Web 
     
  
XI 
List of Symbols 
?̅? Mean value 
MC Maximum capacity in a group 
C 
cc 
Response Message 
Clustering co-efficient  
ci Confidence Interval 
cMessage Challenge Message 
destID  Destination ID 
Enc Encrypted Type of the Value 
G Group 
k Degree of a Node 
L proportion of the links within a group 
N number of nodes in a group 
n global number of nodes 
Nk Number of nodes with degree k 
nodeID  Node Identification 
PK Public Key 
S Samples 
SC1 Service Centre 1 
SC2  Service Centre 2 
Sk Private Key 
Y number of hops, path length in a communication 
Z Level of Confidence Margin of Error 
𝜀 Margin of Error 
𝜎 Standard Deviation 
  
1 
1. Introduction  
The interconnection of autonomous computers and isolated communication networks form 
distributed networks that enable new services and applications. Despite the typical centralised 
computer networks, a distributed network operates more efficiently and effectively over a mix 
of workstations, LAN servers, wireless networks, regional, Web and other servers. Indeed, this 
brings in new security challenges. 
Secure communication and confidentiality, tolerance to failure, ensuring availability and 
integrity of resources, and also prevention of and response to intrusion are the main security 
concerns in a distributed network.  Most networks are secured by firewalls, which apply packet 
filtering between the internal and the external network (Hampton, 1999). The security measures 
are complex because of the network architecture and spread of nodes, mobility and locality 
within the network. The security mechanism should consider cost, time and space as well as 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of resources. 
Since the properties of a distributed network fit within other real networks, humans and 
communication networks, scientists and researchers and even psychologists have brought many 
concepts and proposals to the field. These have all been used to model the characteristics of the 
nodes and entities within the network to predict future behaviours. Several studies have actively 
examined the properties of the distributed networks, resilience to random and targeted attacks 
and how the whole network and individual node would be affected by the attacks (Ying Li et 
al., 2010; Cohen, et al., 2003; Hayes, 2000; Hayrynen, 2005; and Albert et al., 2000). 
Developments in Ubiquitous Computing and Internet of Things (IoT) are expected to introduce 
interactive, interconnected and configurable living spaces as an integral part of future computing 
environments. Such a user-oriented environment will require a secure network infrastructure to 
ensure integrity, interoperability, privacy, fault tolerance and simple development and execution 
of applications. Various solutions have been proposed for Ubiquitous Computing environments 
to secure the network infrastructure, enable integrity, privacy and reliability as part of the service 
access interfaces and the implementations provided. Such solutions have only been addressed 
and implemented within small networks with limited functionalities and services. Little attention 
has been given to the scalability and privacy in these solutions. Expanding the network 
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infrastructure would ordinarily require the architecture to support new entities through extensive 
reprogramming to accommodate the changes in the network size. 
Studies have shown that Small World, Scale-free networks and ubiquitous networks share 
similar characteristics and behaviour. Networks that exhibit Small World behaviour achieve 
better security (Kak, 2011), have more effective communication schemes (Al-Muhtadi et al., 
2004) and improved performance (Zhang & Goel, 2004). Thus, it is imperative to study the 
properties of Small World, ubiquitous and Scale-free networks. This will help us to model real 
networks, scientific networks and human-centred or computer networks. This also contributes 
to our understanding of these systems and helps to improve their properties including 
performance, security and usability. These networks have recently received more attention and 
research effort from academia with interesting achievements and advances. 
This research aims at using Small World infrastructure to allocate network resources and 
organise the network layout to maintain balance by rebinding to equivalent security services at 
specific locations within the network as the size of the network changes. This work utilises 
Small World network infrastructure and properties to propose a framework that first coordinates 
the components in large-scale networks efficiently. Secondly, using novel allocation and state 
management techniques, it allocates Service Centres within a scalable distributed and ubiquitous 
system to provide fair and equitable access for existing and new nodes without complex changes 
to the network topology, policy or procedures. Thirdly, it contributes to efficient communication 
and addresses privacy and security concerns within the Ubiquitous Computing paradigm. 
1.1. Distributed Networks 
A distributed network is a type of computer network that is spread over different networks or a 
wide geographical space. This provides a single data communication channel within a network, 
as well as distributing processors, resources and assets creating autonomous, collaborative and 
robust computational capabilities across a range of small computing devices. This introduces 
new security challenges and the need for an appropriate defence system.  
Distributed networks are part of distributed sensor networks with a fast evolving technology for 
gathering information from natural and social environments as well as for collaborating with 
other devices. All nodes within distributed networks communicate by passing messages between 
them. Most networks are secured by firewalls which apply packet filtering between the internal 
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and external network (Vogt, 2005). Within distributed networks the spread, mobility and locality 
of nodes, and the architecture of the network, make the security measures complex. The security 
mechanisms should consider cost, time and space as well as privacy, confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of resources. 
The current work in the literature demonstrates that a number of researchers have actively 
studied the properties of distributed networks and their resilience to random and targeted failures 
(Hampton, 1999; Watts & Strogatz, 1998; Morens et al., 2006; and Dyke et al., 2003). It has 
considered how both the whole network and individual nodes will be affected by such failures. 
The scale and complexity of newly introduced systems makes conventional security approaches 
hard to implement due to the number of nodes, dynamic membership changes and the lack of 
central control. 
The popularity, efficiency and effectiveness of distributed networks lead to new services and 
revolutionary advances in technology. We are now living in a society where personal devices, 
computers and appliances are connected together with constant and uninterrupted interaction.  
Combined with the Internet and emerging technologies, we find ourselves within an 
environment full of devices connected to each other, processing information and transferring 
data constantly. 
Ubiquitous Computing is a communication paradigm in which technology becomes virtually 
invisible in our lives.  Instead of having a desktop or laptop machine, the technology we use will 
be embedded in our environment. There has been an emergence of cheap and widely available 
technologies that are embedded in everyday objects around us and which interact with one 
another using wireless technology. This phenomenon has come to be known as the Internet of 
Things (IoT). 
“We are still living in a world where information is trapped in a few of our objects. We stare 
into our screens, which are like goldfish bowls full of information swimming around, but unable 
to escape.  The dream is, a world where information would be a butterfly, flitting freely all over 
the place, and occasionally landing on any of the objects we touch to give them life and enrich 
them” (Haladjian, 2006). 
Haladjian states that the ambition is not only to digitise all devices and objects around us but 
also to connect them together. Waves of technological changes have deeply altered our way of 
living and the place of technology within it. It is therefore essential to study the social and ethical 
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impact of ubiquitous computing as well the security and privacy of users and availability of 
services and consider them when developing ubiquitous systems. 
As ubiquitous computing and IoT mature, the most important issues separate from simple 
technological problems to become social and security issues. Researchers focus on uninterrupted 
communication between users and devices. We will soon be able to include computer hardware 
into virtually every manufactured product and provide a wireless infrastructure to let those 
devices communicate directly or indirectly. 
From a practical point of view, the world of networking is facing rapid changes with innovations 
and efficiency in communications, wireless connections and network evolution. However, 
privacy is the least concern with those technological advances, which rather focus on 
interoperability of systems. From technological complications to lack of rules and regulations 
to cover every aspect of ubiquitous systems, privacy advocates are facing tremendous challenges 
in this matter where many believe that privacy is fading away in the digital age. Ubiquitous 
computing systems and flows of information and Internet communication have now created a 
gold mine for marketing companies. Nonetheless, the choice between privacy and security on 
one hand and the efficiency and interoperability on the other hand is often a trade-off. 
1.2. Small World Networks 
The Small World network phenomenon was first introduced in 1967 when Milgram tried to 
show that the average path length between two people, even when those people have only a few 
acquaintances, is only six steps (Milgram, 1967). Known as the “six degrees of separation” rule, 
this suggests that everybody in the world is connected to everybody else either directly or using 
a chain of intermediary people containing at most six people. 
Milgram asked random people in Omaha, Nebraska to send letters to specific individuals – 
called ‘targets’ that were not known to the senders (Kleinfeld, 1967). Senders or originators had 
basic information about target recipients. It was anticipated that, the senders knew a friend who 
could most likely forward the letter to the destination target. Milgram then examined the mail 
routes that successfully reached their destinations. He discovered that the average chain each 
letter took to reach its target recipient had a length of six hops. Although only 15% of packages 
made it to the destination, it created an explosion of interest by social scientists, mathematicians 
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and neuroscientists. The excitement still remains and confirms what people believe naturally; 
that “It’s a Small World” is a valid claim. 
When Milgram attempted to achieve what then has been determined as the six-degrees of 
separation, he suggested that participants relied on clues to direct the package to a presumed 
target or acquaintance (Milgram, 1967). The one-dimensional clue was the possibility of 
knowing the next intermediary chain. The characteristics of Small World networks within this 
experiment mean that the extension of the chain of acquaintances grows exponentially. In other 
words, within Small World networks, the diameter is smaller than the size (Kleinberg, 2000). 
Given the flooding type search algorithm in Milgram’s experiment, the lookup has only one 
dimension in the exponentially distributed network as shown in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1 Three Possible Routes in the Milgram's Small World Experience 
The possibility of the package arriving at its destination could take log N steps where N is the 
number of acquaintances within the chain of acquaintances. In this work, we use the terms 
neighbors and acquaintances interchangeably. The calculated shortest chain of acquaintances 
was later labelled as the degree of separation. This can be interpreted as average shortest path 
in computer networks. Given the underlying unstructured property of such an arrangement, the 
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lookup method used can in ubiquitous computer networks, particularly within community trust 
(Llewellyn-Jones et al., 2009). 
Within community trust, the communication between one node and every other node is peered 
and therefore much more secure than any other approach (Li et al., 2010 and Chung, 2012). We 
use such a scheme to model the Ubiquitous Computing networks. We use Power-Law 
distribution of nodes within unstructured P2P networks can help maintain network balance 
(Jacob & Orters, 2012) and model network growth (Fotouhi & Rabbat, 2013). Furthermore, the 
alternative path shown as dotted line in Figure 1.1 can be considered as a query in a Small World 
network if the network resource or initial route is not available. This will maintain the shortest 
path as well as minimal hops increasing network efficiency and avoiding redundancy. 
In a small world network, a message is directed from one to other using acquaintances until it 
reaches the destination. If there is clue, an identifier in this case, the message is forwarded to the 
corresponding node or the one closer to it. It is important to use the clues to discover the shortest 
path. Using information about neighbouring nodes has already been used for state management 
(Rowstron & Druschel, 2001) and subsequently efficient routing (Gupta et al., 2003). Given the 
common interests within a community trust, finding the clue can be straightforward. In 
Milgram’s experience, a package arrived at the destination with only one intermediate chain. 
However, many of the packages arrived using eight or more chains. Considering the initial 
instruction that the packages should be directed to people who are known to senders by first 
name, it is understandable that some packages may take a longer route than anticipated. Given 
the circumstances, one can conclude that, although that was a wonderful attempt, the outcome 
of the experiment and the plan has been determined with absolute uncertainty. In the experiment, 
the states are not only represented with great distance geographically, but the distribution 
represents social disparity as well (Barabási, 2003). 
In Milgram’s experiment, only 15% of the packages that are sent from the experiment base 
arrived at the destination in Massachusetts. Most of the packages did not arrive at the destination 
because of broken links. In Figure 1.1, the package starting from Nebraska got stuck in 
Minnesota because, most likely, the recipient in Minnesota did not know anyone to direct the 
package to. Although the diagram shows that, the effort stopped after five attempts – the dotted 
route – there have been many instances recorded of higher numbers of attempts before reaching 
a dead end. Based on the instructions of the experience, the last recipient did not have any desire 
or information to re-direct the package to a possible target recipient or acquaintance. This is 
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very similar to flooding-type routing with blind search, which has been used in many P2P 
systems, which have been proved relatively inefficient, especially as the network scales (Ritter, 
2001).  
There have been instances where the package arrived at the destination by only one chain of 
acquaintances as shown – red dashed line – in Figure 1.1. The accuracy of this case relies on the 
pre-existing adequate information about the next acquaintance. However, the desire to 
participate and the level of interaction and previous relationship of the entities have a direct 
influence in the successful and effective completion of the task. Such an approach has been 
adapted by Kleinberg (Kleinberg, 2000), as illustrated in Figure 1.2. Using local information 
not only maintains the integrity, but improves efficiency and successful navigation within a 
Small World network environment. 
 
Figure 1.2 Navigation Using Local Information within Clustering Exponent 
To determine a more realistic approach in dealing with navigation within a scale-free network, 
the third route is more appealing than other methods. It shows a reflection of the shortest path 
within the experiment. If the experiment was set with some conditions such as distance 
limitation, target direction, or provided with a different instruction to move through an 
alternative route, then the success rate would have been much higher, considering the 15% 
churn. However, such an approach opened an insight to navigation in other types of networks 
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and inspired later discoveries but nonetheless presents an inefficient approach to network 
communication and navigation.  
Watts & Strogatz however, discovered that there are a few random long range connections 
existing within the networks that follow the ‘small-world’ paradigm (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). 
In Kleinberg’s model, routing is carried out by using another dimension – delivery time T – 
restricting the routing to be performed within a local cluster (Kleinberg, 2000).  By doing so, 
the probability of a connection between two nodes is determined as a function of their lattice 
distance. This contributes to global knowledge of connections within the network and 
facilitating discovery of the shortest path. Using this algorithm, it takes (log N)2 steps to arrive 
at the destination point where N is the size of the network. Figure 1.2 is revised version of the 
Kleinberg’s navigation model in Small World network using local information within clustered 
environment. 
The communication from node u is facilitated using navigational information from the 
neighbouring nodes. This method eliminates the possibility of flooding search, which may lead 
to exhaustive or failed lookups. Calculating and finding the shortest path is an expensive 
process. As stated earlier, Milgram’s experience relied on one dimensional probability to 
navigate through the chains. However, Kleinberg states that finding short chains in Small World 
networks is easier than others, since local information is used to navigate through the network. 
Therefore, within small diameter and highly clustered networks such as the Small World 
networks modelled by Watts and Strogatz (1998), the shortest path can be captured by 
connecting two vertices. This technique has been used in the Chord system (Stoica et al., 2001) 
with some variation to facilitate scalable key allocation and managing membership changes. 
1.3. Motivation 
The privacy concern that is addressed within this project is based on the hypotheses that 
individuals should be able to manage their own privacy based on trust and level of involvement. 
The trust based communication model is better suited in privacy-aware P2P systems. Llewellyn-
Jones et al. (Llewellyn-Jones et al., 2009) suggest that community trust can be implemented 
within a group of users to improve and manage reputation. The earned reputation is then applied 
to other members within a data sharing architecture preventing illegitimate decisions by 
members. By earning the reputation, individuals gain trust and move between groups 
considering their own interests and privacy concerns. 
  
9 
While dealing with privacy in Ubiquitous Computing, different entities have different interests 
and there have been many heated debates to push for legal recognition and respect for the 
benefits of the entity (Dwyer et al., 2007). On the other hand, people with the intention of online 
file sharing, Freedom of Information and free expression push for complete privacy rights and 
personal data protection. As mentioned later in Section 2.4.3, almost everyone who uses the 
Internet faces privacy risks that come from marketers and advertisers with powerful web features 
and capabilities that facilitate Web browsing on smart phones and digital devices. A Californian 
programmer, Samy Kamkar has created a cookie called Evercookie that is not easily deleted, 
even by Web experts. In creating the Evercookie he was curious about how advertisers tracked 
him on the Internet and drew attention to violation of privacy within the Web (Vega, 2010).  
Samy states that, “I think it [’] s O.K. for them to say we want to provide [a]better service, 
however, I should also be able to opt out because it is my computer”. 
While those additional capabilities and developments enthuse many users, there are serious 
privacy concerns around tracking user’s activities and capturing personal information such as 
location, shopping cart contents, emails, Web history and even photos (Vega, 2010). Moreover, 
users may also suffer privacy breaches resulting from loopholes within smart phones, and social 
engineering attacks that may cause user accounts and devices to be compromised and personal 
information to leak into the hands of unauthorised users (McCallion, 2014).   
Trust has been dealt with as a key element for security within Ubiquitous Computing (Wellman, 
1999). However, can you build a robust security mechanism that is only based on trust? Is the 
‘trust’ trustworthy when it comes to information security? Implementation of a trustworthy 
system based on trust with the minimum human role is the ideal approach for ubiquitous system 
security. However, research has shown that, without involvement of central authority or relying 
on existing nodes, it is practically impossible to present a personalised distinct identity in a 
distributed computing environment (Douceur, 2002). When distinct identities of remote nodes 
cannot be verified, the system might be vulnerable to a Sybil attack (Douceur, 2002). Most P2P 
systems have subscription free access for personal users and therefore they do not control 
memberships. Access control is normally managed by user names and passwords created by 
users. The lack of strong identity management may lead to system vulnerabilities and attacks 
such as Sybil attacks (Douceur, 2002). This can occur when, within a large-scale P2P system, 
an entity with a single faulty member presents multiple identities undermining redundancy. 
Douceur argues that without logical centralised access control, Sybil attacks are always possible. 
However, the author acknowledges that such attacks can be prevented under some conditions 
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such as resource uniformity and systematic coordination among members. Large-scale 
distributed ubiquitous systems are heterogeneous, therefore providing a uniform topology and 
node degree distribution with equal resource access to all entities is required to achieve such a 
condition is very difficult.  
For instance, Pastry is a structured P2P system that provides locality using information about 
neighbouring nodes.  The information includes the node Id and IP address of the nodes that are 
physically closest to the node. Pastry uses proximity to determine the physical location of 
neighbouring nodes. The naming techniques and routing method used in Pastry are similar to 
that of a Distributed Hash Table (DHT); it therefore shares the same limitations such as 
inefficiency of depth search (Kak, 2011). Therefore, the naming policy in Pastry may introduce 
vulnerabilities such as the potential for Sybil attacks (Douceur, 2002). The node state needs to 
be updated within the routing table, however Pastry has no mechanism for updating such 
information, especially for failed nodes. This leads to redundancy and subsequently bandwidth 
cost when lookups for a failed node returns without success. The author proposes direct identity 
validation using coordination and information about other entities to vouch for new entities. 
In a decentralised and distributed system such as Gnutella, a node should know at least one 
existing node to join the network (Portman et al., 2001). Gnutella was the first conventional 
overlay network to have pervasive use. Each user maintains connections to others and 
communication through trusted relationships. Gnutella is designed as a content sharing and file-
sharing platform with no anonymity in mind, and the design structure and network topology and 
routing protocol were not intended to do so. The intention was to form a community of users to 
share files and resources over the Internet. The Gnutella network is dominated by a few users 
with high speed internet access, activity and content who share content and actively respond to 
queries but use most of the network traffic (Sen and Wang, 2004). If a node wants to join to the 
Gnutella network, it should know at least another node within the network. Although this was 
an innovative system when developed with great intentions in mind, this model of network 
management has significant privacy and other infrastructural issues, some still unchanged after 
several overhauls. 
Although freedom of expression, flow and exchange of personal information on social media 
are often claimed to have created an open-data environment – increasing the popularity of P2P 
systems – these trends do introduce serious consequences, especially in terms of privacy. A 
comprehensive survey of P2P overlay networks compares various attributes and creates an 
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algorithm taxonomy of those systems to illustrate the different elements and metrics (Lua et al., 
2005). This provides a comprehensive list, which covers concepts from architecture, look up 
techniques, routing and performance to resilience and security. Apart from Freenet, none of the 
solutions have considered privacy and protection of user identity while preserving freedom of 
information and promoting the free flow of information. Most of the attention has concentrated 
on efficient routing algorithms, flexible naming and discovery schemes and performance. On 
the other hand, Freenet is a P2P system that has been designed with anonymity in mind. 
However, the design and infrastructure of the network has suffered serious flaws. In Freenet, 
the communications between nodes are encrypted and routed through other nodes to make it 
extremely difficult to determine its originator as well as content (Clarke et al., 1999). Peers on 
the network participate in managing queries, data storage and retrieval of data items. The data 
distributed within Freenet are identified by keys. A request for a key is passed along peers using 
a flooding algorithm, which returns the corresponding data. These keys are location-
independent. 
The notion of ‘the wisdom of the crowd’ suggests that large groups of people are smarter than a 
smart or elite few, no matter how brilliant the few are at solving problems or making wise 
decisions (Surowiecki, 2004). In 1906, Francis Galton observed a weight-judging contest in 
Surrey to guess the weight of an ox on display after being slaughtered. There were over 800 
guesses from the diverse group of people who entered. He wanted to prove that the average 
value of the voters’ guesses was very close to the actual weight. He collected all the raffle tickets 
and the average came to total of 1197 pounds, just one-pound difference comparing to the actual 
weight after the ox was slaughtered. Galton observed that this was more accurate than those of 
alleged cattle experts’ predictions. 
However, this method is ill-suited for many applications. If there are many wireless access 
points in a town centre, a particular access point can be overloaded through the application of 
‘the wisdom of the crowd’. The implication of the notion on car GPS systems where an 
alternative route is offered using live traffic information on roads may lead commuters to divert 
their way through quiet roads to overcome traffic at peak times. Therefore, the decision made 
by the crowd can be influenced by many factors. Global recession, inflation and many financial 
and statistical flaws demonstrate that collective information should not be relied on as an 
accurate judgment. A study carried out by Joseph Simmons of the Yale School of Management 
in New Haven, Connecticut found that group predictions about American football results were 
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far from the real results, because of the influence of fans over-confidence in their decision (Ball, 
2014). 
The diverse examples above however are not intended to cement the reliability or unreliability 
of crowd judgment. Instead, it explores the reasons and influences that make crowd judgment 
biased, inaccurate and sometimes damaging. Governments’ decisions on limiting freedom on 
the Internet or freedom of expression and flow of information are fine examples of this kind. 
Surowiecki stated that one requirement for a good crowd judgment is that the peoples’ decisions 
are independent of one another (Surowiecki, 2004). Within a dictatorship, The Wisdom of 
Crowd is biased by the enforced views of the dictator. Therefore, the main requirement of ‘the 
wisdom of the crowd’ is mistreated by adaptation of a biased decision, which would serve the 
interests of individuals rather than a group. To this extent, promotion of security may accomplish 
some predefined objectives within those settings, but the privacy of the users will be violated 
with different justifications. The revelations by whistle blowers on global surveillance have set 
off within online communities and activists (Access, 2014).  
In this work, the heart of the privacy concerns within ubiquitous systems is based on the concept 
that individuals should be able to manage their own privacy settings based on trust and level of 
involvement. This theory is able to fit well within a dynamic, interactive environment where 
distribution of the services demands autonomous decisions. Therefore, it is imperative that 
ubiquitous system design and development should move to user-oriented design even within the 
service-oriented environment to distribute privacy context and maintain an individual’s privacy. 
Such requirements are crucial in social settings such as where a user is subject to an oppressive 
government, where the user identity, data context and interaction history may pose a 
considerable risk to welfare. In particular, mobile devices operating within a cloud service 
require privacy policies in a cooperative manner to operate within a dynamic environment, 
preserving users’ privacy. 
By exploring the current privacy capabilities of P2P and ubiquitous systems, this work develops 
a user-centred privacy policy based on trusted relationship of those clustered communities. 
1.4. Objectives 
1.4.1. Network-aware Topology Construction 
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The distributed ubiquitous system has a dynamic structure where access control, resource 
allocation and efficient communication are all required for effective traffic, routing and control. 
Implementing multiple tasks within such a decentralised and highly clustered network, while 
preserving privacy and security, is very challenging task considering the dynamic and rapid 
membership change.  
This work uses the power-law distribution and clustering co-efficient properties of Small World 
networks and other modelling capabilities such as conditional preferential attachment to 
introduce a novel network-aware topology construction approach for an unstructured P2P 
system. A high degree node called a ‘Service Centre’ with the highest processing power and 
memory is nominated to administer bootstrapping and facilitate membership management. 
Service Centres create groups of trusted users and administer important tasks to provide fair and 
equitable access for existing and new members without complex changes to the network 
topology, policy or procedures. Creating new Service Centres where the network is expanding 
to serve newly joined nodes ensures the accessibility, availability and granularity of the network 
without needing new sets of policies and resources. Moreover, the design presented will ensure 
that existing storage and memory will be sufficient and available to overcome the requirements 
of a scalable network. 
Connecting new nodes and expansion of the network introduces new challenges to the scalable 
network services. The proposed framework keeps the preferential attachment characteristic 
under control by using a novel topology construction algorithm, so the system does not end up 
forming a random network. We propose an algorithm to limit the number of nodes attached to 
each Service Centre. This ensures a structured and orderly arrangement of nodes so the network 
keeps the existing balance to provide services and resources to all members. If the number of 
nodes linking to a Service Centre exceeds the predefined limit, then the Service Centre is split 
in two, increasing the capacity for linking new nodes. In this way the power-law distribution of 
the network and the network scalability are unaffected. 
1.4.2. Secure Communication 
Communication over large area networks can be complex. The shortest path and direct 
communication have been tested as an efficient and secure communication method and 
employed by Ying Li et al. (2010). Keeping the path length to the minimum will provide a 
trusted and direct relationship between every pair of nodes even where long range links are 
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concerned. The average short paths also improve the granularity of the network. The number of 
nodes connected to each hub and their geographical distance using location sensing and 
allocation algorithm improves efficiency. 
The proposed method will simplify communication methods, by using a peered approach and 
encrypted messages administered by the Service Centre to maintain simple and secure 
communication over a long range. This is the main research element within this framework to 
maintain integrity and confidentiality. 
1.4.3. Privacy Preservation 
While the rapid growth of ubiquitous services, digital communications and file sharing systems 
is generally encouraging for users, it does introduce security and privacy issues as well as ethical 
and legal concerns. Freedom of expression, free flow of personal information in ubiquitous 
systems is often claimed to have created an open-data environment. However, these trends 
introduce serious consequences especially in terms of privacy. Anonymity can provide a level 
of privacy for users within a communication system. Because of the topology, dynamicity and 
design of ubiquitous environments and P2P systems, privacy has not generally been considered 
as a major concern in many existing systems. 
Anonymity is the property that maintains privacy, which in turn should be addressed at the 
routing level since exchanging and/or transferring information is involved. Nonetheless, privacy 
measures must be applied carefully to minimise the impact on users and the system while at the 
same time maximise the efficiency and fair resource access in the network. In order to 
accomplish this task, we study a popular P2P overlay structure with the aim of enhancing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the network, which also addresses privacy concerns. The privacy 
of the nodes and agents is maintained in this way because of reputation and trusted relationships 
(Faloutsos et al., 1999; Soldatos et al., 2007; and Jakubowski et al., 2010).  
1.5. Approach 
We analysed and investigated current approaches and different solutions for unstructured P2P 
systems, and discovered that most of the current tools and topologies do not support scalability. 
Those, which do support network scalability, neglect user privacy and system resiliency. This 
work aims to address and tackle different aspects of ubiquitous P2P overlays such as scalability, 
efficiency, security and privacy. 
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A qualitative approach (Gomm et al., 2000 and Schofield, 2002) has been used to reach overall 
aims and objectives of the project in terms of user privacy. It has been characterised to provide 
deeper understanding of the privacy to develop a research strategy that enabled exploring 
different case studies and observing use privacy within different P2P systems. In order to 
evaluate the privacy and security concerns within those systems, analysis of the roles, processes 
and entities involved is demonstrated to critically appraise the privacy implications. 
Triangulation is a strategy that can be used to strengthen the confidence of research findings 
(Arksey and Knight) and to increase the probability of generalising the research findings from 
different methods (Decrop, 1990). We have used theoretical triangulation where we approached 
the research with varied prospective, considering different hypothesis.   
We followed deductive and triangulation approach in order to achieve the design rationale and 
objectives defined later in Section 1.4. In the deductive approach, the researcher develops 
hypotheses and designs a research strategy to test the formulated theory (Saunders et al., 2003). 
In an inductive approach –also known as building a hypothesis – the researcher starts with 
collecting data in an attempt to develop a theory (Saunders et al., 2003). The reason for choosing 
the deductive approach over the inductive approach in this work is that, implementing the design 
rationale and achieving the research objectives fit well within a deductive approach. The process 
of achieving a Small World inspired network structure to enhance the trust and security within 
ubiquitous systems is divided into the following stages: literature review and study of the current 
developments in P2P overlay systems, design of rationale specifications of privacy-aware end-
to-end communications, and implementation of the design rationale and performance 
evaluation. This approach makes the process simple and easy to understand. Furthermore, due 
to the rigidity of the model, we define the requirements and deliverables of each phase to be 
reviewed and completed before moving to the next stage. 
The requirements specifications are focused on related works using different network structures 
and current advances in security and resiliency methods within scalable ubiquitous computing 
environments. The intention is to capture requirements for the proposed structure and 
framework with lessons learnt from ubiquitous P2P systems introduced rapidly over the past 
two decades. This includes investigation of different types of network, their properties, 
structures and behaviours under different circumstances to define a requirements specification 
for a novel solution. The requirements specification phase uses all available parameters and 
system constraints to address the availability and confidentiality of the services within the 
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ubiquitous system. These parameters are identified independent of the technology of the system 
and utilised for the requirements of the proposed framework. To serve this purpose well, 
different security, privacy and scalability parameters incorporating with current tools, 
technology and prototypes are identified to propose a development plan within an innovative 
framework. 
For the implementation phase, we have developed a typical Small World network and 
Ubiquitous Computing network consisting of several nodes arranged in a decentralised manner 
using OverSim (Baumgart et al., 2007), an open-source discrete-event simulator based on 
OMNET++ (Varga, 2001). The simulator is an open-source simulation framework used to 
model large-scale structured and unstructured P2P networks. The network simulator provides a 
platform to virtually present all nodes and effective communications to analyse the source and 
destination, and to implement the proposed algorithm within a scalable network environment. 
The analysis phase follows an analytical appraisal, critical review and evaluation of current P2P 
overlay approaches to help design and transform the specifications captured during the 
requirements phase. This includes thorough analysis of unstructured P2P systems, arrangement 
of nodes, their roles and location information to establish a secure communication scheme and 
effective membership management. 
The evaluation phase includes assessment of the simulation scenarios based on case studies to 
demonstrate the produced results and to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed framework. 
The derived outcomes are then followed by an appraisal of outcomes in simulation environments 
and comparisons to alternative methods.  
1.6. Scope 
This thesis covers the following areas. 
1. Introduction of distributed networks, Ubiquitous Computing and IoT scenarios. 
2. Analysis of P2P communication systems, existing tools and technologies and current 
solutions with insertion of P2P overlay networks. 
3. The need for efficiency, scalability, relative anonymity and confidentiality of the message 
content. 
4. Trust relationships that exist between nodes within the groups, but do not necessarily exist 
across groups.  
  
17 
5. A framework to address the challenges in unstructured P2P applications with inspiration from 
trust models and the potential existing within Small World networks. 
6. Design of the framework which addresses the scalability, security and privacy. 
7. Design and implementation of novel algorithm for anonymous routing within P2P systems 
using trusted relationships. 
8. Thorough analysis of network resiliency towards random and targeted attacks. 
9. Thorough performance evaluation of the proposed framework under different scenarios, 
comparing to the existing best solutions. 
10. Thorough analysis of privacy concerns within scalable P2P overlay networks with emphasis 
on the project contributions. 
11. Conclusion of the analysis and outline of plan for future works.  
1.7. Contributions 
This work introduces a framework consisting of a novel privacy-aware and network-aware 
topology construction, and a novel leader selection algorithm. It uses the transparency, which is 
based on trusted relationships, and a privacy preserving routing and broadcasting algorithm to 
create balance between privacy and efficient communication. Furthermore, the modelling 
technique from Small World and real world network characteristics inspires the unstructured 
P2P network growth and the pro-active state management.  
In order to ensure end-to-end routing efficiency, we modelled the network growth that maintains 
availability of members through reachable shortest paths and using a novel pro-active 
membership management is necessary. However, privacy and security issues have emerged 
while dealing with the distribution of network resources. Thus, we propose a novel privacy-
aware routing and broadcasting algorithm with the help of a trusted and highly capable node, 
Service Centre, that facilitates routing and forwarding within the P2P overlay environment. We 
have performed a thorough analysis of the current tools and technologies and social concepts as 
well as appropriate guidelines and technology trends regarding user privacy and individuals’ 
right to set a scene for critical analysis of the current ubiquitous solutions. 
The efficient routing using proactive membership management and creating responsible points, 
i.e., Service Centres, which act like ‘Rendezvous nodes’ as explained by Goyal et al. (2009), is 
an important feature, which is incorporated into our proposed framework. It does not only 
facilitate the effective topology management within the network, but also administers important 
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tasks such as routing and forwarding to ensure privacy within trusted community and provide 
anonymity to users.  
By enforcing the network to follow a power-law distribution and sustaining clustering co-
efficient, the system maintains load balancing and manages membership change easily. By 
organising network members as clusters of trusted communities using clustering co-efficient, 
we provide privacy-preserved and secure end-to-end interaction between users. This will serve 
the network to achieve efficiency and easy development. Joining a group of hubs with associated 
nodes will form a network with a power-law distribution and maintains the balance of the 
network. With the policies, services, resources, protocols and repositories and responsibilities 
assigned to highly trusted nodes, this creates ‘Services Centres’ that maintain network 
reliability, interoperability and security.  
In our proposed framework, users’ privacy is considered within the local clustering of nodes 
while secure and trusted communication paths are established between them. This is achieved 
using trusted relationships within the network clusters to serve anonymity as well as the security 
of the member nodes. To the best of our knowledge, none of the proposed schemes and 
methodologies used for privacy concerns utilise the existing trusted relationships within the 
community of users. 
 
1.8. Structure 
Chapter 1: introduces the outline of the thesis and discusses recent advances in distributed 
systems. It explains the motivation behind the research and how the design rationale is inspired 
by Small Work phenomenon. The chapter defines the research methodology to achieve 
objectives outlined, detailed contributions, project scope and concludes with this summary of 
the thesis contents.  
Chapter 2: provides background information, the advances and challenges of Ubiquitous 
Computing and its similarities to Small World networks. It then outlines the current advances 
and challenges facing Ubiquitous Computing. It then brings together the two concepts with 
different modelling techniques in mathematics, social science and information theory in order 
to highlight the research motivation by outlining the current issues within ubiquitous systems 
such as scalability, resiliency, security and privacy. The chapter creates a baseline and preface 
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to outline our research motivation by studying different aspects of the Small World 
phenomenon. 
A thorough analysis of P2P network overlays as solutions for scalability within ubiquitous 
systems has been carried out to highlight the challenges, research constraints and needs for user-
oriented design within those systems. 
Chapter 3: presents the Secure, Efficient and Privacy-aware (SEP) design and outlines different 
aspects of the proposed solution such as topology construction, privacy-aware routing and 
broadcasting, trust-based leader selection algorithm and membership management. This chapter 
goes through the details of modelling the network growth using degree-proportionate probability 
technique to maintain scale-free and power-law property of the unstructured P2P overlays.  
Chapter 4: defines the plan for the performance evaluation strategy based on the design 
rationale, implementation methodology, outlines system validation process to implement the 
proposed framework, and compares it to existing methodologies. Furthermore, it defines the 
performance metrics in order to evaluate the design rationale and project objectives. The 
experimental platform and different simulation settings, limitations, configurations and strategy 
for performance evaluation are included. 
Chapter 5: presents the implementation results, performance metrics and evaluation 
methodology using different techniques. The simulation scenarios and results are presented 
using figures, tables and statostocs. We present simulation results to be compared and analysed 
against other unstructured P2P systems. 
Chapter 6: This chapter concludes the thesis, highlighting the research outcomes and how the 
research approach is developed into the contributions of this work by summarising the findings, 
research contributions and supporting segments with emphasis on future of the ubiquitous 
computing and IoT development. The chapter closes by outlining the area of the research that is 
considered for future work. 
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2. Ubiquitous Computing & Small World Networks 
The ubiquitous computing concept was introduced as a development of human-centred 
networks. A ubiquitous computing network comprises pervasive and hidden computer devices 
that interact with each other and humans. The paradigm of disappearing hardware – where 
personal computer and workstation will become practically obsolete as computing access 
becomes ubiquitous – is underway; in the walls, on our clothing and every object around us 
(Weiser, 1993).  Mark Weiser, a researcher in the Computer Science Lab at Xerox Palo Alto 
Research Centre, was the first to put forward the notion of ubiquitous computing (Weiser. 1991) 
as information technology’s next wave after the mainframe and PC. In this new world, which 
Weiser initially called “calm technology” (Weiser & Brown, 1996), technology will reside 
around us, interacting with users in natural ways to anticipate their needs. 
“The most profound technologies are those that disappear.  They weave themselves into the 
fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it” (Weiser, 1991).  
2.1. Development of Ubiquitous Computing 
In the past fifty years, there have been two major eras in computing: the mainframe and the PC. 
Today the Internet is carrying us through an era of widespread distributed computing towards 
the relationship of ubiquitous computing by deeply embedding computation in the world 
(Gellersen et al., 1999). We are now in the midst of third wave – mobile computing. With 
introduction of mobile computing and ubiquitous systems, we are now heading to the fourth 
wave – IoT. 
Data-centric applications such as Web search, recommendation system and sensor networks are 
responsible for data gathering, analysing, processing and storing information (Ranganathan, 
2011). Ubiquitous Computing systems are also context-aware in the way that they detect and 
monitor the current context of users. The context may contain information on location, status, 
and medical conditions.  As Haladjian (2006) suggests, the ambition is not only to digitalise 
every object around us but also to connect them together.  
2.1.1. Challenges 
The conventional centralised security mechanism is not sufficient as nodes are becoming 
sparser, spreading to different locations with no administrable control over them. As security in 
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real networks and computer networks has always been treated separately with different 
methodologies to deal with, the formation of ubiquitous computing will change the balance 
(Chen, 2004; Zheng et al., 2008; and Kak, 2011). Therefore, new methods and techniques are 
required when it comes to security.  Mathematical analysis and simulations have been used to 
study the characteristics and behaviours of real world and Small World networks, and we believe 
these can be used to help satisfy security requirements within a dynamic ubiquitous computing 
network environment. 
Computers can make decisions based on the circumstances around them and on the context such 
as location, time, temperature and other attributes. It enables applications to understand the 
environment and its attributes to effectively interact with other entities and provide the best user 
experience (John Krumm, 1999). Context-aware computing is exploiting the changing 
environment with applications that react to those changes accordingly (Schilit, 1994). With 
development and production of low cost and tiny sensors with high processing power and battery 
life, many attributes of the environment and resource information is captured for computation 
and processing. The attributes and the information are widespread such as temperature, time, 
size, location, state which all interact with various systems and applications. 
The influence of data explosion may offer a unique opportunity for advertisers and marketing 
organisations, at the same time it requires new system architecture to include key design 
challenges such as scalability, security, privacy and trust. 
2.1.1.1. Scalability 
Scalability is the characteristic of a system that enables a network, process, service or 
infrastructure to grow in a capable manner, accommodating new services and resources as well 
as users (Bondi, 2000). Scalability is a significant issue in electronic systems, databases and 
networking as performance can be affected by system growth. Therefore, the base concept of 
scalability is consistency (Laudon et al., 2008). For instance, if accessing a user record in an n 
member database system takes t seconds, after adding additional records, the system 
performance should not decline, or at least decline in a manageable way (e.g. linearly). 
Scalability brings new challenges such as organisation of nodes, state management, resource 
allocation and efficient routing and communication. Measuring system effects and relationships 
before scalability has been the focus of many researchers (Number, Associated, & Files, 2011; 
Masticola et al., 2005; Duboc et al., 2006; and He et al., 2008). However, planning for 
evaluation of scalability using a sequence diagram of different experimentation of scenarios as 
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well as simulation of abstraction of system performance can contribute to validation before the 
design phase. 
When a Ubiquitous Computing network becomes scalable, it turns into an unstructured and 
decentralised network with diverse users and dynamic topology (Baeza-yates & Cambazoglu, 
2014). Application developers need to improve the scalability of algorithms to accommodate 
large numbers of participating entities and to allow running of multiple applications and 
processors with large numbers of data sets (Yalagandula & Dahlin, 2004).  
Scalability heavily relies on predictions and assumptions to identify system bottlenecks and 
outline strategies to mitigate them in order to prevent failures. In achieving scalability, system 
designers face the common dilemma of having to trade-off capabilities. Availability, usability, 
cost and interoperability are the some of the attributes that are considered when designing for 
scalability. 
By their nature, ubiquitous environments encompass large areas, distributed systems and 
applications, all to cooperate and serve users’ purposes (Hightower & Borriello, 2001). This 
may also extend beyond the prototypes to even a larger scale to make the service management 
much more complicated. One thing is certain: that we need to know and record the location of 
each node and application within the environment. The system should locate people, nodes, 
equipment and applications. Many researchers have been working on automatic location sensing 
by addressing location determination, location-awareness, infrastructure versus mobility and 
resolution in time and space (Han et al., 2004; Shi et al., 2002; and Al Muhtadi et al., 2005). 
Since location technologies generally introduce a trade-off between accuracy and cost, the 
application of the feature depends on the particular requirements of the application (Schilit et 
al., 1999). Furthermore, they introduce privacy concerns (Varshavsky & Patel, 2010).  
Researchers have attempted to capture the essence of scalability by identifying the effects and 
relationships that characterise scalability (Duboc et al., 2006; and He et al., 2008). The main 
approach has been defined as a conceptual development model. This includes expression of 
variables, gathering data and then, analysing the effect of scalability to the system. The lack of 
a generic and global solution for scalability and growth within ubiquitous computing is evident 
within all available ubiquitous environment solutions (Perkins & Huang, 2008). 
 
2.1.1.2. Security 
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Pfleeger & Pfleeger (2006) have highlighted three important aspects of security, namely: 
availability, integrity and confidentiality. To define the availability aspect of a system, it is 
important to describe the goals and objectives of a network. Reliability of a network maintains 
system functionality, tolerates faults and fulfils the expectations. In addition, network resources 
should stay available in the time of maintenance or disaster recovery. This can be tested with 
observation of quantitative expression or qualitative failure of an operation (O’Connor, 2011). 
The emergence of the digital era and integration of computerised systems and microprocessors 
within every engineering product that provides public utility, medical emergency and safety 
requires a design with reliability and fault tolerance. Increased emphasis should be placed on 
improving quality, reliability and durability of such devices. Furthermore, the performance of 
such components should be tested with elements such as capability to satisfy functional 
requirements, efficiency to realise objectives and effectiveness to analyse requirements 
(Modarres et al., 1999).       
System validation and verification represent integrity, which include state consistency, 
interoperability, accuracy and usability of a system. Data integrity is maintaining consistency 
and ensuring accuracy of data over its life cycle (Boritz, 2005). With the context-aware aspect 
of ubiquitous systems in mind, data integrity will play an important role in system integrity and 
security. Well-defined data integrity reduces redundancy and increases performance stability, 
application re-usability and system administration (Zhang et al., 2014).   
With the emergence of data explosion and IoT, security becomes a requirement for individuals 
as well as businesses. The amount of reasonable protection of an asset depends on the 
importance and value of that asset, which in turn corresponds with the possibility of an attack 
(Stajano, 1992). The manifesto of ubiquitous computing however changes the traditionally 
considered system security where computers are becoming smaller, cheaper and embedded in 
everything and everywhere. 
2.1.1.3. Privacy 
Privacy is the term referring to a state, in which one’s life or affairs can be free from intrusion 
or interference. In information technology privacy is the relationship between technologies and 
legal or ethical rights or public expectations to collect or share sensitive information. The 
boundary or context of privacy differs among individuals, organisations and cultures. 
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The human rights legislation dating back to the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: Article 12; “No one should be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks on his honour or reputation. Everyone 
has the right to the protection of the law against such interferences or attacks” (Harris et al., 
2009). 
Freedom of expression and flows of personal information in social media and digital media is 
creating an open life style for users. However, these trends sometimes cause consequences, 
which then trigger government action, can feed a news column for a journalist or concern by 
employer or relative for undesirable impacts of the expression. An 18 years old girl was fired 
from her office job because she posted on Facebook that “I am totally bored” (Rosen, 2010). 
There have been many instances such as this one where, users have been supressed because of 
their uploaded private information, ideas and comments on social media and online forums. Due 
to the massive amount of information we share or store online, the notion of privacy is fading 
away in the online world. The common perception is that everybody should think twice before 
putting sensitive information online.  
One of the oldest pieces of legislation to protect personal information against US Federal 
Agencies to control over collection, storage and maintenance was the Privacy Act of 1974. The 
Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure of personal information. The Privacy Act applies only to 
records that are stored in a database or system of records, from which information is retrieved 
by the name of an individual or document identifier (Privacy Act, 1974). The right to access 
records about oneself and amendment of the records, set out in the Privacy Act is also formally 
expressed in the Freedom of Information Act. This provides a guideline to individuals on how 
to access the information stored by government agencies.     
One of the major concerns about privacy within a ubiquitous system is the lack of one single 
privacy law across the borders. The Internet and online communications know no limit and go 
beyond the geopolitical borders. However, legislation by a group of countries is often ignored 
by other countries. For example, many countries have not signed or legalised copyright or other 
internationally recognised regulations such as privacy. 
Not all the privacy violations are for bad intentions. Online tracking might deliver 
advertisements or services that we might actually appreciate. Advertisers, marketing companies 
and sales representatives use the contact information to promote their services and advertise 
their products. You might benefit from a cold caller asking you to switch your energy provider 
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to a cheaper alternative. However, the number of unwanted mails, electronic mails, text 
messages and other correspondence we receive, and the amount of information held about us by 
various public and private organisations, require fair and lawful storage, processing and use of 
sensitive information. While technology introduces many tools, techniques and innovations that 
maintain privacy and anonymity, advertisers find new ways of collecting personal data. With 
the emergence of electronic and digital media, we voluntarily upload our personal information, 
hobbies, interests and every detail of daily life to the online world, which we have no way of 
controlling. This is what has been referred as “The Collapse of Internet Privacy” (Nikiforakis 
& Acar, 2014). Private information is a valuable asset for advertisers, and with the help of social 
media and features embedded in Web browsers, they build a detailed profile of user interests, 
shopping habits and browsing activities to explore and target those interests. In this game, the 
mainstream browsers and online services play along with the advertisers and contribute with 
online tracking features such as third party cookies, browsing history and other online activities. 
Cookies are small pieces of text, which a web site stores and uses on future visits (IETF, 2011). 
This allows websites to send the information and previous activity of the user back to the server. 
Third party tracking cookies are common ways of recording the long browsing history of users. 
Even though the tracking cookies cannot carry virus, malware or malicious codes, they pose 
potential privacy concerns, set out by the European Parliament (EU Directive, 2013) and US 
lawmakers (Rockefeller, 2011). However, security vulnerabilities of a Web browser or machine 
may allow access to credentials or login information. Therefore, users are advised to delete 
browser history and cookies after visiting websites to sustain sensitive information and prevent 
exploitation by advertisement companies or third party tracking cookies. Furthermore, 
mainstream web browsers such as Internet Explorer and Netscape are advised to block third 
party cookies by default (Jackson, 1996). 
It should come as no surprise that by the use of ubiquitous systems and daily interaction with 
digital devices, we put a substantial amount of personal information into the public domain. 
Nobody is anonymous in the Internet world. In July 1993, the New Yorker published a cartoon 
by Peter Steiner which portrayed a Labrador retriever sitting on a chair in front of a computer, 
touching the keyboard with caption saying, “On the Internet nobody knows you’re a dog” 
(Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 Internet Privacy (Nikiforakis & Acar, 2014) 
Nowadays not only do they know you are a dog, but they know the colour of your fur, how often 
you visit the vet and what is your favourite dish which you get weekly from your local 
supermarket (Nikiforakis & Acar, 2014). Every online user builds up a profile with a long list 
of state, location, browsing history, shopping habits and other information. Every mobile phone 
has microphone and camera which can take video clips and store them. We have seen spy 
microphone and tiny recording devices on James Bond films, but there are many tinier invisible 
devices around us with the capability of capturing everything about us, storing in a digital media 
or even emailing to a remote user. This stretches the carefully protected idea of privacy to 
breaking point and is referred to as the death of privacy (Joseph, 2014). 
Technology always moves faster than rules and regulations, leaving the right of privacy to the 
constitutions, especially matters involving the most intimate personal information, choices and 
beliefs, which are important to one’s dignity and morals. Most of the solutions for the ubiquitous 
systems choose a trade-off between convenience versus anonymity, performance versus privacy, 
personal liberty versus social concepts and the list goes on. Many people would disregard the 
privacy concerns in a life-threatening situation, such as rescue and recovery operation in a 
disaster area. To speed up the process of containing the spread of an infectious disease, 
disclosing location information or identity of suspected infected persons by operators will be 
less of an issue. That is why some researchers proposed privacy design with emergency 
management in mind (Cakoukian, 2011). This includes inspection tools and access control, 
which enhances sensitivity of personal information. 
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Considering all of the facts mentioned in this section, one could realise the challenges a 
ubiquitous system faces in terms of dealing with privacy planning, data collection and 
information storage and access.  
There exist several P2P scalable ubiquitous applications and approaches to address the 
challenges facing scalable ubiquitous networks, however the privacy concerns of those systems 
has always been overlooked except within Freenet. Privacy arises in a wide range of contexts. 
One such context is privacy of users within a smart environment such as distributed or P2P 
systems, where enormous amounts of personal data is transmitted. Anonymity is the property 
that provides privacy to users within a P2P system. Because of the topology, dynamicity and 
design of P2P overlays, privacy has not generally been considered as a major concern. However, 
anonymity is the property which maintains privacy, which in turn should be addressed at the 
routing level since exchange or transfer of information is involved. Aggregation is a natural 
abstraction for scalable distributed systems to allow a node to view the detailed information 
about neighbouring nodes (Renesse, Birman, & Vogels, 2003). Designing scalable system has 
its motivation such as increasing revenue by expanding network resource to be able to attract 
more demands. These objectives may be worth allocating extra cost, usability and operability 
design strategy. 
However, one attribute that has been overlooked in designing scalable system is the privacy, 
particularly, user privacy. A design and plan for usability within scalable system required 
understanding of user patterns, habits and other personal information. The tools and techniques 
used by advertising companies to collect information about browsing activities and online habits 
is the typical example that a scalability designer may use to collect information. Although Online 
Behavioural Advertising (OBA) has set a guideline to restrain advertisers and web site operators 
from releasing names and personal information, collecting information, even with the intention 
of offering services, is considered to be violation of privacy.  
P2P file-sharing networks reflects the Ubiquitous Computing paradigm with autonomous 
devices within distributed decentralised systems. The share of data within a community-based 
environment has been considered to resemble community trust (Llewellyn-Jones et al., 2009).    
A considerable amount of attention has been given to improve performance of ubiquitous 
systems; however, privacy concerns have been neglected. As mentioned earlier, ubiquitous 
development and interconnectivity of various smart devices and wireless sensors have generated 
a data explosion, with a substantial amount of personal information stored in distributed digital 
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media. The personal information is always exposed to threats and vulnerabilities. Therefore, 
while governments push for online censorship and advertisers find new ways to push for open 
data access, ubiquitous system designers need to maintain user privacy. Recently, people and 
developers start to realise the privacy impact and consequences of ethical and legal implications 
(Brown et al., 2010). 
2.1.1.4. Trust 
The definition of trust varies from one subject area to another. In information security, the term 
trust is referred to as the level of risk a system can tolerate from a user (Bamberger, 2010).  
When dealing with users, systems make decisions based on metrics of the trust. To grant access 
to a trusted user with valid credentials, a system uses binary type to quantify the trust. The value 
of an identity depends on the trustworthiness of the owner of the identity. If the system knows 
the identity – the owner of the identity is trustworthy – then little will be gained by authenticating 
that identity. Thus, simply proving the identity of a device would be of limited value, since it 
provides little assurance that the device will behave in a trustworthy manner. 
A trust metric is a measurement of the degree to which one person is trusted by another 
(McKnight, 1996). This can be implemented so as to work with information technology. The 
feedback ratings of eBay members were an early implementation quantifying trust. This 
improves the effectiveness of the feedback and can influence future eBay members when dealing 
with the same person, with positive or negative feedback. This approach can be applied to virtual 
and social networks to form friendships and expand connections. Having a positive feedback 
for an eBay seller provides some form of confidence and assurance of the accuracy of item 
description, quality of the service and speed of the delivery (Resnick, 2002). New attributes and 
features have been added to better rate the members on how trustworthy they are and how 
effective and efficient is the service they provide. Positive feedback and reputation determine 
trustworthiness in online business, which directly contributes to an increase in transactions and 
trade (Walia, 2013). 
Trust has been dealt with as a key element for security options within ubiquitous systems and 
even economics (Gerald, 2011. McGeer, 2008). Trustworthiness is a moral value that a person 
can compromise (Hieronymi, 2008). A trustworthy person is who you can trust with your assets, 
personal belongings or personal data. That trust can be measured by assigning a responsibility 
and set the expectation. The expectation determines the level of trust and expected risk from it. 
When considering trust, we may take in to account reliability, loyalty and even dependability of 
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the person. If you trust a friend, does that mean you have to trust the friend of your friend? 
Transitive trust is where you trust a third person by relying on an intermediary trusted 
relationship you already have with your friend (Mu et al., 2010). However, not trusting people 
does not mean that you mistrust them. It would be misleading to assume that negative prediction 
of trust would necessarily increase influence of distrust and vice versa (Xiao Juan Ou et al., 
2009).  
Social media has played an important role in capitalising on transitive trust. Taking advantage 
of the concept, it has created a community of users and network of acquaintances with various 
interests. There are a number of challenges that have been introduced by researchers in relation 
to trust (Zhang & Goel, 2004). 
Humans normally wish to take control of their assets. Since the term ‘ownership’ will not exist 
within ubiquitous environments, this argument will be invalid (Hawley, 2008). The security of 
hardware devices is nevertheless a major concern when it comes to traditional distributed 
networks. If I see available and accessible computers anywhere and everywhere, there is no need 
to carry my own around and claim possession since I can find such an asset everywhere. This 
will be no longer the case within Ubiquitous Computing environment as hardware will be either 
disappearing or valueless. Instead, the main concern will be authentication within the new 
environment.  
Providing an implementation of a trustworthy system based on trust that needs minimal human 
intervention is a strategic element for ubiquitous computing system security. Trust is the 
industry’s answer to growing security problems (ICAEW, 2011). The application of trust to the 
security policies of systems has always been an ambitious approach for security experts. Leaving 
security of sensitive information and valuable assets to trust Researchers have used trust to 
improve both performance and security within pervasive networks (Zhang & Goel, 2004). 
The theoretical and conventional access method ‘all or nothing’ is not sufficient to fulfil the 
needs of new users. The possible scenarios above question the functionality and operability of 
the network and emphasise the need for a more flexible and feasible approach. To answer those 
needs, more generous and open access should be provided to be able to satisfy the accessibility 
of the network. The access method should include not only trusted users within the network but 
to the users who are trusted within a corporate network with similar policy. The above solution 
entirely excludes any user without established credentials and classes them as untrusted. 
Because the base of the security within the network is trust between the networks and pre-defines 
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users with credentials, a direct approach should be taken to expand and stretch the existing 
security policy to fit new solution areas. This type of access control uses limited definition of 
trust and it is worth exploring to include other properties.  In this way the proposed solution 
could work effectively to overcome the circumstances and minimise the cost and effort to design 
and implement new policies.     
Experimental evidence shows that trust-based reputation can model virtual communities 
(Jakubowski, 2010). Access within a Local Area Network (LAN) is restricted to clusters of 
agents with small sets and high mutual trust. This phenomenon should emerge naturally with a 
trend to spread the trust based on acquaintances existing within the network with help from the 
models exhibited within Small World network. That means the system should maintain some 
level of trust in friends of users who have already got access privilege to the network. 
Some literatures exist that try to motivate this approach by quantifying the trust and offering 
initial practical relaxations to models that preserve some of the theoretical flavour using 
mathematical computation (Resnick, 2002; Boukerche, 2008; and Sabater, 2002). Trying to 
define a matrix for trust, Nowostawski and Foukia (2007) determine that referral to local 
interactions can be extended to promote further co-operation and spread trusted participation. 
They claim that a large number of autonomous agents can be clustered to a local community of 
users to be able to satisfy desirable global uniformity. In other words, the approach can act as 
an abstract of trusted relationships and locally interacting components can be distributed in the 
context of information spreading and reputation referral. This then defines a minimal and 
maximal matrix collaborative relationship; this is a central concept in communication 
infrastructure and in security in general (Jinshan & Issarny, 2007). The trust evaluation can 
contribute to establish the trustworthiness of an agent. A maximal trust matrix is a trust matrix 
where every agent has trust equal to one in every agent.  The trust between any two agents that 
have no common max-trust can be set to zero. 
On auction sites such as eBay, members have to build a record of accomplishment of reputation 
and have their trustworthiness assured. The site supports a ranking system through feedback and 
service rating in which buyers and sellers evaluate each other. Members evaluate and score 
transactions based on item description, quality, delivery time, communication time, and overall 
satisfaction. This shows that ranking a member by another user forms a maximum or minimum 
trust system. That is not only the application of trust but also quantifying trust, derived from 
qualitative interactions (Jakubowski, 2010). We should distinguish trustworthiness from 
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reliability. If an eBay member, describes an item incorrectly, it breaches the trustworthiness and 
is not trustable. However, if the item delivery time took longer than anticipated, then the service 
or the member is unreliable. The factors leading to late delivery may include member’s busy 
schedule or order processing, courier service or unforeseen circumstances, which do not 
necessarily fit in the trust category. 
Quantifying the trust within the ubiquitous network would provide an answer to the 
authentication dilemma within the ubiquitous environment (Aberer, 2005). In other words, with 
a wide range of users within a ubiquitous environment, classifying access level and granting 
access based on level of the trust would be the answer to providing access to all as well as 
maintaining security of the system. The current process of access is all-or-nothing. It forms max-
trust cliques, and the trust between any system and agent is a maximal trust. This is useful as a 
general guideline, but in practice and in different circumstances it does not emerge as a fully 
effective solution. With this classification, every relationship should be divided into two 
positions. Quantifying trust in an online auction site and merchant relationship, the trust 
quantification application may apply to the various scenarios such as trust between humans and 
a certification authority, in the iterative prisoner's dilemma game, in the inter-relations among 
software modules in a system, in the stock market, and in other trust oriented applications 
(Xiaowen Chu et al., 2010). 
In an attempt to scrap the binary trust relationship and provide wider access, ubiquitous networks 
should explore trust and include referral, transparency and tolerance (Sabater, 2003). The design 
can include different access rights, a system with tolerance, to accommodate every user rather 
than authenticate only a certain cluster of users.   
Network security is so important and valuable that it cannot be measured and applied by 
probabilities or statistical methods (Patel et al., 2005).  On the other hand, lack of trust is a 
reason that makes ubiquitous environments vulnerable (Kegal et al., 2001). Trust is a key issue 
to construct security in ubiquitous environments, which emerges in Small World networks with 
their occurrence in human-centred networks. 
 
 
2.2. Small World Networks 
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The term Small World refers to the observation that we can find a short chain of acquaintances, 
to connect two people in the world (Marvel et al., 2013). Small World networks are well 
represented by technological advances and the emergence of the Internet. Most social exchanges 
among humans traditionally took place via face-to-face interaction. Social networks have now 
shifted the phenomenon, where friendship and relationships have crossed borders, with a 
relatively short chain of acquaintances.  
2.2.1. History 
The concept of a Small World network was introduced by social scientists trying to measure 
path length in relationships. Explicit studies of the structure of social networks go back a century 
and are considered the earliest examples (Albert, 2005 and Watts & Strogatz, 1998).  Although 
the argument of Small World network is observation of the direct short distances between 
contacts, some implications have concluded the wave-like behaviour of such characteristics to 
model certain behaviours within structured populations, namely spread of diseases (Braun et al., 
2006).   
The small-world model has been used to model many applications such as physical contacts 
networks in the modern world, where distribution of contacts shows Small World network 
characteristics. The possibility of the rapid spread of epidemic diseases around the globe in 
distant locations simultaneously has been studied (Marvel et al., 2013).  The 2009 ‘Swine Flu’ 
pandemic was an outbreak, first two cases confirmed in Scotland after a flight from Mexico. 
The cases spread from school and workplace of those who travelled from Mexico to the UK. 
With the closure of schools and precautions, the cases reached to 1,000 within about a month 
(BBC News, 2009). The number exponentially increased to 3,000 within next month and 9,000 
the month after. In October the same year 27,000 new cases had been reported (Lawrance, 2009). 
Health care specialists have vaccinated the main origins of the virus and prevented further 
spread. One can make an empirical conclusion on how a computer virus can spread quickly 
across a highly connected network of devices. This is the typical structure and formal definition 
of Small World network.   
Scientists, psychologists, marketing specialists and social researchers (Kleinfeld, 1967) have 
examined the idea in detail (Liu et al., 2003 & Zhu et al., 2004). Small-world networks are the 
focus of interest because of their potential as models for interaction, economical, technological 
and real world networks of complex systems. There exists broad research that has considered 
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the properties of a variety of diverse real world networks, with the intention to model them based 
on their characteristics and behaviours (Kochen, 1989; Kleinberg, 2002; Zhu et al., 2004; Xia 
et al., 2007; & Kak, 2011). 
Although Milgram received most of the credit for his ambitious experiment and introduction of 
this phenomenon, his work was inspired by Paris University mathematicians Manfred Kochen 
and Ithiel de Sola Pool (Ithiel et al., 1979) trying to explore the mathematics of social networks. 
They wrote the manuscript ‘Contacts and Influences’ claiming that everybody in the world is 
connected to everybody else either directly or within a chain of intermediary persons. They have 
studied the properties of a variety of diverse real world networks and tried to model them based 
on characteristics and behaviour. The networking formed by the Internet is shaping new social 
relationships (Morozov, 2011). Friendship is not limited to classmate or neighbour or between 
those living in the same village. 
This discovery has excited not only scientists but has inspired artists, journalists and marketing 
specialists for many decades. Imagine you have 1,000 friends and each of your friends knows 
1,000 friends. You are just one hand shake away from knowing one million people. You can 
easily get access to their information and resources, their lives and socialise with them, with the 
privilege that you share with your own friends.  Social networks and digital communications 
have changed the way we live, communicate and participate in open society and the wider 
community. 
2.2.2. Applications 
In mathematics and sociology, Small World refers to a graph to show links of edges representing 
people to their neighbours (Kleinberg, 2002). Research into the Small World phenomenon tries 
to model this kind of network and studies their characteristics and properties. The application of 
security to these networks is complex. A simulation done by Vogt (2005) shows that in a Small 
World network the end-to-end authentication of communication within the network is much 
riskier than that performed peer to peer between neighbouring nodes. He has called it light-
weight and collaborative authentication scheme. In a distributed set of inline nodes A, B, C, D 
and E as shown in Figure 2.2, if node A wants to send a secure message to E, the chances that 
message will be altered after C is more likely because of lack of trust and distance from each 
other.    
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Figure 2.2 Linear Trusted Communication (Chen and Yeager, 2001) 
The trusted relationship and degree of trust is evaluated between nodes A and B with shared 
interests, mutual agreement, performance, reliability or other parameters (Chen and Yeager, 
2001). Two people enrolling on the same course may have close interests and share similar 
goals. But a trusted relationship will be established based on good practices and not common 
interests only. Digital-based system will benefit from trusted communication and building 
confidence (ICAEW, 2011). However, transitive trust will not be integrated in social 
interactions and system communications and may behave harmfully. The trust value is degraded 
between A and E on the above diagram as the peers lack confidence and reliability in each other. 
Vogt (2005) has demonstrated a direct exchange of messages for authentication is not only safe 
and efficient, but it is easy to manage as well. Therefore, he restricts the communication to nodes 
with direct and collaborated links. Not only does this approach provide more security to Small 
World networks, it is also resilient to random failures and known attacks (Albert et al., 2000). 
Researchers have studied the Small World network to apply security measures to networks 
(Vogt, 2005 & Albert et al., 2000) and to improve the interoperability and performance of a 
network (Zhang & Goel, 2004). Many researchers have tried to associate Small World networks 
and ubiquitous computing systems. Notably, Vogt (2005) has emphasised the role of hubs within 
Small World networks, a node with heavily connected links. Hubs often form the basis of the 
network infrastructure, responsible for the existence of Small World networks. In the electricity 
grid network, a power station acts as the main source to provide, distribute and supply power to 
every household. A main entity providing services for smaller members is the same as a father-
children relationship, which requires more authority and effectiveness. However, from a security 
point of view, such entities introduce operational challenges and vulnerabilities. This is 
exploited more in depth with the introduction of comprehensive properties and applications in 
‘graph theory’ (Ruohonen, 2013 and Hayes, 2000). A graph is a finite set of dots called vertices 
(nodes) connected by links called edges (in our context, communication links). In Milgram’s 
experiment of the six-degrees of separation, the number of edges connecting everyone in the 
world to each other, steps through six intermediary acquaintances. This was an attempt to form 
an acquaintanceship graph and determine the nodes and links associated within a social graph. 
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The World Wide Web is distributed worldwide geographically, but the diameter of the web is 
not the same as the globe. To estimate the diameter of World Wide Web, Barabási and his 
colleagues at Notre Dame University (Barabási-Albert, 2002) used robot software to carry out 
a search. The robot visited the Universal Resource Locators (URL), which form edges to point 
to web pages (vertices) to measure the connectivity of a graph. When you click on a link on a 
web page, the hyperlink takes some steps to direct you to the destination web site. If you 
randomly click on to two different links, then what is the distance between them two? Barabási 
and colleagues studied a small portion of the web and applied the result to rest of the graph to 
determine the distribution of nodes and links. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the connectivity graph, 
which has been captured by a router in the US.  
 
Figure 2.3 Diagram of World Wide Web, Captured by Barabási-Albert (Barabási-Albert, 2002) 
Although there are only a few nodes with high-degree distribution, they have direct effect on 
the existence of the World Wide Web. They form several different clusters of communities with 
highly connected nodes as demonstrated in Figure 2.3. Those nodes (hubs) provide shortcuts 
between different clusters of nodes. The diameter of the graph is important when you are trying 
to search on the World Wide Web. The experiment conducted by Barabási et al. was using blind, 
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random and exhaustive search. Using smart techniques and clever algorithms employed by 
modern search engines, they reduce the number of edges to the minimum possible, improving 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
Small World properties have been discovered in brain cells, the World Wide Web, citation 
websites and other collaboration networks such as social networks (Vogt, 2005). Those 
networks share two characteristics namely, direct collaboration and short-range communication 
(Hayes, 2000). Small World network properties have been implemented in many ubiquitous 
systems, namely within smart object collaboration environment (Siegemund, 2004). The 
properties have been utilised in wearable devices, sensor networks and other context-aware and 
self-organising computing systems.      
2.2.3. Scale-free Networks 
For many years, scientists who have been examining complex networks assumed them as being 
random (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003). The examination included the statistical properties of 
those networks such as degree distribution, clustering, diameter and average path length. Erdös 
and Rényi then suggested that such complex systems could be effectively modelled by 
connecting their nodes with randomly placed links (Erdös-Rényi, 1959). It models random 
graphs, which sets an edge between each pair of nodes with equal probability, independent of 
other edges. The simplicity of their approach helped many scientists to focus on complex 
networks and renew graph theory with mathematical theorem (Hayes, 2000).        
Scale-free networks were first investigated by Barabási-Albert (Hayrynen, 2005) after 
modelling the World Wide Web, scientific and social networks. Barabási and Albert have gone 
beyond the Small World network and opened a new research field by discovering the scale-free 
properties of real networks such as the Web, protein cells and social networks. They discovered 
that some nodes – called hubs – have many more link than others. They suggested that the 
highway network in America forms a random network as every road is connected to every other 
via a few links. The distribution of the cities has made them randomly connected to each other. 
However, if we study distribution of the airport network within Europe, we can realise that they 
form a power-law distribution with most of the small airports connected to large airports in 
capitals such as Heathrow, Paris, Amsterdam and Istanbul. These airports act as hubs in the 
Barabási model as they are connected to other small airports – nodes – with direct or short paths. 
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Therefore, when considering scale-free connectivity, it is important to consider the role of ‘hubs’ 
in a connectivity graph.  
From the creation of the first Web page up until the emergence of the World Wide Web with 
billions of web pages connected to each other via links, everybody thought of the network as 
being random. The theory behind it was that everybody connects the newly created web page to 
another one based on various reasons, expectations and interests with a tremendous number of 
choices.  
It was assumed the World Wide Web was a very random network with complete random 
topology up until 1998, when Barabási and his colleagues discovered the scale-free properties 
of it (Albert et al., 2000). They discovered a few nodes with a high number of links. Although 
they examined only a small corner of the web, they realised that other parts of the network 
should follow the same principle.     
In an exponential network, attaching new nodes to the network without a clear structure will 
follow a random distribution on a linear scale as shown in Figure 2.4. If the attachment of a 
newly joined node to the existing network does not follow a pattern or clear rule, the network 
will end up with no structure, topology or organisation. The further away the node is from the 
central hub the longer will be the communication time, response time and network latency 
therefore reducing the network efficiency.  
 
Figure 2.4 Random Network where a is the hub 
Scale-free networks are networks whose degree of distribution follows a power-law. This shows 
the relationship between two quantities with preserved scale variance. In the other words, the 
scale feature does not change when the quantity is altered. Figure 2.5 demonstrates the 
distribution of nodes in a scale-free network.  
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Figure 2.5 Power-law Degree Distribution of Nodes (Hayrynen, 2005) 
Considering Scale-free connectivity within the typical network infrastructure represents a 
particular degree of distribution, this can be useful when considering security within critical 
systems.  
For example, such scale-free connectivity will be resilient to random failures. However, 
considering the World Wide Web example, highly connected nodes such as search engines can 
have a significant impact on the operation of the system. The removal of such high degree nodes 
can cause failure of the network. There are hubs, where a few nodes have a high number of links 
to them.  
The World Wide Web follows a power-law distribution as a few web sites – such as Google and 
Yahoo – dominate the most linked web sites. The Figure 2.6 is an indication of a scale-free 
networks interconnected using the dotted links. 
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Figure 2.6 Scale-free Networks 
Figure 2.7 demonstrates a random network where nodes have no organisational pattern, balance 
or structure. 
 
Figure 2.7 A Random Network 
The node with black colour represent hubs within the random network. Figure 2.8 shows the 
effect of an accidental node failure with a random network. 
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Figure 2.8 Random networks - Accidental Node Failure (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003). 
Scale-free networks have different properties from random networks, which make them 
attractive to the research community and security experts. Some of these properties include the 
following;  
 Scale-free networks are more robust against random failures. If you remove a chosen node 
randomly from the network, the rest of the network will stay connected and functional.  So 
removing low value nodes from the network will not have a significant impact on the 
operation of the network as a whole as shown in Figure 2.9. 
 
Figure 2.9 Accidental Node Failure in a Scale-free network (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003) 
 Scale-free networks are more vulnerable to deliberate attacks. This means that the network 
will fall apart when nodes are removed deliberately according to their degree. A targeted 
attack on large and high value nodes (hubs) will have a disastrous impact on the network as 
shown in Figure 2.10. 
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Figure 2.10 Scale-free Networks - the Effect of Targeted Attacks (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003) 
These laws have implications for many real world networks such as protein cells, brain cells, 
World Wide Web and so on. Eradicating viruses from the Internet is difficult if infected. 
Marketing companies study the spread of information on a scale-free networks model to 
propagate information about a new product to a community of consumers. In Medicine, 
identifying and vaccination of individuals with many connections can contain an infectious 
disease such as Swine Flu. 
In a scale-free network, there are many low degree nodes, but the frequency of high degree 
nodes decreases relatively slowly as demonstrated in Figure 2.8. Because of the heterogeneity 
of scale-free networks, failure of small degree nodes will have less impact on the network 
operations as demonstrated in Figure 2.9.  Instead, loss of high degree nodes (hubs) will cause 
the breakdown of the network into isolated clusters of nodes (Albert & Barabási, 2000) making 
most of the network difficult to operate. Such a scenario is shown in Figure 2.10. 
2.2.4. Preferential Attachment 
Preferential attachment involves the creation of links based on some quantity such as popularity, 
wealth or fame. In a computing environment, preferential attachment is a process whereby some 
nodes get more connections and therefore attract a higher number of nodes to connect to them. 
In real world, this is referred to as accumulative advantages, often informally related to the idea 
that ‘the rich get richer’. Barabási and Albert first introduced the preferential attachment model 
to explain the power-law distribution of nodes in Small World networks (Albert et al., 2000).     
There are quite a few preferential attachment models trying to represent diverse networks with 
different characteristics and behaviours (Srinivasan, 2013). The links start from a few 
connections and form a tree-type topology with more links to the nodes with high degree like 
World Wide Web. Nodes with stronger ability and higher profile have more chance of attracting 
newly joined members. As new nodes enter the network, they are more likely to link to highly 
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linked nodes than nodes with just a few links, since the highly linked nodes are easier to reach 
and may serve their interest. 
The preferential attachment paradigm introduces an explanation to the degree distributions 
following a power-law behaviour (Albert et al., 2000 and Jacob & Orters, 2012). Networks with 
preferential attachment are robust under random attacks if the power-law exponent is 
sufficiently small, and have logarithmic diameters depending on the power-law exponent. These 
features, together with a reasonable degree of mathematical tractability, have all contributed to 
the popularity of these models (Jacob & Orters, 2012).  
Preferential attachment may lead to the degree distribution of the network losing balance and 
forming an unbalanced, random network. However, if it is used conditionally then it can be 
employed to accommodate newly arrived nodes and maintain the scale-free property of the 
system at the same time. One approach is to distribute newly arrived nodes based on linear 
degree correlation by using degree-proportional probabilistic (Fotouhi & Rabbat, 2013). This 
approach demonstrates how different classes of network can grow by calculating degree 
distribution of nodes and enforcing preferential attachment to incorporate with the degree 
proportional value of the node of interest as shown in Figure 2.11. 
 
Figure 2.11 Role of Preferential Attachment in Scale-Free Growth (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003) 
Some studies suggest that although the principle is applicable in linear evolutions of fixed degree 
nodes, in most instances the initial “wealth” is irrelevant (Redner & Krapivsky, 2008). However, 
this does not contradict the primary principles of the phenomena; instead, it simplifies the 
mechanism and ignores correlations such as wealth, popularity, quality or importance. With 
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these principles in mind, we can analyse the entire dynamics of the network to model the 
proposed network structure. The theory demands construction of a global trust network where 
any node can easily contribute directly and connect by a short path. Highly linked nodes are 
easier to reach and generate more connections than any others. That is why by studying the 
structure of the World Wide Web, Barabási discovered that, unlike the theory of random 
distribution of the nodes, most of the pages linked to a small number of the most visited sites 
like Google (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003). If a new page is created, the likelihood that particular 
website will be linked to Google is so much higher than to others.  
2.2.5. Power-law Distribution 
Scientific and communication networks are studied by observing the real geometry and topology 
of connections. The trend started with studying communication patterns on the Internet by 
Barabási and Albert (Albert et al., 2000). Work on human mobility has shown that the lengths 
of trips people take follow a power-law distribution over a wide range of scales from tens to 
thousands of kilometres (Kleinfeld, 1967 and Lawrance, 2009) and theoretical work by 
Kleinberg (Dyke, 2003) suggests that such a power-law distribution of connections implies the 
small-world effect. Moreover, new strains of pathogens such as Influenza are observed to travel 
around the globe rapidly, appearing in distant locations almost simultaneously (Hayes, 2000). 
One possible cause of such rapid spread is the presence of short chains of physical contacts 
linking individuals in distant parts of the world.  
Barabási and colleagues suggested that the scale-free networks follow a power-law distribution 
mechanism (Albert et al., 2000). Protein networks, citation networks, some social networks, the 
World Wide Web, and the cells in the humans brain all form Scale-free networks. 
Numerous studies and experiments have examined the resilience of those networks against 
different attacks and vulnerabilities (Hayes, 2000; Hayrynen, 2005; and Albert et al., 2000). 
They are resilient against accidental failures. The idea can bring new prospects to information 
security in ubiquitous environments. 
In a computer network, if an attack targets a network and destroys a small number of low degree 
nodes, this is not really a problem because most nodes have a low degree. Losing many low-
degree nodes will not affect the network as a whole. However, an attack that targets the high-
degree nodes can be disastrous. The entire network might collapse and revert to an earlier state 
(Albert, 2005). 
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2.2.6. Clustering Coefficient (CC) 
Watts and Strogatz have modelled the small-world networks as a class of random graphs (Watts 
& Strogatz, 1998). They noticed that graphs could be classified into two independent structural 
features; clustering coefficient and shortest path length. The Clustering Coefficient is the 
measure of connections within the nodes’ neighbourhood from available connections. The 
algorithm produced by Watts and Strogatz to measure Clustering Coefficient in a network with 
N nodes is demonstrated as below: 
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where Ci is the local coefficient for a given node i, Ni is the set of neighbouring nodes for node 
i, E is the set of edges, ejk is the edge connecting node j and its neighbour k, and ki is the degree 
of node i – the number of its neighbours.  
Watts and Strogatz (1998) have modelled the spread of a disease within a real world network.  
“Infectious diseases are predicted to spread much more easily and quickly in a Small World; 
the alarming and less obvious point is how few short cuts are needed to make the world small”.  
This statement can be related to the possibility of the spread of a malicious program within a 
distributed network and the resulting widespread effect can be catastrophic with critical systems, 
health and government and financial organisations heavily linked with computerised systems. 
On the other hand, considering such a model can be used to protect computer systems.   
The measure is the proportion of a connection a given node can have with number of potential 
neighbouring nodes. The clustering coefficient of a node in a network determines how close its 
neighbours are with it. In a graph it is the vertex in quantifies the clique to complete the graph.  
In Figure 2.12, the local clustering coefficient of node A is the number of triangles connected to 
A divided by number of triples around it; 
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where EA represents the number of edges, k is the number of A’s neighbours within the 
corresponding cluster and CA is the CC of A. Based on the calculation and structure shown in 
Figure 2.12, A has the maximum CC of 1. 
 
Figure 2.12 Local clustering coefficient of 1 
Figure 2.13 demonstrates the possible connections of A towards four nodes in an undirected 
graph and their local clustering coefficient among their neighbours.  
 
Figure 2.13 A Graph with Clustering Coefficient of 0 
It is the ‘local’ clustering coefficient on an undirected graph. Within the demonstrated diagram 
the clustering coefficient is 0 therefore, it has the minimum possible clustering coefficient.  
The clustering coefficient of each node is zero because there are no edges among their first 
neighbours. Both the maximum and average path length increase linearly with the number of 
E
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nodes and are long for pathways that have many nodes. This type of graph has been widely used 
as a model of an isolated signal pathway. Table 2.1 shows various complex networks, which 
exhibit scale-free properties. Interconnected networks with scale-free topology lead to having 
Small World characteristics (Mathias & Gopal, 2001).   
Table 2.1 Average Shortest Path for different Scale-free Networks 
Network Vertices Degree Path Cluster 
WWW 2 × 108 7.5 16.0 0.10 
Movie actors 150,000 28.0 11.0 0.18 
Phone calls 53 × 106 3.6 Not known n/a 
Synonyms 22,311 13.0 4.5 0.70 
 
Table 2.1 shows the degree distribution and number of vertices of some Small World networks, 
which exhibit a power-law property as well as values corresponding to the shortest path and 
clustering coefficient using the Watts and Strogatz model. In a Small World network, the 
average shortest path has always been the focus when determining the communication path 
between two nodes. A high degree node (hub) normally acts as a one of the intermediate nodes 
when planning routing between two chosen nodes. The concept of the shortest path and 
techniques that are used to determine it is explained later in Section 2.2.7. 
The nodes of a graph can be characterised by the number of edges that they have (the number 
of other nodes to which they are adjacent). This property is called the node degree. In directed 
networks, we distinguish the in-degree, which is the number of directed edges that point toward 
the node, and the out-degree, which is the number of directed edges that start at the node. 
Whereas node degrees characterise individual nodes, one can define a degree distribution to 
quantify the diversity of the whole network (Albert, 2005). 
As stated earlier, Barabási and colleagues made a breakthrough in the direction of understanding 
the generic features of network development (Barabási, Albert & Jeong, 1999). They discovered 
the degree of self-organising characteristic of large-scale complex networks such as the World 
Wide Web. However, Watts & Strogatz (1998) have already investigated modelling random 
networks. By studying the statistical aspects of random graphs using probabilistic methods, 
Erdős and Rényi (1959) discovered that many properties of random networks appear suddenly. 
In their network model, the network ends up with isolated clusters of nodes within the network. 
In the Watts and Strogatz (1998) model, the topological structure of the network is formed 
linearly by bounding the new arrivals to the nearest neighbours. The model considers an 
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indefinite number of arrivals connected to one of the existing high degree nodes generating a 
completely random network and increasing the average path value linearly. 
2.2.7. The Average Shortest Path 
There are many algorithms that are used to identify scale-free connectivity and calculate 
properties of such systems, in particular the Average Shortest Path (Lamb, 2009). In ubiquitous, 
distributed and autonomous systems with so many hubs, the choice of connecting through 
intermediate entity is not obvious. Small World graphs are characterised by any two nodes only 
a few hops away from each other, with intermediary connections. Given the connectivity of the 
nodes and hubs in a scale-free network, overwhelming routing requests could potentially lead 
to system bottleneck due to potential exploitation of preferential attachment. On the other hand, 
choosing random routes may also lead to exhaustive hopping and cause unnecessary timing 
delays. When planning a route between two nodes, the average shortest path will use the most 
available route with efficiency and effectiveness in mind.  Some suggest that, calculating the 
average short path between two pairs to determine the shortest available route may very well be 
computationally expensive (Lamb, 2009). However, with clustering and local arrangement of 
nodes and leaving some routing authority to hubs, this can be characterised as efficient routing 
methods in many ways (Schank & Wagner, 2004 and Tsang & Smith, 2008). The algorithms 
provided in Small World network models can simplify the complex and expensive calculations 
as nodes are only a few hops away from each other. High degree nodes with many connections 
can act as intermediary entities to not only drive the cost down, but to improve efficiency and 
security through direct or average short path communication using the trust element within a 
clustered network. Cohen and colleagues (Cohen, et al., 2003) suggest ‘Acquaintance 
Nomination’, a targeted immunisation strategy aimed at identification and immunisation of such 
high degree nodes will improve security within such systems. This is an interesting method, 
which singles out the hubs in the system. It requires no previous knowledge of node density. 
They claim that the proposed technique improves coverage within the network topology as well 
as safeguarding against failures and vulnerabilities. The well-connected hubs are nominated 
under the acquaintance nomination. They prove that only removal of a large fraction of the 
network will compromise the integrity of the system. This is useful since Small World networks 
and Ubiquitous Computing networks share the same degree distribution pattern. Since the 
Shortest path and direct communication have been tested and considered to be efficient and 
secure (Ying et al., 2010), one can justify such a mechanism in distributed and scale-free 
systems. 
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2.3. Network Overlay     
A network overlay is a solution to address scalability issues within distributed systems. It is a 
virtual network of nodes and logical links that are built on top of the existing network (Stoica, 
2004). It provides services that are not available within the existing network. A network overlay 
is considered to be the best option for autonomous systems (Wei et al., 2012). This is because 
within the network overlay, peers can contribute to the network or act independently. The 
routing and alternative communication path is facilitated by network overlays. Figure 2.14 
illustrates a typical overlay network. 
 
Figure 2.14 Typical Network Overlay 
Distributing some network resource is not possible such as the physical peripherals or print 
servers on network overlays. Enterprises created cloud services for converged and shared 
service infrastructures; however, the Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) could not cope with 
the traffic from virtualisation in the Cloud (Brandon Hoff, 2012). 
In addition to providing many answers to network scalability issues (Wei et al., 2012) network 
overlays are easy to deploy. They do not require software or protocol modification when new 
equipment is deployed. Network overlay also supports multicasting by sending IP datagram to 
a multicast address of every node joined the group (Stoica, 2004). Dynamic members such as 
nodes joining, leaving of failing will have a significant impact on topology, routing condition 
and network traffic. There are many approaches to address these issues such as state 
management using collective aggregate messages (n-dimensional graph system like CAN) or 
using neighbouring node aggregated messages (Gupta, 2003), Pastry (Rowstorn & Druschel, 
2001) and Chord (Stoica, I. Morris, 2003). 
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2.3.1. P2P Overlays 
P2P file-sharing networks reflect the Ubiquitous Computing paradigm with autonomous devices 
within distributed and decentralised systems. The popularity, success and ubiquitous use of P2P 
and file sharing systems and the need for efficient communication and improved management 
has created pressure to roll-out efficient and effective communication methods to address 
dynamic change of members and resources within ubiquitous P2P networks. The self-organising 
overlay networks that are distributed on IP networks are called peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. 
P2P systems are managed by protocols implemented at the application level. For example, 
primarily they will be implemented on top of the UDP or TCP communication protocols. 
Furthermore, P2P overlays provide support for scalability within dynamic and decentralised 
systems. The nodes within a P2P system act in a self-managing manner in contrast with the 
client-server model. Such overlay networks go beyond the services offered by conventional 
client-server systems (Lua et al., (2005). P2P systems are popular and pervasive, and largely 
used for file sharing and data communication.  
A P2P overlay provides support for scalability within a dynamic and decentralised system with 
self-managing nodes. This means they can take advantage of the available resources, content 
and traffic stability independent of central servers. Nodes have dual client and server roles, 
meaning they can both initiate and listen for incoming connections. They can also have 
computational power and can run processes – called queries – at the same time. 
There are many P2P networks with diverse properties that are classified based on different 
methods such as performance metrics, topology, protocol and structure (Jawad, 2013). Each 
class of system has its own advantages and disadvantages but we will focus on decentralised 
and heterogeneous P2P overlays that support scalability to some extent. 
 
 
2.3.1.1. Chord 
Chord is a lookup algorithm for Internet applications using scalable key location item (Stoica et 
al., 2003). Keys are distributed based on item locations. The lookup protocol provides support 
based on item location using the key. Given a key, it maps it to the desired node, which holds 
the data item. If it is a file sharing application such as bit torrent, it maps to the desired file. If it 
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is the Internet application such as Chord, it yields IP address of the node associated with the 
given key. Node address is assigned based on node location. Therefore, Chord forwards 
messages based on numerical differences with the destination address.  
Chord acts as a distributed hash function, distributes keys uniformly over different nodes 
providing natural degree distribution and load balancing. In Chord, routing is performed using 
iteration method at each hop and invoking Remote Procedure Call (RPC) at the next hop through 
the path. In a network with n member nodes and within a normal situation, each node maintains 
information about O(log n) other nodes and resolve all search and lookup operations using 
messages no more than of O(log N). This makes the algorithm simple and provides effective 
system correctness. Figure 2.15 shows how Chord uses neighbouring information and 
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) to deliver the packet from source (node 12) to destination (node 
4); 
 
Figure 2.15 Chord DHT Routing 
The coloured nodes 1, 4, 7, 9 12 18 and 23 in the circle represent finger tables. Finger tables 
maintain the information for the successor nodes and are referred to as hash tables. Because they 
are fully distributed in Chord, they are called Distributed Hash Tables. Keys represent the 
information held within the node. Searching for the key returns the value on the node. In the 
Internet communications, this value is considered the IP address. Each finger table keeps list of 
nodes and keys. To route from source to the destination, a key is mapped to the node, which 
return a resource such as file. Despite the favourable characteristics of Chord, it has some 
drawback such as lack of physical location consideration in look-up operations, leading to 
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bandwidth waste and system overhead. In addition to those advantages, Chord share some 
disadvantages with DHTs in terms of security such as traceability of users who share files online.  
2.3.1.2. Freenet 
Freenet (Clarke et al., 1999) is an unstructured P2P system that has been designed to exchange 
information between users. It allows publishing and retrieving contents in an anonymous way 
that the source and destination of the information is withheld from third parties even the system 
servers. Freenet is decentralised, that means there is no central-server structure. There are many 
advantages for centralised systems such as cost effective management and efficient 
communication. In a community where privacy and security is the most important requirement 
especially for users, the client-server model is not feasible. Servers and clients can be identified 
and penetrated or shut down by governments or agencies. The routing process is demonstrated 
in Figure 2.16. 
 
Figure 2.16 Search in Freenet – Node A Searches for Key 8, Located at E (Zhang & Goel, 2004) 
Like Chord, Freenet use DHTs for key distribution. Freenet does not assign responsibility for 
documents to specific nodes instead; lookups are carried out by searching for cached copies. 
Freenet aims to provide a flat Internet topology. In other words, you can communicate with an 
IP address next door, the same way you would communicate with another IP on the other side 
of the planet, without being discovered. It was first used by a large community of online users 
to distribute copyrighted materials on the internet without being discovered. Clarke et al. (1999) 
claim that this was not the purpose of the project. They believe the Internet is the biggest bastion 
of freedom of speech, since governments try to impose censorship on the flow of information in 
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the press, broadcasting and printed materials. However, the design and infrastructure of the 
network has been suffering serious flaws such as performance (Zhang & Goel 2004) and 
scalability and load balancing (Portman et al., 2001). The scalability issues were later resolved 
by changing the system architecture to support a distributed and scalable system. 
Communications by Freenet nodes are encrypted and routed through other nodes to make it 
extremely difficult to determine its originator as well as content (Clarke et al., 1999). Peers in 
the network participate in queries, data storage and retrieval of data items. The data distributed 
within the Freenet are identified by 160 bits keys. A request for key is passed along peers using 
flooding algorithm, which returns the corresponding data. These keys are location-independent. 
If a node received a request and knows the location of the file, it forwards it to the destination, 
which holds the information. If the node does not know the destination address, it forwards it to 
a node, which might hold the information or is likely to know the whereabouts of the resource.  
It is same as the routing mechanism, which was identified and implemented during Milgram’s 
Small World experiment. The information is cached locally which helps subsequent routings to 
be effective and efficient. To make the routing more efficient and smart, Freenet uses historical 
information and statistics from previous routing experiences to make a decision-based estimate 
of the time it might take to reach the destination. Caching based on specialisation of the nodes 
accumulated cache of the information that it then resulted Freenet not to cope with 
overwhelming requests and collapsed in July 2003. It was then that the designer addressed the 
load balancing issues by ensuring the uniform load distribution and constrain queries to maintain 
the defined quota. Considering this approach has addressed the problem and works effectively, 
but it may lead to interoperability issues by limiting incoming requests to retrieve resources. 
This means that individual nodes behaving other than anticipated may affect load balancing and 
increase request failure rate. Therefore, the challenge in terms of scalability and performance 
still persists within the Freenet structure. Like any other P2P system, nodes in Freenet can have 
a dual role and are not distinguishable by name. This component of the system improves the 
anonymity. However, an adversary can easily identify the traffic load and distinguish server 
nodes using a packet analyser. Having said that, Freenet remains one the important systems in 
providing user anonymity. 
2.3.1.3. Gnutella 
Gnutella is one of the earliest unstructured P2P systems, developed for file sharing (Portman et 
al., 2001). Gnutella has fully distributed architecture with no central servers. This means each 
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node can act as client and server. Gnutella is widely used over the Internet for file sharing with 
its ‘simple to implement protocol’ and ‘search’ and ‘forwards’ queries. Joining the Gnutella 
network starts with a ping message to one of the existing nodes and request to join. To join the 
network, a client should find IP address of an existing member. The system then grants access 
to the node with valid association to an existing group member. The system growth follows 
power-law connectivity to form an ad doc P2P topology. 
Gnutella takes the simplest routing approach – Flooding – to support search and broadcasting. 
Each search, called a ‘Query’, is performed by looking for the key where each key represents a 
data item. If successful, the data associated with the key is returned to the source via direct link. 
Due to lack of location information and central indexing table, the search process is unbiased 
without prior information. To route from first node to the last node, the message has to visit 
every node to arrive at the destination failing to utilise an efficient mechanism such as taking 
advantage of connectivity distribution (Adamic et al., 2001). The network has optimised the 
routing with cache replacement. Each query is forwarded node by node across the network until 
it reaches the destination. If a file is retrieved from a destination node, it leaves the replication 
on every node that it visits on the response route. Gnutella has some advantages such as 
simplicity but its operation heavily relies on users’ cooperation and consistency.  
2.3.1.4. GIA 
GIA has been developed in response to the design flaws and scalability issues of Gnutella and 
to improve heterogeneity of the network by adapting overlay topology and to replace flooding 
search algorithms (Chawathe et al., 2003). The capacity constraints are taken into account when 
adapting the topology and to assign Skype-type super node role to the nodes with high degrees 
in terms of capacity. These high degree nodes facilitate random walks described in GIA 
documentation. This is also used to achieve scalability. 
GIA uses random walk search rather than flooding by introducing a token-based flow control 
algorithm. However, the random search performs a blind search and forwards nodes based on 
probability that the higher degree node is likely to know the destination. The flow control 
ensures the heterogeneity of the system and assigns responsibility to individual nodes based on 
their capacity. The node capacity factors are considered processing powers, communication 
delay and bandwidth consumption. 
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As with Chord, GIA uses neighbouring information to maintain pointers to contents and 
provides efficient one-hop replication. GIA claims guaranteed successful results for a high 
number of queries using high capacity nodes. However, a constant search for high capacity 
nodes may exhaust system maintenance and end up flooding type search. In the absence of this 
issue, GIA heavily relies on client’s contribution to implement flow control and topology 
adaptation.     
GIA replaces the Chord used by Gnutella to accommodate dynamic membership change and to 
handle different churns.  In an unstructured file sharing P2P network such as Gnutella, clients 
leave, join and fail, leading to unsuccessful queries and high bandwidth cost.   
GIA provides dynamic topology adaptation to avoid overloading nodes with high degree and 
system bottlenecks. However, GIA uses random walks towards high capacity nodes as search 
algorithm. This is achieved by using reputation based topology adaptation. In other words, nodes 
with a high capacity and high capability are allowed to handle a high number of queries. 
However, GIA does not provide a definite success by using biased random walks. In other 
words, the search might well be the optimum result in random walk as the search is directed to 
high capacity nodes but, having high capacity does not correlate with high contribution or high 
success rate. 
GIA allocates proportional tokens to neighbours based on their processing capabilities. This 
further maintains an index of content of all neighbours within the group and results in one-hop 
replication. GIA claim that it performs better than other algorithms such as FLOOD and RWRT 
(Chawathe et al., 2003). Furthermore, GIA system uses ‘GIA Search App’ using the following 
attributes and metrics: 
• Capacity settings such as bandwidth, CPU and disk access that are configured by the user. 
• Satisfaction level that is based on capacity, degree, age of neighbours and capacity of node. 
• Query resilience where keep-alive messages are periodically sent and optimisations on 
adaptation to avoid query dropping. 
GIA has never been fully implemented as a real-world application using capacity settings for 
supermodel configuration. It has rather, assigned random numbers to nodes to be set as node 
capacity, which is then used for message forwarding within a simulated environment. 
2.3.1.5. NICE 
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Application Layer Multicast (ALM) has recently gained increasing popularity in the multicast 
community. In this type of multicast, group membership, multicast tree construction and data 
delivery are solely controlled by participating nodes with complete autonomy (Li et al., 2005). 
NICE is the early application layer multicast protocol which uses a tree topology to organise 
nodes into a hierarchy of users. This provides effective control of network resources, robustness 
of network overlay and ensures quality of data delivery path (Banerjee et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, NICE controls the cluster size by constant topology adaptation, cluster refinement 
and membership updates. 
NICE starts the topology by forming a cluster of users choosing a cluster leader for them. The 
leader is selected from where the node is located in the middle of the group. Depending on the 
dimension of the topology defined, the tree grows exponentially forming different clusters. The 
group of different clusters forms a super cluster. A rendezvous point is selected from within the 
cluster leaders. The cluster leader who is located closest to the middle of the super cluster is 
selected as the rendezvous point, which is responsible for bootstrapping, cluster refinement and 
other membership management tasks. It provides a central point of command and control for 
data path control, new member assignment to appropriate cluster and network maintenance. 
Cluster refinement and network maintenance is achieved using constant heartbeat messages to 
every member node to update and maintain members’ state.  
NICE provides efficient broadcasting using hierarchical layered arrangement of nodes but has 
no mechanism to avoid redundant queries and self-loop messages. Although NICE is the best 
solution in terms of multicasting and topology adaptation (Krause & Hubsch, 2010), there are 
serious limitations to the original design; 
 Security: NICE’s operations rely only on node state management, update and global 
advertisement of such parameters. All of these operations are performed at the rendezvous 
node, which creates a single point of failure. Furthermore, NICE has no mechanism to 
address the issue of misbehaving nodes. 
 Leader selection criteria: NICE only considers the node location as a metric for cluster 
leader selection and subsequently the rendezvous point. There are no other considerations 
such as processing power, node life time or system granularity for leader selection process. 
This can lead to system performance compromise if the leader fails to cope with queries that 
require significant processing power. Frequent interchange of cluster leaders can also 
impose a high maintenance cost and overhead. 
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 Rendezvous node vulnerability: The location mechanism is the only parameter for 
choosing the rendezvous point for the NICE topology. Every node and cluster leader relies 
on the rendezvous point for membership management, topology adaptation and naming 
scheme. While replacing the rendezvous point seems a straightforward process, it creates 
single point of failure, which can pose serious resilience and interoperability concerns. 
 
2.3.1.6. Scribe 
Scribe is a scalable, decentralised ALM protocol built on top of Pastry, a Key Based Routing 
(KBR) protocol. It allows routing to random keys. Scribe supports a large number of groups of 
any size with high rate of membership turnover. A message is routed recursively to a node, 
which is closest to the given key. Scribe uses Pastry to manage the group creation, group joining 
and to build multicast tree, which is used to disseminate the multicast messages multicast in the 
group. 
The group ID is the hash of the group’s textual name. The collision resistant hash function 
ensures a uniform distribution of group IDs. Pastry nodes are uniformly distributed, ensuring an 
even distribution of groups across Pastry nodes. 
Scribe provides reliability for the broadcasting process, which guarantees high success rate. The 
message delivery is ordered if there are no faults in the multicast tree. Pastry’s randomisation 
properties and Scribe’s selection of a multicast root ensures load balancing. 
2.4. Summary 
In this chapter, a thorough analysis of ubiquitous computing birth, growth, development and its 
advances such as IoT were discussed. The challenges and applications of ubiquitous systems 
were reviewed, considering alternatives or alteration of such elements to enhance security and 
interoperability of ubiquitous systems. Different aspects of system security were discussed 
including availability, integrity and confidentiality to safeguard computerised and digital system 
as well as maintaining usability, interoperability and maintainability of such systems.  
This chapter provides background information about the Small World network phenomenon, its 
properties, advances and applications. The history and a thorough analysis of applications, 
properties and advances of Small World network phenomenon along with its constraints and 
challenges are introduced. 
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The chapter brought together the problems arising from development of scalable ubiquitous 
systems.  Furthermore, we outlined the challenges and issues emerging from scalability, to draw 
focus to user-oriented system design and development. 
It then goes through different elements of the Small World networks discovered and modelled 
using different approaches. This allows the reader to have a clear understanding of Small World 
network and its close relationship to, and great similarities with real world networks. We also 
looked at methods for modelling complex systems, in particular Small World networks from the 
networking and connectivity point of view. 
The next chapter will start with an introduction of the SEP framework and describe our network-
aware topology construction design policy that maintains user privacy. We then introduce a 
novel efficient routing protocol and provide a detailed design for our system. 
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3. SEP System Design 
This chapter presents the design and architecture of SEP (Security, Efficiency & Privacy), a 
scalable P2P framework inspired by the Small World network phenomenon. It includes a novel 
privacy concerned topology construction, membership management, leader election and lookup 
algorithm. SEP constructs a network-aware topology grouping trusted users into clusters of 
peers. The SEP framework constructs network overlays and assigns routing and administration 
roles to high degree nodes with high capabilities in terms of computational power and memory. 
Such nodes are nominated as cluster heads and take administrative roles and responsibilities 
within the cluster. We refer to such nodes as ‘Service Centres’ where they act as ‘Rendezvous’ 
nodes to facilitate data communication, routing and forwarding. 
In SEP, the network-aware topology construction manages network overlay, which consists of 
existing trusted users that construct friendly groups where members can communicate within 
the cluster using P2P communication. The topology starts by forming a membership group 
within trusted nodes and nominating a group leader: Service Centre. Service Centres are 
responsible for housekeeping and administering local membership and data transmission. In 
order to observe maintenance overhead and link stress, the capacity of the group is set to a 
predefined figure. This contributes to efficiency and security and ensures that the scale-free 
property of the network is maintained. After the network membership capacity exceeds the 
defined figure, it splits the cluster into two and nominates a new Service Centre to take admin 
responsibilities within the new cluster. Splitting the existing group into two groups promotes 
common interests and friendship and maintains community trust as the network grows. Even 
though the system clusters may have various sets of users with different interests and 
relationships, the common interest is built up to maintain reliability between them. The common 
interest is then passed through different groups particularly after expansion. Therefore, 
transparent topology management will associate the trusted relationships to new friendships, 
which in turn contributes to security and privacy. The topology management protocol within 
SEP ensures system scalability with effective and efficient membership management. 
The Service Centre election process is crucial for establishing a trustworthy infrastructure, 
where the group leader is elected from within the nodes, which already have trusted friendships 
with each other. Each node has its say in electing the Service Centre promoting the trusted 
relationship. With such a trusted relationship and direct interaction, Service Centres have the 
group members’ best interests in mind. We consider leader rejection to improve the integrity of 
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the system. This mean a member can choose to reject the leader. However, this does not mean 
that a member can block the election by simply rejecting the nomination. Instead, the node can 
leave the group in the presence of a conflict. Confirmation messages maintain the integrity of 
the system to include every node in the election process. If a node does not vote for the 
nominated Service Centre, it will be reminded again and removed from the group if it hesitates 
in acknowledging. Service Centres form a hierarchical level of clusters on top of the existing 
groups of nodes with direct communication between each other. 
The membership management defines the rules and procedures to maintain node joins and how 
to deal with untrusted nodes that try to join the system. To maintain system security, two-stage 
verification is exercised to prevent unauthorised access. Every join request is controlled and 
evaluated by the Service Centre based on current associations and previous actions. The 
membership management provides autonomy to the system by leaving the membership 
decisions to the Service Centres. Full details and conditions are explained later on in this chapter. 
The current unstructured P2P systems such as GIA, NICE and Gnutella use global identity 
advertisement for search and broadcasting. We maintain user anonymity by keeping the 
advertisements local. We introduce a discrete lookup algorithm that is facilitated by the Service 
Centre to preserve user anonymity; even when the routing is carried out within different clusters 
of users. Furthermore, this topology management and the Scale-free properties of the cluster 
contribute to a secure and efficient routing and lookup process. This algorithm can be used on 
both multicast and unicast applications. 
3.1. Topology Construction Algorithm 
This section explains the proposed topology architecture in SEP based on clustering co-efficient 
and arrangement of the nodes within a clustered overlay. The topology construction is proposed 
considering the scalability issues in unstructured P2P systems. This maintains the overlay 
structure as a logical network whose dimension represents potential ‘one hop’ or ‘minimal hop’ 
lookup routing. In other words, the average shortest path is guaranteed in this model with a focus 
on maintaining a trusted membership and a forwarding function. This determines the resource 
distribution policy and data distribution topology. We explain the lookup algorithm later in this 
chapter.  
Although there are incentives for centralised approaches such as cost effective management and 
efficient communications just to name a few, large-scale distributed systems are a better fit with 
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ubiquitous and IoT applications. Gnutella (Adar et al., 2000) is a good example for a resource 
distributed and unstructured system used for file sharing, but it suffers from many design flaws 
and does not scale efficiently and effectively (Ripeanu, 2001). Moreover, its successful 
operation depends on users’ contribution, affecting availability and interoperability of the 
system.  
Many solutions such as GIA (Chawathe et al., 2003) and NICE (Banerjee. 2002) have been 
introduced to address the scalability issues, but security and privacy is overlooked within those 
systems. GIA type systems address scalability and propose super-node-based overlays with pre-
defined clusters. However, GIA uses a global naming scheme and key based routing to 
implement its search application. GIA uses a blind search by implementing a ‘random walk’ 
broadcast and search algorithm. Furthermore, it does not consider user privacy and system 
security by directing search queries to random nodes with a higher degree of capacity. This 
approach is very similar to the Skype search and routing mechanism explained by Baset & 
Schulzrinne (2006). 
Our topology construction algorithm considers clustering based on user reputation and 
association as well as nodes’ technical attributes such as processing power, computational 
capability and memory capacity. A node with the highest value attributes is selected as a 
potential Service Centre and forms a cluster with nodes with common interests associated with 
each other. When new members join the system with no limit in numbers, it introduces 
scalability issues. It is important to address these issues at an early stage of the system design. 
To mitigate the scalability issues, we use the degree-proportional probability method of system 
expansion explained by Fotouhi and Rabbat (2013). If a cluster exceeds its defined capacity, a 
new cluster is established with the same configuration. Service Centres, which act as cluster 
leaders, support direct and trusted communication between each other. We allow numerous 
clusters to be formed using this algorithm to scale the system to an Internet-scale level. This 
ensures topology scalability. 
A major Challenge in designing a scalable P2P network is maintaining the network balance 
(Henricsson & Abbas 2008). Service Centres take responsibility to ensure that the network 
topology stays symmetric. This means a uniform distribution of the nodes, which ensures load 
balancing within a network. Using the node degree proportional-probability method, new nodes 
are attached to the desired Service Centre until the overlay capacity is reached. We believe this 
method is the right candidate to support network expansion, by maintaining the relevant scale-
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free properties of the system. Node join requests are directed to the closest Service Centre where 
a node receives a signed invitation from an existing member. 
Furthermore, we exploit the heterogeneity of nodes to facilitate overlay formation and topology 
management. This includes how the network deals with topology initiation, join, leave and 
update of member nodes along with a detailed description of the naming scheme and 
housekeeping. The proposed topology management ensures network granularity and better state 
management. 
 
Figure 3.1 Illustration of Node Degree Distribution (Fotouhi and Rabbat, 2013) 
The topology construction uses Service Centres to enforce a degree distribution of nodes within 
the overlay and to maintain power-law connectivity. Joining a group of nodes with an associated 
hub to an existing overlay will form a network with a power-law distribution and maintain the 
balance of the network. This is achieved by using a merge function, which ensures efficiency of 
network maintenance. To avoid network overload and achieve load balancing, the split function 
is also used to ensure the effectiveness of the approach. This has already been evaluated by 
(Barabási, Albert & Jeong, 1999), where they have modelled the allocation of new resources 
once a network has already been established, allowing the network to continue to grow without 
altering the Small World characteristics. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the network growth based on 
Fotouhi and Rabbat (2013). In our work, network growth is time independent and the expansion 
represents a steady-state growth with the predicted dimension of the expanded network. 
The Fotouhi and Rabbat (2013) approach has been considered in merging two small groups into 
one overlay if the number of nodes falls below a certain limit. It is worth re-iterating that, 
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although SEP uses the pre-evaluated elements of Small World networks, it does not follow those 
characteristics step-by-step. In other words, some characteristics of the Small World have been 
discarded such as those techniques used in greedy routing algorithms (Jahanbakhsh et al., 2010) 
and some have been customised for use within the proposed framework such as the use of 
unbiased preferential attachment. 
In SEP, the model chosen for network formation and topology expansion – degree proportionate 
preferential attachment – is considered with special focus on node characteristics such as 
trustworthiness and processing power. Service Centres incorporate the degree correlation to 
construct and maintain a scale-free graph model topology. The formal expression of the 
algorithm is shown in (3.1), extracted from (Fotouhi and Rabbat, 2013). The network growth 
process starts off from an initial graph, whose number of links is denoted by L(0) where N is the 
number of nodes in the network, and 𝑁𝑘 is the number of nodes with degree k.  

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Each node that is connected to other node and to the Service Centre with degree k has the 
following conditional probability. 
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where k is the number of neighbouring nodes within of the Service Centre – the degree - and l 
is the proportion of links. This is dictated by a trade-off between delayed communication and 
maintenance-cost, as the periodic sign-in would use network bandwidth to communicate with 
peers as shown by Adamic et al. (Adamic et al., 2001). This would ensure effectiveness of the 
system and prevent unnecessary calls from adjacent Service Centres. Furthermore, if the number 
of nodes is about to exceed the capacity defined for a Service Centre, the split function is 
initiated by the system to divide the group into two and appoint a Service Centre for the new 
group. The split and merge functions are explained in detail in Sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5. 
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Figure 3.2 SEP Topology Construction 
Figure 3.2 shows how the high degree nodes with super node responsibilities form clusters of 
their own to construct and maintain a trusted community. The two-tier network topology is 
constructed with observation of nodes’ capabilities and peers’ reputations. 
3.1.1. Leader Election 
In this section, the process of choosing a node to serve as a Service Centre is presented. This 
can be generally considered as ‘leader election’. There are many leader election algorithms 
based on different objectives and criteria in the literature (Garg, 2004). For example, within 
‘Asynchronous Ring’, a node with highest ID is simply selected as a leader, without considering 
other attributes. However, the naming mechanism cannot be the base of leader selection within 
an unstructured and dynamic P2P system, unless the naming mechanism represents many 
attributes of the individual node or user. This may lead to inconsistencies and naming 
discrepancies. Therefore, the nodeID may reflect its capabilities such as memory, CPU power 
and topological location but not all information and attributes can realistically be contained 
within a nodeID. 
Skype chooses super nodes based on the Internet connection speed and maintains a list of super 
nodes to facilitate routing (Baset & Schulzrinne, 2006). However, there is no evidence whether 
they have been assigned different attributes after being selected as super nodes. GIA attempts 
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to choose a node with higher capacity and directs queries to nodes with higher capacity. The 
node capacity is measured using a random number, assigned to the node on arrival. However, 
the full scale of this protocol has not been implemented as a real world application due to the 
capacity calculation algorithm. There are also various negotiation protocols to select a leader 
for a group (Patterson & Bamieh, 2010) such as the following. 
1. Query-reply protocol that involves no negotiations. This means interested parties agree on 
the selection without making any decision. 
2. Request protocol where parties either agree or refuse the request with no negotiation, but the 
request service is guaranteed to be provided.  
3. Negotiate-commitment protocol in which the system negotiates with all entities, 
acknowledges the agreement, and shares the agreement between all parties. The criteria for 
leader selection also includes power-based (Shah & Flikkema, 1999), heuristics-based (Dionne 
& Dionne, 2008) and convergence-rate-based (Johnson et al., 2008). 
None of the above-mentioned leader selection algorithms is decision-based nor they are 
accomplished through an election process. Rather an assignment is given to a particular user to 
act as a leader or super node. The nominated node has no jurisdiction over the appointment. 
However, they can make a binary decision on selection or rejection of the nomination. Our focus 
is to nominate a node with higher capabilities but with the inclusion of reputation and 
trustworthiness. To the best of our knowledge, all of the leader selection mechanisms perform a 
binary decision-making process regarding leader or super node selection within unstructured 
P2P systems. Their system either approves or rejects the super node appointment. GIA is the 
only exception that uses node capacity to select super nodes. This has been implemented in 
Skype, which is a structured VoIP protocol. Most of the current literature introduces binary-type 
leader selection, considering only one attribute as criteria for being selected as a leader. 
However, SEP introduces a multi-dimensional approach in selecting super nodes and takes into 
account node capacity, location and node reputation based on trusted relationship in the selection 
process. The detailed description of selection criteria is explained in this section. 
A node is nominated from within the group of users by the system and elected by community 
members after a negotiation process. The negotiation process is vote based. This is achieved by 
confirmation from all or a majority of the members. To nominate a member as leader, different 
attributes are considered such as memory capacity, processing power and location. We define 
an algorithm that determines the node with highest processing power and geographically closest 
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to the member nodes for nomination as a Service Centre. After the nomination, a voting process 
acknowledges and appoints the node as leader. The pseudocode for the leader election as 
outlined in the table below. 
Table 3.1 Pseudo Code for Leader Election Process 
/* A is the sender, SC1 is the Service Centre, CL is the Cluster */ 
1.     if SC1 ∉  CL then 
2.  return ERROR; /*nominated leader must be within the group*/ 
3      if SC1 is unconfirmed then  
4.        start confirmation process; 
5.     else  
6.        set attributes(); 
7.        update leaders’ list(); 
8.        inform peers();  
9.     if A∈ SC1 &A has more computing and network resources than other nodes then  
10.      compute distance(); 
11.   get Repuation value(); 
12.   send VoteMessage(members); 
13.   if VoteMessage is unconfirmed then 
14.       send ReminderMessage();    /*node be reminded to confirm the nomination */ 
15.   if !VoteReminderResponse then   
16.        eraseMember();                  /* remove node from group */ 
17.   if VoteMessage is confirmed && Stats = 50% + 1  then  /* if majority of nodes confirm the nomination*/ 
18.      if reputation rate ≥ 3 then   
19.          LeaderConfirmed();     
20.         setAttributes();  
21.         sendLeaderAcknowledgment(); 
22.         setLeaderHeartBeatInterval(); 
 
 
We define the heartbeat process to sign in within the defined interval as a confirmation 
messages. If a Service Centre fails to acknowledge the ‘HeartBeat’ message, it is assumed to 
have failed and a role transfer operation should take place to nominate and assign a new Service 
Centre. 
It is possible for nodes to reject the Service Centre confirmation. We define the probability of 
rejection using three different situations. First, the majority of members approve the leadership 
and confirm it by sending an acknowledgment message. This state is denoted with state 1 where 
the majority is calculated as anything greater than or equal to 1
2
Nodes ofNumber 
 . The 
second situation is represented by state 2, where the majority of the nodes reject the leader 
selection. This occurs if the number of positive votes is less than or equal to 
1
2
Nodes ofNumber 
 . We also consider a third situation where we can discard all other 
probabilities and enforce the Service Centre on the member nodes. After node selection is 
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complete some functions and attributes are added to the Service Centre such as Overlay Key, 
capacity, neighbour list and timestamp. These attributes are used to consider a nodes’ suitability 
for leadership nomination or as a backup Service Centre in case the existing group leader leaves 
or fails.  
3.1.2. Node Join 
Like Gnutella, a node should know at least one member within the community to join. Therefore, 
existing friendship is necessary to complete the ‘NodeJoin’ function, which further contributes 
to the security and privacy of the system.  
Join: The join request is initiated by a node that intends to join the group accompanied by an 
invitation ID in the form of a digital signature of the node that invites it. To ensure that the new 
node is in fact a friend of an existing node, a challenge message is exchanged between two nodes 
to authenticate. The signed invitation is then presented to the Service Centre to be verified for 
security. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the sequence diagram from join request until the completion 
of the task. 
 
Figure 3.3 Sequence Diagram for the Node Join Process 
Where cMessage is the challenging message, C is the response of node B to cMessage, S(key, 
message) is the signed message with private key key, PKA is the public key of node A, PKB is 
the public key of node B, PKSC1 is the public key of SC1, SkA is the private key of node A, SkB is 
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the private key of node B, and PKE (key, message) is the public key encryption of the message. 
The table 3.2 demonstrates the pseudo code for the ‘node join’ process.  
Table 3.2 Pseudo Code for Node Join Process 
/* A is the node and G is the group */ 
1.     Size = getSize(G); 
2.     if Size > (10k – 1) then  
3.        sendMessage to Service Centre; 
4.        initiate Split(G);  
5.     if A ∉   G then 
7.        if !SignatureMatch then  
7.            remove(A); addToBlacklist(A); 
8.      if AddressMatch && SignatureMatch then 
9.         AddMember(A); Assign(A, Transportaddress, NodeID); 
10.    else  
11.         GetAddressofInvitedMember(); 
12.         GetPosition(); 
13.         GetCapability();  
14.   sendAcknowledgmentMessage(); /* to neighbours */ 
15.   SetHeartBeatMessageIntervals();     
16.   AddNodeCapability(A);  
17.   AddtoNamingTable(A); 
 
Several messages such as request, acknowledge and warning messages are exchanged between 
new member, inverter and the Service Centre to complete the node addition to the network. 
Node join is an important process as it may lead to a group split if the group capacity reaches 
the maximum. Figure 3.4 is a flow chart containing all of the entities and data transmission to 
accomplish the task. 
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Figure 3.4 Flow chart - Add Node Function 
Discovery: The discovery mechanism is acknowledgment of presence of a new node. It takes 
place before the node is added. As soon as a node joins a group, the Service Centre is alerted by 
either neighbouring nodes or response message by the new node.  
Join confirm: The Service Centre matches the signature and verifies the request before the node 
is added to the cluster and the node list is updated with a timestamp. This is achieved by the 
discovery mechanism and ‘AddNode’ function within the system. Considering the clustered 
topology of the network, this is administered by Service Centres.    
Join response: The Service Centre responds to the join request by matching the signature 
attached to the request with the signature of an existing member of the group. Two different 
scenarios are considered in the join response. 
 First, if the signature attached with the invitation is a match, then the node is added to the 
group and an acknowledgment message is sent to the node and the inviter of the node 
informing him of the decision.  
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 Secondly, if the signature is not matched or the request to send the invitationID times out, 
the join request is denied and details of the node are stored in a blacklist, with the time stamp 
stored for future decisions in case the node requests to join again. If the Service Centre is 
about to exceed its capacity upon the join operation, the split is initiated by the Service Centre 
to divide the group in two and send a message to the node informing it of this. After the split, 
the node is added to the group and assigned appropriate attributes in the same way as when 
a new node joins. The topological location the nodes determines which of groups they will 
be added to.   
3.1.3. Node Leave 
When a node leaves the network, it follows the departure protocol to maintain the network 
balance and the integrity of the network topology. The constant update of the node list ensures 
a minimal effect on lookup and multicast algorithms. If a node leaves the group, an 
acknowledgment message is sent to the Service Centre and its neighbouring nodes so they can 
update the list. After that, the Update function removes the node attributes and adds one to its 
stored maximum capacity value. If a node leaves the group without informing the Service 
Centre, it is classed as an ‘ungraceful leave’. Ungraceful leaves are detected during the heartbeat 
message exchange when there is no response from a node. 
3.1.4. Group Split 
Each Service Centre maintains number of nodes and state information by exchanging constant 
sign-in messages at defined time intervals within the local group. This mechanism maintains the 
Service Centre membership and refines the group by asking members to register using sign-in 
intervals. If a member of the group is idle, this will trigger a wake-up call to move to the ‘ready’ 
state. Also, this allows members of the group to dissociate from the members who left the group 
or have been evicted. 
The Group size and state are checked periodically by the Service Centre to observe the capacity 
and status and to perform appropriate actions to maintain balance. Every group within the SEP 
system maintains a number between the minimum defined value and maximum capacity. If we 
define the membership ratio as 10:1, this will ensure that a minimum of 10 nodes per Service 
Centre exists within the topology. If the number of group members exceeds the maximum 
capacity, then the split function is initiated to split the cluster into two halves. This ensures load 
balancing within the system and to maintain availability of services. If the number of member 
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nodes exceeds the defined capacity, a split function is initiated and a message sent to member 
nodes. The back-up Service Centre takes responsibility and forms a new cluster. Any node 
wanting to join the newly created cluster exchanges request messages and acknowledgments 
with the Service Centre. 
3.1.5. Group Merge 
A cluster size is evaluated by the Service Centre regularly to compare the maximum and 
minimum value defined. If the number of existing group members falls below the defined 
minimum value, the Service Centre initiates a merge function to join the existing group with 
another group share similar interests. Since neighbouring groups have closest common interests 
with the group, the merge function directs the members to the closest neighbours. It is normally 
the closest group in terms of topological location. In merging a small group which falls below 
the minimum number defined, the leader of the larger group will maintain the position as a 
Service Centre and the sole leader of the group. The merge function may introduce malicious or 
misbehaving nodes who may oppose joining a new group or try to reject the new leader. A node 
exhibiting such behaviour will be forced either to join the group by confirming the new leader 
or to move to another group. 
3.1.6. Naming Table 
The naming strategy and identity management is an essential element of the networked 
communications. Therefore, within a ubiquitous system, each smart device is an expression of 
the owner and may represent some or part of their attributes (Keerthi et al., 2013). The group of 
nodes which form the overlay has an indexing table similar to DHT, which stores nodes’ IDs, 
IP addresses, node states, neighbours’ information and associated attributes. The node state and 
all other information are stored in the naming table within the Service Centre. This is only true 
for the nodes within the same group. Each node is assigned an identifier by hashing the 
associated IP address. The choice of the identifier and the length of the identifier is based on the 
one implemented in Chord (Stoica et al., 2001). The key length is n bits therefore giving a choice 
of 2𝑛 identifiers to assign. Consistent hashing ensures the integrity of the identifiers and 
eliminates the possibility of duplication. 
The naming table within the Service Centre keeps details of nodes and node sets such as IP 
address, nodeID, node role, type, state as well as information about neighbouring Service 
Centres and topological network location. A prefix identifies that the node is assigned to a 
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specific Service Centre. Therefore, the whereabouts of the node is also kept within the naming 
table. Since the node information is maintained and advertised locally, it does not impact 
anonymity. This prefix supports the globally visible and reachable unique identification by 
associated Service Centres, which integrates with the IP addresses assigned to them. Also the 
state of the neighbouring overlay and nodeID is kept within the naming tables. There are 
different states considered in dealing with membership change. These are Active, Idle and 
Failed. 
Active nodes are those that can be communicated with by peers, therefore reachable in case of 
any request. Routing requests are forwarded to nodes with Active status. Failed nodes are those 
that fail to communicate with other peers. This can happen when they leave the network and the 
network list has not been refreshed to renew memberships within the naming tables. Idle nodes 
are nodes that have been inactive for a long period of time, but they are peers that can potentially 
still be reached. 
Each node connected to the network will join the naming table list and will be assigned a nodeID 
and associated attributes. The naming table will shift the list when a node leaves or a group is 
dismantled and will create new space for newly joined nodes and groups. A minimum of one 
link exists between adjacent overlays and an aggregate message is sent to the Service Centre to 
ensure consistency as well as integrity within the network. In case of failure a wakeup call 
message is sent to the neighbouring nodes or Service Centre. In response the state and 
information about the nodes is aggregated within a time interval using short messages, which 
will subsequently be passed to the neighbouring overlays. The Service Centre maintains these 
records and update the record periodically. Each node will have active, idle, or unavailable state 
stored within the naming tables. 
The nodeID has a numerical prefix identifier that relates to the group the identified node belongs 
to.  This will establish a topological location for the nodes, mapping them to the overlay set with 
links to neighbouring nodes along with other sets within the network. Upon arrival of a new 
node, the nodeID is assigned based on the locality of the set and the information is registered in 
the naming table of the Service Centre which the node is joining, along with relevant attributes. 
 
 
3.2. Network-Aware Message-Forwarding 
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The SEP topology design supports lookup, message-forwarding, multicasting and broadcasting 
of services in a discrete manner. The Service Centre acts as a cluster leader and administers the 
‘forwarding’ operation. The ‘Node Handler’ function is responsible for delivering a message 
from its source to its desired destination. If it is a search and broadcast operation within the local 
group, P2P communication is considered. If the communication with a node that is outside of 
the group, the Service Centre forwards the message to the corresponding Service Centre of the 
destination node, allowing it to be delivered to the destination node. The full identity of the 
source node is only known to its Service Centre and the destination node maintains anonymity 
within the process as far as possible. To ensure user security and privacy, the forwarding hops 
throughout are kept as short as possible. This is accomplished using network-aware Service 
Centres which are linked directly to each other. 
With a membership management policy in place, the next part of the design considers how the 
lookup and communication process is performed. In defining a lookup algorithm, many designs 
have been considered and many trade-offs have been taken into account. To define a lookup 
mechanism, we have user anonymity in mind over content security. 
In order to achieve privacy in a P2P system, every developer faces two choices: self-censorship 
by limiting the private communication to a minimum, or to contain the user communication and 
improve anonymity. SEP achieves the latter by proposing a novel lookup and broadcast 
algorithm and by clustering users into a community of trusted acquaintances. The node list is 
not globally advertised in contrast to GIA or NICE. Instead, SEP uses local information for P2P 
communication and intermediators to facilitate communication within a group of users. Figure 
3.5 shows the communication model with NICE and highlights how data is transmitted at the 
end host level. 
 
Figure 3.5 Data Transmission at the Host Level in NICE 
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Figure 3.6 on the other hand shows multicast data transmission within SEP administered by a 
Service Centre. It is an overlay consisting of two Service Centres which, administer routing and 
forwarding of messages between peers without significant change to the network infrastructure. 
 
Figure 3.6 Data Transmission in SEP 
The Service Centre SC1 coordinates the communication between local nodes A and B as SC2 is 
responsible for nodes D and C. Suppose overlay nodes A and B want to communicate with each 
other. A direct P2P communication is established between the two nodes as they are located 
within the same group. The dotted line shows the P2P channel between the two peers. As shown 
in Figure 3.6, the multicast message is forwarded using associated Service Centres from source 
to destination. 
For unicast applications, the data transmission process is similar to above however, after 
forwarding the message from the source to destination node, a P2P channel is created for direct 
communications as shown in Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7 Data transmission within different overlays 
In Fig 3.7, the dotted lines show the secure and direct P2P communication channel between the 
nodes which are located within different overlays. To communicate within the same overlay, 
nodes can participate in a P2P way with complete autonomy. However, if the whereabouts of a 
node is not known to its group members for any reason, a Service Centre initiates the 
communication and establishes a direct communication between the peers. An example of this 
can occur if a newly joined node does not know where the destination node is located due to 
delay or absence of an update of the naming table. Figure 3.8 demonstrates a simple 
communication process between two nodes – a and b - within the same overlay through Service 
Centre SC. 
 
Figure 3.8 Look up within the Same Overlay 
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To establish a direct link between two nodes, six steps are required as shown in Figure 3.8. A 
query –for instance searching for a file – is initiated by node a, and is handled by the Service 
Centre SC, which forwards the message to node b. 
In order to establish a connection between two nodes A and B that are located within different 
groups, the following protocol is followed. Node A encrypts the message and sends it to its 
corresponding Service Centre, which is SC1. SC1 decrypts the messageID using its private key 
to find out which Service Centre the destination node belongs to. It then encrypts the messageID 
with the public key of the destination Service Centre – SC2 in this example – and forwards the 
message to the destination Service Centre. SC2 receives the message and decrypts it using its 
private key to determine the destination node B. Subsequently, B decrypts the messageID using 
its private key to identify the sender – node A. The payload is then decrypted using the private 
key of node B. Figure 3.9 also illustrates how the process preserves user identity. 
 
Figure 3.9 Privacy-aware Communication over Different Overlays 
To be able to fully explain the routing algorithm and how a message is forwarded from one point 
to another, we define the data types and attributes of the main entities. 
Service Centre Key (SCKey). Each Service Centre is assigned with a key SCKey that is 160 
bits and generated by hashing the public key of the Service Centre using SHA-2. It dynamically 
maps to the live nodes within the overlay. The peers within the Service Centre are known to 
each other and to the service Centre however, their identities are not known to any other Service 
Centres outside of their group. 
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Source Node (srcID): each srcID represents an instance of a peer in the overlay network where 
the message is initiated. The nodeID is assigned to peers randomly using a 160 bits identifier 
space. The length of nodeID should be long enough to preserve and maintain the uniqueness of 
the nodeID. The construction of the nodeID can be generated by hashing the public key of the 
node using SHA-2. Each node has an identifier mapping it to the neighbours and the Service 
Centre. In defining the routing process, the nodeID is converted to a srcID, identifying the 
message source. The node identifier is associated with the Service Centre that it belongs to. This 
makes the local routing within the same cluster efficient and secure as well as determining the 
destination of a routed message by mapping the destination to its associated Service Centre. The 
srcID includes the public key of the peer that originates the message and sends it to the 
associated Service Centre to be forwarded to the destination node. Once it is advertised locally, 
it will not pose any privacy issues. 
Destination Node (destID) – the target node identifier, which has the same attributes as any 
other node. This information is attached to a message when the ‘node handler’ forwards the 
message to the intended destination.  
Message (messageID) – the identifier of the payload to be forwarded by a Service Centre.  
NeighbourSet – every node within SEP maintains a list of its neighbours. This facilitates 
coordination for the node handler function of the Service Centre by providing proximity 
information about member nodes. Friendly nodes share this information as soon as they join the 
network. 
Node Handler: every node is assigned a nodeID and a transport address upon joining the 
network. These are used for routing and message delivery by the node handler function. The 
node handler is responsible for obtaining information from the Naming Table and coordinating 
with different Service Centres to route a message from a source to its destination. Figure 3.10 
shows the relationships between the different classes of ‘node handler’ function. 
 
Figure 3.10 Class Diagram of Node Handler  
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The solution to the problem of privacy is achieved using the structure of the network group, 
membership management by the Service Centre and the lookup algorithm that maintains the 
anonymity of users. Within most unstructured P2P systems, the decisions about routing and 
packet replication are accomplished at either network routers (Skype) or at end hosts (NICE). 
SEP takes a different approach and assigns those roles and responsibilities to a trusted entity: 
The Service Centres. Since the Service Centre is an elected member of the group of friendly 
users, the nodeIDs of the source and destination are not passed to anyone beyond the associated 
group community. In order to route a packet from one user to another we define the following 
algorithm shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Pseudo Code for Packet Routing 
/* A is the node and G is the group */ 
1.     Node A wants to send a request for a resource – a file – which exists at node B. 
2.     Node A encrypts the message using the public key of B and forwards it to SC1. 
3.     SC1 decrypts the messageID and checks whether it is a local node or not based on the desID. 
4.     if it is a local node then 
5.        SC1 diverts the message to node B and informs node A of the locality of the destination node 
6.     else   
7.       SC1 identifies the associated SC2, hashes the messageID with the destination Service Centre public key. 
8.       SC1 forwards the messageID to SC2. 
9.       SC2 receives the message and payload, decrypts the messageID using SC1’s public key. 
10.     SC2 identifies the next destination based on the partly known desID 
11.     if the node is NOT within SC2’s group then  
12.         Bounce back the message with an error. 
13.         Sends an acknowledgment to its neighbours.  
14.         Updates the Naming Table in SC2.  
15.     else      
16.        Forwards the payload to node B.  
17.  Node B receives the message and check for signature of node A. 
18.  It then check the signature using the public key of A and its own private key. 
In our framework, we suggest that before a query is run, the source and the destination nodes 
and the routing path must be in a ‘clear’ and ‘ready’ state to avoid failed lookups and redundant 
traffic. This is regularly checked and update by the Service Centre using heartbeat and 
maintenance messages. Considering the high cost of a single query within a large-scale network, 
this will improve the network efficiency as well as reducing latency. The proposed lookup 
scheme maps keys to values through a ‘Naming Table’ within each Service Centre. If the state 
of the destination source is in an ‘active’ state, then the overlay grants the look-up and creates a 
path from the route to the destination either directly or through an available route within an 
adjacent overlay. The only way to determine that the destination node is not in an ‘active’ state 
is through its Service Centre. If the destination node is not in an active state or not available for 
any reason, there are two possibilities: the destination Service Centre wakes it up using a 
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heartbeat message and completes the forwarding process, or removes the destination node from 
its Naming Table and informs the Service Centre that the destination node is not reachable. If 
the destination node is a network resource, the destination Service Centre forwards the message 
to an alternative source. 
3.3. Scalability 
The group member generation policy defines our design for topological growth of the network. 
Group members form a cluster of friendly users and invite trusted acquaintances until the cluster 
reaches its maximum capacity. The overlay topology grows exponentially by creating another 
cluster adjacent to an existing one once reached the maximum capacity, choosing a Service 
Centre for the new cluster. The network overlay forms a logical link over the physical underlying 
network. In contrast to other overlay expansions where nodes are randomly attached to access 
hosts or routers, SEP administers the membership process to maintain security and privacy. This 
involves the addition of only trusted nodes to existing groups to maintain community trust. 
Furthermore, it maintains network balance by enforcing merge and split functions, which 
contribute to network efficiency. Figure 3.11 demonstrates that a new network overlay is created 
adjacent to the existing one, replicating existing network resources and services. 
 
Figure 3.11 Extension of Network Overlay to Accommodate New Members 
The network resources are allocated to an overlay as a virtual network to extend the network 
functionality. Common examples of virtual or physical nodes can be found in Cloud Services 
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and P2P networks. Although such devices are accessible by every node across the network via 
different interfaces, further interaction with such entities requires physical communication. 
Additional Service Centres are created as the number of users within the system grows.  This 
will support system scalability by allocating extra resources with minimum infrastructure or 
policy modification.   
Network maintenance and high bandwidth consumption has always been an issue within a 
scalable system. The SEP system bootstraps nodes with common interests to the same group. 
As such, it is highly likely that the communication is done locally within the friendly peers. SEP 
organises nodes into a few Service Centres with large group sizes. This ensures low maintenance 
cost in unicast and multicast applications because of small short links. This further improves 
network efficiency and effective membership management of the nodes.   
3.4. Privacy 
Freenet, which is first developed by Ian Clarke for anonymising search on the Internet (Clarke 
et al., 1999), was designed to provide a tool to promote free speech and discussions, allowing 
the expression of social political views by human rights dissidents and by those who fight for 
freedom of speech especially in oppressive communities. Clarke believed that the World Wide 
Web is a highly decentralised storage system in which search is coordinated by Domain Name 
System (DNS) that leaves traces of user routing information with service providers. Clarke 
stated that the regular Internet made it too easy to keep track of user information by providers, 
for instance, location (Kak, 2011).    
In SEP, the distribution of the keys follows the technique used in Freenet; randomly generated 
keys distributed over nodes. The path of trust within Freenet enables two non-direct nodes to 
communicate with each other. Within SEP, this path is generated and governed by the Service 
Centre, while maintaining the anonymity of users. The path also provides efficient routing 
information, service discovery, membership updates and naming consistency improving 
usability, integrity and availability of the system. As stated in Chapter 4, there is a fundamental 
problem with Freenet, which places a limitation on the scalability of the network and 
subsequently, routing efficiency. The depth search for a data object may go to the destination 
with no trusted path. It might be true because the initial overlay for Freenet was established as 
a small community of trusted users to exchange data objects. Nonetheless, in a scalable system, 
the network may expand greatly with the addition of new nodes. In Freenet there is no 
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mechanism for shifting and re-arranging data objects in case a member leaves or fails. Therefore, 
there is no guarantee that the lookup for a data object will lead to a successful retrieval or that 
searches will complete in a timely manner (Kak. 2011). 
Within SEP, the unstructured physical layer of the nodes and network links is organised as a 
well-balanced overlay where a diverse path is offered by a Service Centre if the routing process 
has exceeded the Time-to-Live (TTL) threshold. The TTL avoids infinite search and the hop-to-
live implemented by Clarke et al. (1999) rejects vising a node twice ensures anonymity within 
a look up process.  
3.5. Security & Resilience 
The proposed framework provides a cost-effective and network-aware topology solution to 
acheive scalability by accommodating a large number of nodes and replicating network 
resources respectively. Therefore, the topology of the existing network stays intact and self-
scaling. Maintaining the scale-free property of unstructured networks improves percolation of 
the network in network membership (Deng et al., 2011) and ensures availability. Such networks 
are resilient against random attacks (Barabasi et al, 2000). If an attacker knows nothing about 
the network, he must destroy every member to be able to disrupt the network operation (Gallos 
et al, 2005).  However, having reliable information about high degree nodes within the network 
makes them candidates for targeted attacks. 
SEP provides an efficient self-healing algorithm if the current Service Centre fails for any 
reason. Constant updates of the SEP topology ensure interoperability of the system and maintain 
integrity and availability. If a Service Centre fails or becomes unavailable, a backup leader 
replaces the current leader. This replacement process is considered to be completed within a 
minimum time and effort to reduce the impact on the network operation. The algorithm replaces 
the Service Centre as many times as possible, as long as the number of the existing group of 
users does not fall within the threshold that may trigger the merge function. 
Providing a diverted path or offering an alternative path for communications with broken 
physical links or when the initial network path is not available is similar to the one proposed in 
Resilient Network Overlay (Anderson et al., 2002). It provides a certain level of resilience and 
self-healing when facing a legitimate problem. It is convenient because autonomous and 
decentralised systems are independent of the central servers therefore, failure of only one will 
not affect the system operation significantly. 
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Using the clustering co-efficient to select a node to be entrusted by other users to facilitate data 
flow and communication has been considered as a way to reduce risk of membership change 
attacks (Seibert et al., 2008). El Defrawy et al. (2007) reported a number of exploitations in P2P 
systems such as Bit Torrent, where an attacker sabotages the neighbour selection mechanism. 
In this way, an attacker forces large number of peers to believe in existence of and exchange 
information with an arbitrary node on the Internet. We believe such attacks are omitted by direct 
selection of neighbours with the clustering co-efficient. In other words, the neighbouring nodes 
with common interests share information locally maintaining the security by implementing a 
transient trust within neighbours. Such an approach has been tested by Seibert et al. (2008). 
Seibert and colleagues (2008) proposed a clustering co-efficient algorithm to prevent such 
attacks. Preventing risks at such an early stage is crucial for a privacy observed and secure P2P 
system. Furthermore, implementing clustering co-efficient improves efficiency in P2P networks 
where membership changes lead to failed lookups and high bandwidth consumption (Banerjee 
et al., 2002). 
3.6. Trust 
The privacy and trust properties of SEP are based on the crucial hypothesis that group formation 
is founded on trust and that the community group members trust each other to some degree. The 
main limitation of this method is that it might be subverted by misbehaving nodes or nodes with 
malicious intent, for example acting as sleeping agents. 
Malicious nodes can hinder interoperability by obstructing vote-based decisions such as Service 
Centre election. Other possibilities can include sabotaging split or merge functions. Malicious 
nodes with a high degree and high computational power with potential of becoming a Service 
Centre can join the group, build up their reputation until they become Service Centres at a 
suitable opportunity, gather, and misuse users’ information. The possibility of such a case is not 
plausible but it depends on the level of trust a member has in forming a community trust. We 
assume that the formation of friendly relationships and confidence is based on a genuine trust 
and no misappropriation of such belief is going to occur within the group members. The only to 
mitigate a possible failure is to identify misbehaving nodes, removing it from the group and 
inform neighbouring nodes of this decision.  
Even in real life, we are – normally – careful in choosing a friend and consider some attributes 
such as trustworthiness and common interests. We might trust with a new friend with whom we 
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are travelling around the world with our luggage, but we certainly do not share details of our 
financial affairs. Therefore, the SEP scheme intends to maintain the integrity of communication 
by proposing appropriate encryption mechanisms applied to the messages interchanged between 
peers. Each associated Service Centre is aware of identities of the member nodes in its group, 
their whereabouts and probably their associations, but their communications with other nodes 
in different groups will remain totally private and confidential. 
3.7. Summary 
In this chapter, the Secure, Efficient and Privacy-aware (SEP) architecture is presented. A novel 
topology construction and management is presented to form a trust-based community of users 
to provide scalability and autonomy to large-scale P2P systems. A new and inclusive leader 
election method is presented to maintain privacy using community trust. Furthermore, we 
described the details of the search and lookup algorithm using Service Centres, which provides 
anonymity to peers and maintains efficient P2P communications.  
The next chapter presents the implementation strategy of SEP using a discrete P2P network 
simulator – OverSim – and provides an outline of our simulation results. It outlines design 
rationale in order to define the performance metrics to analyse and evaluate the proposed 
framework. 
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4. Implementation of SEP Framework 
In this chapter, we present the implementation of the SEP framework using the OverSim 
(Baumgart et al., 2007) network simulator. We use the experimental methodology to achieve 
our objectives and implement the simulation scenarios and test plans derived from the system 
design rationale. Furthermore, we include performance metrics to validate our research 
hypotheses with a plan to compare the produced results with other unstructured P2P systems in 
the next chapter. The testbed provides an opportunity for us to model, implement and measure 
a scalable P2P system and collect various statistics to allow us to validate our proposed 
framework. 
4.1. Implementation Methodology 
For the implementation of our proposed framework, we have focused on system scalability, 
security and user privacy issues within large-scale unstructured P2P systems. We analyse and 
evaluate the scalability and performance of the proposed scheme using OverSim, an open source 
and discrete network simulator built on top of OMNet++ network simulator. 
Our network-aware topology construction approach is aimed at providing scalability and 
autonomy for unstructured communication of file sharing or broadcasting P2P systems. We also 
demonstrate that this ensures the integrity and heterogeneity of the system by providing 
equitable access and maintaining state consistency. The equitable access provides constant 
maintenance and update the state on every node within the topology.  
Furthermore, we implement a novel anonymous search and broadcast algorithm using network-
aware group leaders within the unstructured P2P system. Again, the aim is to create an overlay 
topology to support file sharing, search and broadcast functionalities. In dealing with 
confidentiality, our focus is user privacy, which is achieved by providing anonymity. Wherever 
appropriate, some trade-offs have been considered to explain the system constraints and justify 
the proposed design. 
4.2. Network Simulator 
A network simulator is a software tool that is used to model network events and evaluate the 
behaviour of a computer network and displaying the output in textual or graphical format. The 
network simulator can add virtual networking capabilities via network overlay to derive network 
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experiments on different scenarios and can be used to validate proposed models and 
frameworks.  There has been much debate about whether network simulators are the right tools 
to validate results, especially for small scale configurations and calculations of execution time 
(Soren, 2007). However, in a scalable network with 1,000+ nodes, it would be almost impossible 
to create an environment for modelling future wireless ubiquitous networks and test availability, 
communication and response times using real machines and network components. The use of 
network simulators to validate published research has also been growing and several techniques 
have been developed to improve the credibility of the results (Soren, 2007). Table 4.1 illustrates 
some network simulators that have been used by researchers and academics to validate their 
results. 
Table 4.1 Survey of the Most Used Network Simulators – Number of Times appeared in a paper (Henderson, 2009) 
Simulators  NS2 OPNET QualNET/GloMoSim 
TRANSPORT LAYER & 
ABOVE 
123 (75%) 30 (18%) 11 (7%) 
NETWORK LAYER 186 (70%) 48 (18%) 31 (12%) 
MAC & PHYSICAL LAYERS 114 (43%) 95 (36%) 55 (21%) 
Each network simulator has particular capabilities, advantages and disadvantages. A simulation 
scenario may involve using more than one simulator. Sometimes one simulator is used to 
generate the results and another to analyse and compare the results. We chose OverSim because 
of the flexibility and ease of implementation, the modular layered structure and the many overlay 
protocols that are already included in the package. Furthermore, our choice is strengthened by 
the visualisation support, bootstrapping support and look up functions embedded within 
OverSim. 
4.3. OverSim 
OverSim is an open-source discrete-event simulator built on top of OMNET++ (Baumgart et 
al., 2007). OverSim is capable of simulating overlay networks with many P2P overlays models 
such as Chord, GIA and Pastry. OverSim is well documented and supported, structured as 
object-oriented C++ programing, and offers visualisation tools and debugging to validate P2P 
topology construction and routing algorithms. To enable the implementation of new protocols, 
OverSim comes with many common functions and features that are useful for implementing 
overlay protocols such as: 
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 Message handler: Uses RPC and is facilitated by the Base Overlay Class that implements 
structured P2P protocols, a generic lookup class and API Key Based Routing (KBR) 
protocols. Many routing models such as iterative, recursive, semi-recursive, full recursive 
and source-routing-recursive are implemented using the KBR protocols. 
 Flexibility: OverSim allows simulation and development of structured and unstructured 
overlay networks. 
 Visualisation support:  The interactive GUI and OMNET++ features provide a framework 
for visual inspection of code, a debugging environment, network topology visualisation and 
the ability to examine routing tables and messages. 
 Scalability: The existing examples implementations provided with OverSim enable 
researchers to compare results with existing approaches. OverSim is designed to simulate 
large-scale networks. A network of 100,000 nodes has successfully been simulated using 
OverSim (Baumgart et al., 2007). 
 Statistics: OverSim enables the collection of simulation results and statistics such as hop 
count, number of packets sent, received or dropped as well as successful delivery or failure 
of communications. The output results can be exported in CSV or Octave format to be 
analysed later on. Python Script support is included for post processing the results and 
generation of gnuplot output. 
 Applications: OverSim also includes several overlay applications such as Application Layer 
Multicast (ALM), Scribe, DHT and SimMud. 
 Churn: Within a P2P networked environment, nodes join the network, participate in 
network operation or services, use or share resources and then leave independently. Churn 
is defined as the independent leaving or joining of nodes during network operation 
(Stutzbach, 2006). Most of the file-sharing or content distribution P2P systems rely on user 
contribution, affecting network structure and service delivery directly. Furthermore, churn 
can have an effect on network resilience and interoperability especially within the systems 
whose interoperation and security heavily relies on high degree nodes. OverSim uses 
different churn generators for simulating static and dynamic network environments, to 
accommodate custom configurations and the use of different parameters to reflect different 
node behaviours. Churn generators in OverSim are an important feature for initialising a 
network and creating a network topology by bootstrapping the joining nodes until the 
initialisation phase is complete. Furthermore, they incorporate the collection of simulation 
statistics such as transition and measurement time. 
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In order to understand the different churn approaches, their definitions and effects on different 
P2P overlays, the following list describes the different churn implementations provided by 
OverSim. 
a. No churn: Represents a static P2P network where the number of nodes does not change. 
Nodes are added to the network in the initialisation period by the bootstrapping process until 
the defined number is reached. 
b. Life-time churn: Similar to ‘no churn’, but nodes are given a time-to-live. Each node’s 
lifetime is assigned randomly upon their arrival and a node departs once its lifetime is 
reached. The average lifetime is set using the ‘LifeTimeMean’ parameter measured in 
seconds. The ‘lifeTimeDistName’ parameter is used for defining the lifetimes of the nodes. 
c. Random Churn: Nodes join, leave or migrate randomly. Nodes are assigned a random 
number and nodes behave based on the number. To restrict the nodes’ behaviour to the 
defined parameters, nodes are given the probability of the three states. This enforces the 
network configuration based on three probabilities, namely creation probability, migration 
probability and removal probability. These probabilities are distributed randomly based on 
the network topology, scale and growth model.  If we assume the join probability is 70%, 
then the probability of the node leaving or migrating will be 30%. The sum of those 
probabilities should not exceed one.  
d. Pareto Churn: A node’s lifetime is assigned in the same way as for the ‘life-time churn’ 
case, but as a two-stage process. Pareto churn was originally proposed as a response to the 
heterogeneity of lifetime churn. Some nodes spend a substantial amount of time in the 
network, share content, and contribute to the network operation. In contrast, there are nodes 
that contribute a little and spend a minimum amount of time as part of the network. Pareto 
is a custom-made churn used to analyse user behaviour and assign churn based on user 
activities (Yao et al., 2006). 
4.4. SEP System Design Rationale 
The implementation scenarios we have chosen are focused on running the SEP framework to 
evaluate two distinct characteristics, namely: topology construction and network scalability, and 
the privacy-aware lookup process. Within these characteristics, we outline the design rationales 
in order to critically analyse the proposed scheme. To be able to evaluate the network 
infrastructure, scalability, security and resilience of the SEP, we constructed and evaluated a 
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hybrid overlay design. This hybrid overlay created an unstructured P2P systems organised into 
clusters to form and maintain scale-free property as explained in section 2.2.3. 
In order to evaluate the various features of the SEP scheme, we define a variety of performance 
metrics that we will measure the system against, and which we are able to determine from the 
simulation results. The next sections explain in detail these metrics and their relationship with 
the overall objectives of SEP. 
4.4.1. Stability 
Since the system is intended to handle a large numbers of nodes, it is important to analyse and 
understand the system stability characteristics. We evaluate and analyse topology stress to 
determine the network stability during membership change. Membership change includes nodes 
leaving, joining and failing randomly. We compare the network stability in various scenarios: 
with a low, medium and high numbers of nodes using various configurations and initialisation 
times. This helps us determine how the topology is able to handle the different operations under 
different numbers of nodes with different churn rates. From our simulation results we can 
compare the cluster stability when applying dynamic topology adaptation and clustering. To be 
able to evaluate the system stability we define two specific metrics, namely link stress and 
topology stress. 
Link stress represents the physical connection between the nodes and how membership changes 
can affect system operation. To evaluate the link stress, we measure the power-law distribution 
of nodes derived from scale-free property of the topology. We generate the number of links to 
each Service Centre, which represents the node distribution in the topology. The number of links 
are calculated using the direct connection between Service Centre and member nodes. 
For the topology stress, we measure the recovery time in the event of Service Centre failure. We 
conduct several experiments to see how quickly the system recovers from a Service Centre either 
ungracefully leaving or unexpectedly failing within both a small group and large-scale system. 
Furthermore, we observe how quickly the system regains balance and the scale-free property 
once the high degree node becomes unavailable. In addition, join retries need to be considered 
in analysing why a node join request is rejected and how node join re-tries are handled within 
the topology. We define membership change as a metric to evaluate the membership 
management of the topology, which has direct effect on system stability. It is measured to 
evaluate how the system can accommodate new resources once the existing nodes leave or fail. 
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The unit of calculation is considered as the time taken from a node leaving or failing until the 
topology responds to the issues with a new member replacement. 
A node departure can occur because of a failure or when a node simply chooses to leave. Any 
departure, which involves leaving the group without informing the associated Service Centre is 
classed as an ‘ungraceful leave’. The membership update is accomplished by obtaining 
membership status through a heartbeat or using neighbours’ report messages. This is when an 
ungraceful leave is detected. As soon as an ungraceful leave is detected, the steps taken to 
replace it are as follows 
1. The node is deleted from the member node list in the Service Centre’s naming table 
2. An addition to the group capacity is added to the Service Centre’s records. 
3. The system prepares to accept a join request. 
To measure the membership changes in the system we measured the average time between each 
create and delete. This means a topology with n nodes should maintain network membership by 
looking at the total number of existing members and add a new member as soon as a node departs 
the group. This is achieved by constantly sending heartbeat messages and receiving 
acknowledgment messages between Service Centres and group members. 
4.4.2. Scalability 
Preferential Attachment (Barabási -Albert, 2002) in a power-law distributed network can be used 
to bootstrap incoming nodes to a node with high degree. However, applying this would lead to 
some nodes having too many members – “the rich get richer” – and cause a system bottleneck. 
Furthermore, this would introduce new scalability challenges such as bandwidth distribution 
and membership management. To overcome these scalability challenges, we use the 
proportionate degree-distribution method (Fotouhi & Rabbat, 2013) to accommodate group 
members within different Service Centres. Our aim is to ensure the distribution of Service 
Centres and member nodes will follow a scale-free property, thereby maintaining topology 
scalability. To maintain the scale-free property we define metrics such as the number of node 
limitation where we limit the maximum number of nodes allowed in the group, maximum and 
minimum hops allowed within a message re-diversion and topology flexibility where group split 
and merge is performed. To achieve better efficiency and security, we limit the number of nodes 
allocated to a Service Centre. In order to stress the topology, we measure the changes to the 
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power-law distribution as the network grows. Furthermore this ensures better distribution and 
load balancing, which are the main factors to ensure topology scalability.   
4.4.3. The Average Shortest Path 
The shortest path between two nodes is the smallest number of hops a packet can take to get 
from source to destination. In other words, for nodes A and B, if Y is the set of all cyclic paths 
between A and B, and for y ϵ Y we use |y| to represent the length of the path y (number of hops), 
then the shortest path length lA,B between A and B is be given by: 
lA,B = min{|y| : y ϵ Y}                         (4.5) 
This reflects the network efficiency as the shorter is the distance, the less time a packet will take 
to reach from the source to its destination. Furthermore, the existence of the average shortest 
path within community of trusted acquaintances contribute to the security of the system.  
We measure and record the number of hops from the data source to the destination node. To 
assess the quality of the data path, we measure the shortest path length for communications 
when data packets are transmitted through different links within the topology along with the 
number of packets lost, number of responses for a query (response count) and failed routes as a 
result of the destination node being unavailable. 
4.4.4. Control Overhead 
Network overhead represents the maintenance cost of the network operation in terms of the 
quantity of data packets sent or received to maintain the network. These packets include 
transmissions for group refinement, wakeup call messages, join and leave request messages 
within the network. Within SEP, the network uses maintenance, acknowledgment, instruction 
and aggregate messages for different operations. The accumulation of these messages is 
considered as control overhead. We compare the ratio of operation and maintenance packets for 
different groups under different churns and configuration settings. We evaluate the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the SEP topology and membership policy when large numbers of nodes are 
organised in different clusters. We argue that the overhead enforced on the system is justified to 
some degree if user privacy and system security are well maintained. However, in order to 
achieve a lower management overhead, we employ an aggregate approach where multiple 
groups are managed by Service Centres with constant local wakeup calls and sign in messages 
to keep state consistency up-to-date. For example, SEP uses an alternative route path if a Service 
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Centre fails. We measure the extra bandwidth required to replace the system as well as the 
message-forwarding cost at the application level. Furthermore, we measure packets lose when 
the destination becomes unavailable because of a Service Centre failure. 
To be able to maintain user anonymity we use additional communication and verification. To 
provide security and confidentiality, we encrypt the exchanged messages, which imposes extra 
bandwidth on the system. The extra bandwidth is generated because of additional verification 
and acknowledgment to accomplish better user anonymity. We use asymmetric encryption 
methods for communications, which increases the data size as compared to the original clear 
text or the output from a symmetric cypher, resulting in greater bandwidth than the unsecured 
or symmetric case. 
We record the maintenance costs caused by encryption as the data packets exchanged between 
nodes as verification messages and carry out an evaluation of it. In addition, pro-active state 
management is an important design goal. We achieve this by using local and pre-defined time 
intervals to control aggregate messages to keep state consistency within the group. We measure 
the bandwidth consumption within the system, including heartbeat messages, join and leave 
request messages and any other maintenance cost.  
4.4.5. Security & Resiliency 
System reliability represents the system security and its ability to recover from a random or 
targeted failure. Scale-free networks are resilient to random attacks but prone to targeted attacks 
especially if the attack is focused on high degree nodes. Targeted attacks can affect the security 
and interoperability of the system by directing attacks at these high degree nodes. As a high 
degree node has increased responsibilities, it will be relied on more as part of the overall 
topology. Service Centres are therefore likely to be the focus of targeted attacks. 
We use various metrics to evaluate the reliability of the SEP scheme in terms of security and 
interoperability. To evaluate system security and the self-healing properties of the topology, we 
simulate targeted and random attacks on Service Centres and measure the recovery time: how 
quickly a Service Centre is replaced after a point of failure and how long it takes to re-gain the 
scale-free topology. Fault detection before the system recovery is done by exchanging ping/pong 
messages locally within the Service Centre group.  
4.5. SEP Topology Structure 
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OMNET++ allows the use of multiple churn generators for a network simulation. This means 
that, depending on the topology defined; multiple churn generators can be used in a single 
simulation. This is useful when implementing the topology construction algorithm of SEP 
because, diverse group of users are evaluated using different churn generators.  
The SEP protocol uses structured negotiations based on Service Centres for topology 
construction. However, application of the search and broadcasting model uses an unstructured 
P2P topology where users can join and leave freely. Therefore, there are two different churn 
generators, one for the Service Centres and one for the other nodes within the network. A trace 
file can be loaded in to OverSim to control and manipulate the nodes entering and leaving the 
network. Figure 4.1 shows the modular architecture of OverSim. 
 
Figure 4.1 OverSim Architecture (Baumgart et al, 2007) 
Tier 1
Tier 2
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The topology of SEP is incorporated with the Base-Overlay within OverSim structure. The 
maintenance of the protocol is dictated by the underlying infrastructure of OverSim. Figure 4.2 
shows the layered structure of the SEP topology integrated within the OverSim architecture.  
 
Figure 4.2 Layered Architecture of the SEP Design 
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The topology implementation of SEP incorporates with the BaseOverlay in OverSim 
Framework. The topology is implemented over the BaseOverlay of the OverSim architecture as 
shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
4.6. Simulation Strategy and Constraints 
In this section, we present the implementation strategy and simulation constraints. We also 
justify our chosen simulation settings and configurations in terms of time, size of the network, 
size of the group and other considerations. Some experiments were carried out with different 
configurations to those presented here, however the results of these have not been included 
because they did not display notable differences from similar or other configuration settings.  
4.6.1. Number of Runs 
We have selected ten runs for each set of experiments performed. We have justified the choice 
of the number of runs with Confidence Intervals performed for each experiment as explained in 
section 4.4. To manually analyse the results and evaluate the possibility of any changes within 
a larger number of runs, we also performed a set of simulations with the same seed and over 30 
runs. We compared the accumulated results to the original sample of 10 runs, and found no 
statistical difference. Based on this we continued performing 10 runs for each set of experiments. 
4.6.2. Simulation Time 
In order to test the system, we initially set the simulation to run over a 600 seconds period and 
with a network of 100 nodes. However, we increased this to 2,000 seconds because we found 
the bootstrapping of nodes for simulations with larger numbers of nodes was taking longer than 
the session time, producing no statistics. To achieve accurate results for our simulations we 
ensured that the bootstrapping time would not take more than 1% of the simulation time. We 
altered the settings to record the statistics only after the bootstrapping process had completed. 
However, if we were to evaluate the network stability and inclusion of the bootstrapping session 
it would provide a better understanding of the topology stability. For other scenarios, the 
statistics and mean of the results are calculated after the initial period of overlay topology 
creation. Some systems implemented in OverSim such as Chord and GIA support short 
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bootstrapping, but some systems such as Koordle do not. SEP supports simultaneous join 
requests as well as short bootstrapping. For fairness and to improve the accuracy of the 
experiments, we adjusted the initial creation time to 0.1 seconds for 100 and 500 nodes, 0.01 
seconds for simulations over 1000 nodes and 0.001 for simulations of 10,000 nodes and above. 
In addition, 10 simulation runs for over 10,000 nodes with two other systems would require an 
overwhelming amount of memory as much as 50GB. In the following, we describe some of the 
information captured. 
We have run a single simulation with 10,000 and set the initial bootstrapping time to 0.001 
seconds included in the complete simulation time of 2,000 seconds. It took just over 10 minutes 
of simulation time to complete the bootstrapping and start the statistics recording. This equates 
to half the simulation time being spent on bootstrapping the member nodes. 
4.6.3. Number of nodes 
In order to obtain performance metrics – described in the next section – we ran experiments with 
100 nodes and incremented the size of the network by 100 nodes for each experiment. We 
continued until reaching a simulation run with 1,000 nodes. We used this strategy in order to 
understand the nature of the results as the network scaled. This also maintains the ratio of Service 
Centres to numbers of groups to maintain the scale-free property of the network that our work 
is based on. The OverSim developers claim to have tested simulations with up to 100,000 nodes 
(Baumgart et al., 2007). However, we were unable to perform simulations with over 10,000 
nodes.  
When attempting to perform an experiment with one run incorporating 20,000 nodes the 
simulation crashed before the bootstrapping session was complete. The reason for the crash was 
that the allocated memory for the simulation for that many nodes was not sufficient. We have 
evaluated the trend of the results produced by our experiments using different numbers of nodes 
and found it to be consistent with a linear trend. Therefore, there is no evidence to believe that 
the simulation with 100,000 nodes would have produce different results compared to the 
simulation with 1,000 nodes. 
4.6.4. Experimental Platform 
We used a desktop machine with Windows 7 Operation System Enterprise Edition 64-bit with 
Intel Core i7-3770 CPU 3.4GHz processor and 16GB RAM for all of the simulations. We 
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performed most of the simulations on desktop. We installed OMNET++ 4.4, OverSim-2012 and 
the INET-2011 framework on both machines. The simulation time was slow in real time for the 
desktop; however, this resulted in no difference in the outputs recorded. 
4.6.5. Simulation Settings 
We have developed a number of different simulation scenarios using OverSim to analyse and 
evaluate the design rationale and objectives using the performance metrics defined in Section 
4.6. The scenarios are defined by altering the input settings for OverSim1. The system’s inputs 
and outputs are defined using the SEP modules for different applications and layers such as the 
TCP and UDP layers. Furthermore, the following configurations have been applied for the 
simulations: 
 We run the simulation for 10 minutes for a topology of under 1000 nodes and 20 minutes for 
over 1,000 nodes. The default churn generator is set to ‘NoChurn’ for the Service Centres 
and ‘Pareto’ for the remaining nodes with lifetime means set to 1800 seconds.  
 Since we plan to simulate up to 1000 nodes, we set the number of Service Centres to 10 for 
each simulation. This means that for a simulation with 100 nodes each of the 10 Service 
Centres will manage 10 members. For a simulation of 500 nodes each Service Centre will 
manage 50 members and for a 1,000 nodes simulation each with manage 100 nodes. 
 We use Application Layer Multicast (ALM) and GIASearchApp applications to perform the 
simulations and to evaluate network robustness. To test for stability, we have disabled 
probability of leader rejection by members for SEP. We also use Scribe for some simulations 
for the Tier1 application layer as defined in the OverSim architecture to evaluate 
multicasting capabilities of SEP. 
4.7. Summary 
This chapter presented the implementation strategy to evaluate the objectives of the SEP. It 
explains the implementation methodology with justification of the network simulator choice 
to validate the research objectives. It then identifies the design rationale in order to plan an 
effective implementation strategy to generate simulation scenarios. We present simulation 
settings, configuration information and limitations we had to include in order to analyse and 
evaluate different characteristics of SEP topology.   
                                                     
1 Defined in the omnetpp.ini and default.ini configuration files. 
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5. Performance Evaluation of SEP Framework 
In this chapter, we analyse and evaluate the design rationale of the SEP framework based on the 
simulation results and performance metrics discussed in Section 5.1. We evaluate the security 
and privacy requirements based on three main properties: availability, integrity and 
confidentiality. 
Designing a semi-structured P2P system such as SEP for security and privacy concerns is an 
important practice as we encounter increasing numbers of violations of privacy and personal 
spaces (Barnett & Raab, 2006 and Gross & Acquitsi, 2005). As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, 
security and privacy are often overlooked within unstructured P2P systems. In previous 
chapters, we presented our scalable and network-aware topology construction inspired by Small 
World networks for enhancing the security and privacy of the system by harnessing existing 
trusted relationships. 
Although the main objective of our proposed framework is to provide security and privacy for 
a scalable unstructured P2P topology, other metrics and design motivations such as stability and 
performance are presented to explain the system trade-offs and to justify the proposed scheme. 
The availability and integrity of the system is analysed and balanced against efficient and 
effective membership management and communication within the SEP framework. This is 
presented under the topology stability Section 4.4.1. We presented the simulation results and 
compared them with the multi-tiered tree type clustered overlay topology, NICE. Many related 
work suggest that NICE is the best Application Layer Multicast overlay designed in terms of 
scalability, performance and effectiveness (Li et al., 2005; Banerjee et al., 2002; Krause & 
Hubsch, 2010). Therefore, we evaluate the SEP system by comparison with the NICE design, 
highlighting security and privacy concerns where appropriate, to validate the proposed scheme. 
The confidentiality of the system is analysed by establishing privacy concerns and 
considerations and the need for user-oriented and privacy observed services. 
Scalability issues have been highlighted in unstructured and Gnutella-type networks (Adamic et 
al., 2001) which in turn, affects the security of the system. In other words, scaling the 
unstructured P2P systems with autonomous services introduces security challenges. These 
issues are exercised in the SEP framework with an eye on privacy and maintaining the system 
performance to an acceptable level. We analyse and validate the scalability issues using the 
modelling techniques and properties existing in Small World networks with a power-law 
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distribution of node degrees. Furthermore, we evaluate the load balancing and network growth 
using a degree-proportionate distribution technique. The developed network-aware topology 
construction in SEP can be implemented within unstructured multicast and unicast applications. 
We assess the validity of the system rationales and evaluate the system performance and its 
security. In addition, the evaluation appraises the privacy observation of the SEP framework in 
response to current alternative ubiquitous system examples, namely unstructured P2P overlay 
systems. 
5.1. Performance Metrics 
In this section, we present the performance metrics. Different qualitative and quantitative 
metrics are considered in line with the project objectives in order to map those metrics to the 
SEP design rationale for performance evaluation and analysis;   
5.1.1. Membership Change  
The network-aware topology construction algorithm maintains topology membership by 
responding to changes in the groups. This includes nodes leaving or failing. We evaluate the 
effect of the membership change in network stability and link stress. In order to evaluate the 
topology stability described in Section 4.4.1, we use membership change in order to evaluate 
the topology management of SEP. We define the membership change as the ability of the system 
to allocate the member nodes after a node failure or departure. We calculate the membership 
change as the time taken to add a new member once an existing member of the group is failed 
or has left the group. 
5.1.2. Topology Recovery Time  
This metric is used to analyse the recovery time when a Service Centre fails or leaves 
ungracefully. The network-aware topology construction maintains the scale-free property of the 
network by replacing the Service Centre if it ungracefully leaves or fails. This metric is 
calculated from the time of the Service Centre failure to the time the system replaces it, making 
all of the services available within the group. The metric is defined to evaluate the system 
stability and topology stress as described in Section 4.4.1 of the design rationale. 
 
5.1.3. Node Distribution 
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The membership management strategy ensures the conditional preferential attachment of nodes 
to the appropriate Service Centre in order to fairly distribute and allocate member nodes. The 
node distribution metric is considered to analyse the node stress and evaluate the effect of node 
stress in topology scalability. Furthermore, the effective distribution of nodes ensures load 
balancing, which is explained in Section 3.3. To be able to analyse the node stress, we calculate 
the clustering co-efficient of Service Centre to member nodes, described in Section 2.2.6. We 
define the clustering co-efficient as ratio of number of links to the number of nodes within the 
group. If the node distribution of nodes forms a scale-free topology with maximum CC of one 
as shown in Section 2.2.6, it will satisfy the scalability element of the design rationale. We 
define the scale-free element of the topology as a condition if the network growth model follows 
the degree-proportional probabilistic and exhibit a power-law distribution. 
5.1.4. Forwarded Message Maintenance 
This metric is used to analyse the effectiveness of the topology clustering, and evaluate the 
message-forwarding algorithm by Service Centre. This metric presents the trade-off between 
anonymous routing and the control overhead. The anonymous communication and message-
forwarding is explained in network-aware message-forwarding Section 3.2. The messages 
maintenance cost is calculated as the sum of the bytes as result of the exchange of the messages 
between nodes. 
5.1.5. Hop Count 
We define the Hop Count as the number of nodes a packet should visit in order to get from its 
source to the destination. The hop count evaluates the ability of the system to find and maintain 
the shortest path in communications as explained in Section 4.4.3. We calculate the number of 
nodes that a packet the Service Centre takes from its source to the last node as the destination 
of the route.  
5.1.6. One-way-latency 
We define the one-way-latency to evaluate the efficiency of the topology construction, which in 
turn contributes to the design rationale set out in Section 4.4.3 that ensures shortest paths in end-
to-end communications. We observe the time expected to deliver a packet at the destination and 
compute the maximum delay in delivering the message as the difference between them.  
5.1.7. Application Forwarding Maintenance 
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This metric is used to evaluate the performance of the SEP topology construction as a base 
overlay to handle different applications. It evaluates the effect of an application on the overall 
topology maintenance as explained in Section 4.4.4 and calculates as the sum of bytes as result 
of running application over the SEP overlay.  
5.1.8. Packet Drop Rate 
The packet drop rate analyse the effectiveness of the clustering of the topology by allocating 
Service Centre and to evaluate the integrity of the system as explained in Section 4.4.5. We 
calculate the packet drop rate as the difference between the sent packets and the successfully 
received ones at the destination node.  
5.1.9. Join Request Byte Count 
In order to join a group, a node should send request to the service Centre. We define the join 
request byte as the cost of the process in order to evaluate the control overhead described in 
Section 4.4.4. We record the cost of the join request to be able to evaluate the effect of the 
membership change on maintenance cost. In case of a Service Centre failure, SEP nominates 
the backup Service Centre to take its place. However, some nodes may try to join other groups. 
Sending join requests to a Service Centre generates extra overhead, especially if the request is 
initiated after a Service Centre failure. 
5.1.10. Average Response Count 
The clustering strategy of the proposed scheme not only improves the effectiveness of the end-
to-end communication, but also improves the security and resiliency as explained in Section 
4.4.5. To be able to analyse the effective use of short paths, we define average response count. 
The average response count is calculated by observing the successful delivery rate of the sent 
packets at the destination by counting the number of messages arrived back at the source node. 
We define the average responses received from the destination nodes as an acknowledgment of 
successful delivery of the packets. 
5.1.11. Disconnection Ratio 
The disconnection ratio is considered to analyse the topology aggressiveness in response to 
random or targeted attacks and to evaluate the topology security and resiliency as explained in 
Section 4.4.5. The disconnection ratio is defined as a mean to calculate the system failure in 
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managing node membership. When a Service Centre fails randomly or due to an attack, the 
member nodes are directed to connect to a new Service Centre or join the neighbouring group. 
In some cases, node members fail to re-instate their links to any group and disconnect from the 
network. We measure the average disconnection ratio as result of the change within each group. 
We determine the disconnection ratio by calculating the number of nodes that fail to sign in to 
a Service Centre after a Service Centre failure, group merge or split. 
Table 4.2 summarises the different features of the SEP scheme, which we have evaluated and 
the defined metrics for the validation of each component. 
Table 5.1 Performance Metrics 
 Stability Scalability Average 
Shortest Path 
Control 
Overhead 
Security & 
Resiliency 
Membership Change      
Recovery Time      
Node Distribution      
Forwarded Message 
Maintenance 
     
Hop Count      
One-way Latency      
Application Forwarding 
Cost 
     
Packet Drop Rate      
Join Request Cost      
Average Response Count      
Disconnection Ratio      
 
 
 
5.2. Confidence Intervals 
In order to evaluate the performance of SEP in comparison with other P2P protocols, we ran 
several simulations and compared the results to other unstructured overlay networks. We ran 
simulations using a variety of churns, numbers of nodes and parameters for all of the systems 
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under investigation. We ran 10 different sets of simulations for each scenario and calculated the 
mean values and associated confidence intervals. Simulation seeds are set with the 
corresponding run number from 0 to 9. The confidence intervals allow better understand of the 
sample distribution of the overall system performance. 
Statisticians use confidence intervals to express the degree of uncertainty associated with a 
sample statistic. A confidence interval is an interval estimate combined with a probability 
statement. A confidence interval consists of taking a sample and finding the mean value of that 
sample to estimate the population mean. Using the confidence interval, we can calculate the 
margin of error within our simulation to validate the significance of the results. Suppose S 
represents the set of samples and |S| is the number of samples. We calculate the mean ?̅?, standard 
deviation 𝜎, margin of error 𝜀 and confidence interval 𝑐𝑖 as follows. 
?̅? =
1
|𝑆| 
∑ 𝑥𝑥∈𝑆         (5.1) 
𝜎 = √
1
|𝑆| 
∑ (𝑥 − ?̅?)2𝑥∈𝑆       (5.2) 
𝜀 = 𝑍∗ × (
𝜎
√|𝑆| 
)       (5.3) 
𝑐𝑖 = ?̅? ± 𝜀.        (5.4) 
Where Z is determined based on the level of confidence being considered. There are four 
common levels of confidence Z* used in our experiments and given in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Common Confidence Intervals to determine the ‘Margins of Error’. 
Level of confidence Z*-value 
80% 1.28 
85% 1.44 
90% 1.64 
95% 1.96 
99% 2.58 
We aimed at achieving a 95% level of confidence. This means that the margin of error 𝜀 for the 
system is represented be 5% of the samples that we have examined during the experiment. To 
calculate the confidence interval, we used the mean value of the results and the number of 
experiments carried out to justify that the simulation results actually represent 95% of the 
represented sample. We have calculated confidence intervals for every set of experiments we 
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have performed. The confidence interval pertains to what would happen if we carried out a large 
number of experiments and constructed large-scale data value. If we repeated the experiment t 
times, then we would expect that 95% of the confidence intervals would contain the mean of the 
produced results. 
5.3. Simulation Results and Evaluation 
In this section, we present the experiments based on the implementation methodology outlined 
in Section 4.1 and include the results generated by different simulation scenarios. We map each 
simulation scenarios to the performance metrics outlined earlier to validate the design rationales 
and evaluate the objectives of the project. 
5.4. Topology Stability 
In order to evaluate topology stability, we define two metrics namely: Membership Change for 
analysing node stress as explained in Section 5.1.1 and topology recovery time to analyse 
topology stress as explained in Section 5.1.2. Table 5.3 outlines the simulation settings and 
summary of the configurations for this experiment. 
Table 5.3 Simulation Settings 
Parameter  Value Parameter  Value 
Number of nodes 100 nodes Application Type ALM Test App 
Simulation time 1000s Max Key Length 100 bytes 
Initial phase creation interval 0.1s Message Delay: 60s 
Churn type:  Pareto Heartbeat intervals 5s 
Lifetime mean 100s Message size 100bytes 
Max responses 10 Query Interval 2s 
Max number of Service Centres 10 Service Centre Capacity 10 
 
 
 
5.4.1. Experiment 1 (A): Membership Change 
We perform Experiment 1(A) to evaluate topology stability as described in Section 4.4.1. Nodes 
are allocated a lifetime mean distributed uniformly within the topology.  
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In this experiment, we set the number of existing nodes and expect that the membership 
management will maintain the numbers of group membership to be able to ensure topology 
stability. We observe the average number of nodes at different time lines to evaluate membership 
changes within the timeline of the simulation. The network-aware topology construction 
changes the bootstrapping interval proportional to the number of the join requests every Service 
Centre receives. Once a node leaves the network, the system replaces it with new node in order 
to maintain the network membership. This evaluates the stability of the system in terms of 
membership management. Figure 5.1 shows the total number of nodes plotted within the 
timeline across the lifetime of the simulation.  
 
Figure 5.1 Average Membership Change in SEP 
The blue lines show the timelines of the added nodes, whereas the red lines are the timeline for 
node leaves and node failures. The time log shows the steady and consistent membership 
management for our proposed SEP framework. This means that the network-aware topology 
management maintains the group membership with effective replacement of the network 
resources. 
To be able to compare the effectiveness of membership management in SEP, we evaluate the 
performance of NICE system with similar settings and configurations. We observed the 
membership change over the timeline to see how NICE implements the membership 
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management and membership recovery as explained in Section 2.3.1.5. Figure 5.2 shows the 
results recorded during the experiment.   
 
Figure 5.2 Average Membership Change in NICE 
The blue time line indicates the replacement in response to the node failure during that period. 
This means that NICE takes longer to replace failed or left nodes. 
It can be noticed from Figures 5.1 and 5.2 that SEP maintains the number of nodes effectively 
within the group and replaces the failed nodes in a timely manner since the Service Centres 
directly maintain membership information and constantly monitor the node status. Furthermore, 
this improves the availability of the nodes in the network. The node replacement trend in NICE 
becomes more effective overtime since it uses neighbouring nodes to report failed or left nodes. 
Nonetheless, it suffers effective response to membership change and maintain the topology 
membership where neighbour cooperation is limited.   
To evaluate the stability within more scalable network, we increased the number of nodes to 
1,000 and the simulation time to 1,000 seconds. Figure 5.3 plots the simulation results for the 
average of membership changes for SEP and NICE over the simulation time. 
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Figure 5.3 Topology Stability - Membership Change 
As demonstrated in the Figure 5.3, the trend of the membership changes on both systems shows 
a steady line, which can be interpreted as a liner relationship between membership change and 
topology stability. However, SEP outperforms NICE in terms of topology stability and 
membership management. The number of nodes in NICE always stays higher than SEP showing 
that additional nodes are connected to each group. This means that NICE fails to maintain the 
group clusters within the defined limit. Exceeding the cluster capacity will cause topology stress. 
Furthermore, this may lead to resource starvation if the system is overwhelmed by additional 
requests.  
5.4.2. Experiment 1 (B): Topology Recovery Time 
In this experiment, we evaluate the topology stress in terms of system stability defined in Section 
4.4.1. Topology stress evaluates how quickly the topology construction algorithm defined in 
Section 3.1 repairs a network by replacing the Service Centre when they fail or leave 
ungracefully.  
Each Service Centre acts as a super node within the group, maintaining direct link with group 
members as well as other neighbouring Service centres. If a Service Centre leaves without 
informing the group members or fails, the topology construction algorithm replaces it by 
electing new leader as outlined in Section 3.1.1. We define the recovery from failure metric as 
explained in Section 5.1.2 to evaluate the process. The metric is calculated as the time difference 
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between a Service Centre failure and its replacement. Figure 5.4 is a representation of the 
effective system recovery with Pareto churn applied to the Service Centres shows the sum of 
the statistics recorded during the simulation. 
 
Figure 5.4 SEP Topology Recovery under Pareto Churn of Service Centres  
The green lines represent the average ‘delete’ and the red lines indicates the average ‘create’ 
times for the topology management of 1,000 nodes during a simulation of 2,000 seconds. 
The Service Centre change starts from t = 100 seconds. The times between ‘deletes’ and 
‘creates’ shown in Figure 5.4 are consistent as the SEP topology effectively replaces the Service 
Centres once they fail or leave. The average number of nodes stays at a flat rate of 1,000 as 
shown by the yellow line in the figure 5.4. In other words, the group membership stays constant 
as the Service Centre always maintains the group membership. 
We perform simulations with similar configuration and settings for NICE. The NICE cluster 
replacement pattern is comparable to SEP, replacing every failed cluster leader as shown in 
Figure 5.5. The timeline between ‘deletes’ and ‘creates’ for the NICE topology with 1,000 nodes 
simulated over 2,000 seconds is uneven comparing to the SEP topology. This means that, 
although the cluster leader recovery in NICE is as effective as SEP, but it is not as consistent as 
shown in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5 Network Stability in NICE – Cluster Leader Recovery 
To be able to see the effectiveness of the approach, we have extracted the ‘delete’ and ‘create’ 
times for the simulation timeline for both SEP and NICE. Figure 5.6 shows the moving average 
for the timeline where a Service Centre is removed and then replaced over a period of 2,000 
seconds.  
 
Figure 5.6 System Reliability – SEP Topology Recovery 
Figure 5.7 demonstrates the moving average for cluster leader replacement for NICE. 
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Figure 5.7 System Reliability – NICE Topology Recovery 
The difference between the patterns of the moving average for the two topologies can be seen 
within the above two Figures 5.6 and 5.7. The moving average time for the NICE topology is 
more uneven than the SEP topology. This means, in practice, that the consistency in replacing 
the cluster leader in NICE is not as efficient as SEP in terms of recovery time from failures. 
During the experiment to test the topology stability within NICE and SEP, we have concluded 
the following observations. First, both systems were resilient in terms of availability. There were 
no packets dropped because of overwhelming requests. Secondly, we found that setting the 
initial mobility delay to 0.1s produced good stability with both systems. Thirdly, changing the 
payload from 100KB to 500KB did not affect the system performance and statistics 
significantly. 
To measure the effect of the power-law distribution and scalable clusters of users and evaluate 
how the network performs under different loads, we measured the network stability as an 
indication of how efficient the load distribution and membership management are. To measure 
the efficiency of the topology, we measured the power-law distribution characteristics by 
recording the connectedness of the nodes to Service Centres and calculating the links to 
determine whether the node distribution follows a power-law property. 
Node stress measures the topology stability in relation to the number of attached overlay 
terminals to the Service Centre. The power-law property of the network is maintained by the 
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Service Centres attracting member nodes and retaining them by sending heartbeats at constant 
intervals. 
We first defined the maximum members allowed in a group, the initial join and member churns 
within the given time scale using the OMNET++ configuration. We ran the SEP topology with 
an initial 500 nodes and waited until the bootstrapping process started. We then disabled the 
grouping algorithm and started the initial bootstrapping without a topology. Figure 5.8 
demonstrates the network with distributed nodes and no topology. 
 
Figure 5.8 Topology Free Arrangement of Member Nodes 
We then applied the clustering algorithm to organise member nodes as a group and assign them 
to a Service Centre upon joining the network. We define the Service Centre capacity as 500 
nodes with no churn. Figure 5.9 is a screen shot of the topology interface after a join operation. 
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Figure 5.9 Grouping Node Members using Service Centre 
We collected statistics while initialisation of SEP topology before it is stable to analyse the 
network stability and network cluster quality. After bootstrapping of 100 nodes, the topology 
showed in Figure 5.10 was formed after 100 seconds of simulation. 
 
Figure 5.10 Topology with Clustering Co-efficient of Zero 
A Service Centre can be overwhelmed by a large number of users subsequently claiming 
bandwidth within an overlay network. To manage this, the Service Centre monitors the network 
balance by frequently sending heartbeat messages to the members and updating membership 
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changes accordingly. Merge and split functions maintain load balancing and sustain the network 
overhead when the situation is determined due to membership changes. 
GIA uses preferential attachment to divert the network traffic to nodes with the highest capacity. 
Consequently, the preferential attachment will move most of the incoming traffic to the node 
with greatest capacity, overloading the cluster, while the node with second best capacity is left 
with only a few links. Figure 5.11 shows two clusters established within a GIA topology with 
300 members.  
 
Figure 5.11 GIA Super Node Topology 
More than 85% of the nodes are connected to the node with the highest capacity and the highest 
satisfaction level, while only 15% of the nodes are connected to the second cluster. Around 5% 
of the member nodes are either not connected, or have left the system. 
In a scalable GIA type system, the network topology fades away from uniformed distribution 
because of the lack of control of the location of the selected super nodes as shown in Figure 
5.11.  As a result, GIA suffers from load balancing in terms of node and resource distribution. 
This will have significant impact on resource availability and end-to-end communications.  
NICE uses Hierarchical-tree type node distribution, where cluster leaders are located at the top 
of the hierarchy as demonstrated in Figure 5.12.  
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Figure 5.12 - NICE Hierarchy-Tree Topology 
The cluster leaders are elected based on their topological location as described in Section 2.3.1.4. 
The arrangement of nodes and their cluster leaders are the effective approach in multicasting 
within each individual hierarchy-tree. However, it introduces challenges such as resiliency and 
efficiency. We explain and evaluate the effect of such approach in terms of efficiency in Section 
5.5.1 and resiliency in Section 5.8.2. 
5.5. Topology Scalability 
We evaluated the SEP topology using the network growth model described in Section 3.3 and 
the scalability design explained in Section 4.4.2. To be able to evaluate the scalability of SEP, 
we measure the node stress and topology stress within a power-law distributed model and scale-
free topology. 
The main objective of this research was to achieve optimised scalability using a power-law 
distribution to generate a scale-free network. We model the SEP topology as an undirected graph 
G = (V, E), where V is the set of member nodes and E is the set of links between the nodes within 
the group. We analyse and evaluate the SEP network to show that the implemented network 
prototype exhibits Small World properties. To achieve a scalable topology, we present a 
qualitative analysis of SEP in achieving a topology with a sustainable power-law distribution of 
nodes. Using node connectivity and link stress, we present the connectivity distribution to 
analyse and evaluate the design hypotheses that the network-aware topology construction 
exhibits and preserves a power-law structure.   
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5.5.1. Experiment 2 (A): Node Distribution. 
The topology construction algorithm creates a new group, assigns a Service Centre to them and 
attaches the nodes that join to the new Service Centre to form a cluster. We perform an 
experiment to evaluate the effective distribution of nodes. Using the degree-proportionate 
distribution and preferential attachment of nodes explained in Section 2.2.4, we model how SEP 
distributes nodes to achieve better scalability by maintaining scale-free property. We define the 
node distribution metric to evaluate the effective use of preferential attachment. We determine 
the node distribution by calculating the clustering co-efficient of nodes within each Service 
Centre. After completing a simulation run of a network with 200 members, the resulted topology 
is shown in Figure 5.13. 
 
Figure 5.13 Power-law Distribution is SEP 
As explained in Section 2.2.3, although the preferential attachment is an important element of a 
small world network, which retains scale-free property, its application may lead to a long tail or 
random network. As such, we use clustering co-efficient in order to enforce the conditional 
preferential attachment explained in Section 3.1 to maintain the scale-free property of network.  
In order to achieve better model growth and scalability, we structure the topology by distributing 
the nodes to be proportionate to the number of Service Centres. To avoid overloading a Service 
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Centre and inappropriate implications of preferential attachment, we limit number of nodes 
allowed to attach each Service Centre. As the Service Centre reaches it maximum limit, the split 
function is initiated to accommodate newly joined nodes. Thus, the network will follow a power-
law distribution and nodes will be connected proportionate to their degree. 
To be able to measure the node stress, we calculated the ratio of the number of network nodes 
to the overall number of Service Centres created. If we define the network size to be between k 
and 10k – 1, for a network of 100 nodes there will be at most two Service Centres. This is further 
illustrated via our simulation results shown in Figure 5.14. 
 
Figure 5.14 Node Stress in SEP 
In order to predict the future behaviour of the topology in terms of node distribution and model 
the network growth, we perform regression analysis to establish the data trend line. Performing 
a trend function and regression analysis of the data presented in Figure 5.13 generates the results 
shown in Figures 5.14.  
Table 5.4 summarises the residual output for the data collected from the experiment. 
Table 5.4 The Residual Output - Prediction of the Node Distribution Trend 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT 
  
Observation Predicted Number of Service Centres Residuals Standard Residuals 
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1 9989.114 10.886 0.035 
2 9338.517 -338.517 -1.101 
3 8037.325 -37.325 -0.121 
4 6736.133 263.867 0.859 
5 6085.537 -85.537 -0.278 
6 4784.344 215.656 0.702 
7 3483.152 516.848 1.682 
8 2832.556 167.444 0.545 
9 2181.960 -181.960 -0.592 
10 1531.363 -531.363 -1.729 
The regression analysis compares the relation between two variables. The residual represents 
the discrepancy between the predicted and real values (Gelman & Hill, 2006). In our case we 
consider X – the dependent variable – to be the number of nodes, and Y – the independent 
variable – to be the number of links. Using the regression analysis, we interpreted the 
relationship between X and Y and generated the scatter plot shown in Figure 5.15. 
 
Figure 5.15 The Relationship between Nodes and Service Centres 
To be able to find the best fit, we performed a regression analysis of the data and generated the 
trend line for the node distribution. The node residuals are scattered all around the graph as 
shown in Figure 5.15. Now, we can determine the power relationship between the variables and 
therefore can draw the trend line as shown in Figure 5.16. 
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Figure 5.16 – The ‘Goodness of Fit’ for Node Distribution Prediction in SEP 
The R2 in Figure 5.16 is the statistical relationship between two events (Gelman & Hill, 2006) 
within the network growth process, namely the number of joining nodes to a group and the 
number of links currently active within the group. In other words, it represents the proportion of 
the variation in number of nodes, which is explained by number of Service Centres. 
The number of active links are referred to the connection between Service Centre and their nodes 
which we deduce the number of Service Centres. In Figure 5.16, we use the R2 value to interpret 
the relationship and to describe the ‘goodness of fit‘ for the set of experiments we have 
undertaken. R2 value varies between 0 and 1, where 1 represents the perfect fit. In other words, 
all of the variations close to 1 are inherently represent a model of good fit, although possibility 
of a perfect fit is unlikely.  
We compared the number of nodes to the degree distribution of nodes accommodated at each 
Service Centre. We recorded the number of links to each Service Centre and calculated their 
ratio to the total number of Service Centres to demonstrate the power-law distribution of the 
nodes within the topology. The result shows many nodes with a few links and a few nodes with 
many links, which exhibits a power-law property as demonstrated in Figure 5.17. 
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Figure 5.17 Power-law Distribution in SEP 
To be able to prove the fact that the node distribution follows a power-law, we use a trend 
function and calculate the trend line derived from the data. In order to do so, we plot the residual 
values of the data and concluded a power trend line within the node distribution. 
We compared the node distribution of SEP with the most effective multicast topology NICE. 
The NICE distribution follows a multi-tree clustering topology where every tree is assigned a 
cluster leader at level L0. Every layer has a cluster leader, which forms a cluster over the existing 
layer L1. Finally, the cluster leader within L1 in the centre of the cluster is selected to serve as a 
rendezvous point. The dimension of the clusters is determined by the number of adjacent 
neighbours at each layer which in turn is used to decide when to initiate a cluster split or merge 
process. We observed the ratio of cluster leaders in total to the number of the nodes 
accommodated in the NICE topology. The results are shown in Figure 5.18. 
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Figure 5.18  NICE Node Distribution 
We calculated the residual analysis of the data using regression testing and found the residual 
distribution pattern as demonstrated in Figure 5.19. 
 
Figure 5.19 NICE Node Distribution Residual Plot 
The residual plot shown in Figure 5.19 shows the relationship trend between cluster leaders and 
ordinary nodes within the tree-hierarchy distribution model of NICE. The node distribution 
residual plot for NICE in Figure 5.15 is scattered in a way that represents polynomial 
relationship (Gelman & Hill, 2006). Using the analysis, we can determine the trend of the cluster 
leader-node relationship as shown in Figure 5.20. 
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Figure 5.20 NICE Node Distribution Trend line 
The size of the network and the density of the neighbours has a direct effect on the number of 
cluster leaders in NICE. Due to the effective forwarding capabilities of the cluster leaders, they 
contribute significantly to efficient multicasting and ensuring a low redundancy rate in terms of 
failed communications. NICE organises member nodes in large groups of cluster leaders with 
associated small numbers of member nodes. As such, random failures are more likely and the 
impact of cluster leader failure is greater. Therefore, it may have significant impact on successful 
packet delivery ratio, failed lookups and additional network bandwidth. We demonstrate these 
effects and explain these metrics later on in this section.  
SEP on the other hand, organises the member nodes in groups proportionate to the size of the 
network and assigns a Service Centre to each group. Therefore, random failures will not have 
significant impact on overall interoperability of the network.  
SEP uses conditional preferential attachment to model the network growth and to maintain a 
power-law distribution of member nodes’ links. To achieve the design rationale and overcome 
the traditional problems arising from preferential attachment, we use the proportionate degree-
distribution technique to accommodate group members within different Service Centres. To 
maintain system scalability, we ensure the prototype achieves scale-free properties. The 
simulation results show that SEP successfully sustains a power-law distribution and therefore 
scales well. 
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Furthermore, SEP handles the topology stress better than NICE. The topology adaptation 
recovers from random failures in a timely manner. In order to evaluate the topology stress, we 
measure the Scale-free properties as the network grows. For the node stress, we measure the 
number of the groups and number of entries for each group to indicate that SEP achieves better 
distribution and load balancing, which are the main factors for ensuring topology scalability. To 
be able to evaluate the scalability of the system using the data derived from the simulation 
results, we perform regression testing. Regression analysis will prove that the topological 
structure of the SEP remains scale-free. Table 5.5 summarises the regression statistics for 
topology observation in Experiment 2(A). 
Table 5.5 Regression Statistics 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.994834042 
R2  0.98969477 
Adjusted R2 0.988406617 
Standard Error 325.9949082 
Observations 10 
The R2 in Table 5.5 is the statistical relationship between node distribution and Service Centre. 
It determines the ‘goodness of fit’ as explained earlier and determines the proportion of the 
variation in number of Service Centres, which is derived by number of nodes. The number of 
active links are referred to the connection between Service Centre and their nodes which we 
deduce the number of Service Centres.  
More importantly, the network growth model described in Section 4.4.2 is predicted to follow 
the power-law distribution. In other words, we expect the network topology will stay scale-free 
regardless of number of nodes. Figure 5.15 is a scatter plot of the link distribution between 
Service Centres and member nodes, which shows a power-law distribution of the nodes to ensure 
better scalability. To be able to find the trend line for the data, we have calculated residuals for 
the produced results.  
The power-law distribution of the nodes is in line with the design rationale and objectives in 
regards to modelling the network growth as explained in Section 2.2, validating the probability 
analysis of degree distribution. Figure 5.21 demonstrates the degree distribution of SEP 
topology. The analysis of node distribution and its relationship to Service Centre appointment 
shows the degree distribution within the network. Comparing the links within the topology 
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shows that there are many nodes with few links. However, the analysis shows that there are only 
a few nodes within the system with many links. This is the true characteristics of a power-law 
distribution as explained in Section 2.2.5. 
 
 
Figure 5.21 Scale-Free Distribution of Nodes in SEP 
Simulation results show that the number of links stayed proportionate to the number of Service 
Centres with 100 nodes. After scaling the topology and performing an experiment with 1,000 
nodes, the ratio of the Service Centre to the node distribution stayed relatively the same and 
scale-free property of the network was sustained. 
We observed that using different types of churn engines cause slight changes to the topology 
stability with 1,000 nodes. While setting the node distribution to Service Centre ratio as 10:1, 
the R2 displayed variation from 9.1 to 9.8. This was due to some nodes being rejected from 
entering any group and failing to acknowledge or interact with Service Centres to maintain 
stable links. However, this change was insignificant and had no impact on the network operation 
as a whole.  
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5.6. Average Shortest Path 
In this section, we analyse the ability of the proposed framework in finding and maintaining the 
shortest paths in communication in order to evaluate the design rationale explained in Section 
4.4.3. In a peered approach, the average shortest path will stay as low as possible preventing the 
long tail communications. The Service Centres serve as intermediary nodes to divert requests to 
the right destination in the routing and lookup process. They act as a network overlay on top of 
the logical network using live trusted links. The average shortest path not only ensures efficient 
(Ying et al., 2010) and effective communications, but it improves the security (Cohen, et al., 
2003) within the communications. 
5.6.1. Experiment 3 (A): Hop Count 
We define hop count as a metric to analyse the effectiveness the SEP in finding and 
implementing the average short path as explained in Section 4.4.3. We consider the hop count 
as the number of steps a message takes from its originating source to reach the desired 
destination. We describe the step as the nodes are visited during the routing process. Therefore, 
we observe the path length as representation of hop count. To be able to compare the results, we 
also observed the average hops for an equivalent NICE topology. Figure 5.22 shows the average 
hop count for both systems within different network size. 
 
Figure 5.22 Overlay Path Length 
Using regression analysis of the data, we produced the line fit plot shown in Figure 5.23. 
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Figure 5.23 - Line Fit Plot for Hop Counts 
Figure 5.244 shows the residual plot for the best fit, which represents the relationship between 
number of nodes and hop count. 
 
Figure 5.24 Residual Plot of Hop Count 
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The way the residual plot is scattered on Figure 5.24, and because the average hop count will 
never be 0, we can conclude that the trend of the hop count shows a logarithmic pattern. Figure 
5.25 shows the forecast trend line for the average hop count for the NICE and SEP topologies. 
 
Figure 5.25 Hop Count Trend line 
SEP outperforms the NICE topology in terms of achieving lower hop count, improving 
efficiency. As shown in Figure 5.25, both systems improve the average hop count as the number 
of the nodes increase. In other words, the average shortest path stays steady even with significant 
increases in the number of nodes. One way to explain this can be explained is that the shortest 
path is identification of high degree nodes (Cohen, et al., 2003) makes the routing process 
efficient by singling out the cluster leaders and directing the messages to them. Furthermore, the 
use of neighbouring information and user cooperation in routing and broadcasting in 
communications. This feature is better implemented within a highly populated topology where 
availability is guaranteed.  In SEP, this is achieved by collaboration between Service Centres 
which ensures an alternative shortest paths if the initial link becomes unavailable or broken. The 
suitability of this concept and topology design is explained in Section 3.2. 
Random walks in power-law networks naturally gravitate towards the high degree nodes 
implemented in systems such as GIA (Chawathe et al., 2003), but better scaling is achieved by 
intentionally choosing high degree nodes (Adamic et al., 2001). By choosing a Service Centre 
as a high degree node within a network-aware topology to administer efficient search and 
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broadcasting, we replace the random-walks and blind searches with a more effective 
communication channel and bias search and broadcast to use the shortest paths. 
The proposed framework is suited to a large-scale dynamic system where network resources are 
distributed over large numbers of users. By employing a small-world network model and state 
management, the shortest link is maintained to ensure routing efficiency and resource 
availability. 
5.7. Control Overhead 
We observed different experiments to evaluate the control overhead encountered by SEP within 
different scenarios as defined in Section 4.4.4. First, we calculated the effect of membership 
change and node failures on the control overhead. We calculated the bandwidth cost generated 
as a result of node disconnection during membership changes and compared this to the situation 
where no membership change has taken place. 
In the second experiment, we analysed the effect of the topology size on the control overhead. 
We observed the maintenance cost for forwarding messages within different network size. 
Through this experiment, we were able to evaluate the path length distribution for different 
network dimensions and the effect on the topology maintenance. We then compared the 
generated results with maintenance cost in NICE. 
5.7.1. Experiment 4 (A): Join Request Cost 
The topology management maintains the integrity of the system by accommodating member 
nodes and replacing the Service Centres if they fail or leave ungracefully. A Service Centre is 
replaced by a back-up Service Centre, if it leaves the network. The replacement process also 
involves exchanging acknowledgment messages between peers and the Service Centre. During 
the Service centre replacement, some nodes disconnect from the group or try to join other groups 
due to conflicts of interest or failing to acknowledge and approve the change. The same issue 
happens during the split and merge operation.  
We evaluate the effect of such scenarios by calculating the join request cost.  We measure the 
bandwidth cost of node disconnections where a join request is made subsequently. 
When a node is disconnected from a group, it needs to re-join the group or may join different 
group. Re-joining the group requires an exchange of messages between the node and the Service 
Centre of the group it is trying to join. In order to evaluate the control overhead of the join 
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request resulting from a membership change, we observed the join request cost incurred by the 
process for SEP.  
We calculated the join request cost as the byte counts and compared it to the cost when there is 
no membership change. Figure 5.26 shows the average byte count for the join requests during a 
simulation of 1,200 seconds. 
 
Figure 5.26 Join Request Cost 
The cost of a join request is significant particularly if there is a membership change or a failure 
in the network. Therefore, this requires careful consideration. As shown in figure 5.24, the 
membership change enforces extra cost on network operation.  
To be able to evaluate and justify the design rationale, we measured the control overhead 
incurred by node disconnections in SEP and compared this to the equivalent results that were 
generated for NICE. Figure 5.27 show the join request cost for EP and NICE where the network 
deals with random membership change as result of member nodes node or cluster leader failure.  
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Figure 5.27 Comparison of Join Request Cost in SEP & NICE 
Figure 5.27 shows that the join request cost for SEP is comparable to NICE within larger size 
networks (500 and above). However, it outperforms NICE within smaller size networks (400 
nodes and below).  
Within SEP, a Service Centre is nominated by the system and elected by group members with 
close ties, common interests and friendships. In a technical sense, this includes nodes within the 
same or neighbouring group, as well as close topological location. The Service Centre is also 
responsible for facilitating node joins and governing the membership table after a node failure 
or a graceful leave. If a Service Centre is rejected by the majority of the nodes, the system 
replaces the nominee with the one whose attributes comes as second best. This is most likely 
the case within merge operations where a group of nodes need to join another group 
geographically close and most likely sharing a common interest or where their interests are close 
to each other. Disputes are unlikely within a split operation where a group of nodes which 
reaches its maximum capacity attempts to split in two, but it is possible. In most application 
multicasts, this function has been disregarded. This may bring conflict of interests, security and 
privacy issues within systems. 
SEP accounts for the probability of Service Centre rejection and forwards the nodes to 
neighbouring clusters or removes them from the group. This will not affect Service Centre 
operation if the majority of the nodes exchange acknowledgment messages and confirm the 
leadership. If group A with the minimum defined number wants to join group B and group A’s 
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leader’s attributes and capacity is higher than that of B’s leader, then group A’s leader with 
minimum members will be selected as the new Service Centre. There is a good chance that the 
majority of existing members will reject the new Service Centre. We define that the Service 
Centre for group B will maintain leadership and new members acknowledge and confirm the 
decision.  
In Figure 5.27, the maintenance cost for SEP within a topology with 500 nodes increases 
considerably. This is because of the cost of a merge operation which kicks in when the group 
size reaches 500. The merge and split requests generate extra maintenance costs for the network 
that is crucial for membership management and integrity. Considering the benefits of the merge 
and split on the network efficiency and effectiveness, the extra overhead is justifiable. 
5.7.2. Experiment 4 (B): Message-forwarding Cost 
In the previous experiment, we measured the control overhead on topology efficiency through 
observation of the effect of the membership management. In this experiment, we measure the 
effect of the scalability on the control overhead and evaluate how clustering the network 
enforces additional cost to the interoperability of the topology.  
As explained in Section 3.2, the network-aware message-forwarding algorithm administered by 
the Service Centre ensures efficiency and effectiveness using average shortest paths and 
privacy-aware route and broadcasting. Within an autonomous and unstructured P2P system, this 
generates additional cost in order to cooperate and coordinate those processes. We analyse and 
evaluate the message-forwarding maintenance cost. 
To measure the maintenance cost for message-forwarding, we do not consider membership 
changes. We have observed and collated the message-forwarding cost for both systems as 
displayed in the Figure 5.28. 
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Figure 5.28 Maintenance Cost on Message-forwarding 
The figure suggests that maintenance costs for NICE are lower for small network sizes (less 
than around 300 nodes) and comparable to SEP, but that for larger network sizes (around 300 
nodes and above) the efficiency of NICE decreases rapidly. In contrast SEP achieves relatively 
consistent performance in terms of maintenance costs, and so has a lower maintenance cost than 
NICE for larger (around 300 nodes and above) network sizes. 
In order to contact a node at the higher end of the hierarchical-tree, a NICE message must be 
routed through every layer of the hierarchical-tree, which involves exchanging acknowledgment 
messages, which cost network bandwidth. However, SEP performs better as the maintenance 
messages are routed through only two Service Centres. Using the direct communication, the 
shortest path and a lower hop count make the search, broadcasting and messages forwarding 
more efficient comparing to NICE.  
Figure 5.29 shows the trend line for the maintenance cost of message-forwarding for both 
systems. 
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Figure 5.29 Maintenance Cost Trend line 
The maintenance cost increases in NICE in contrast to SEP where the cost is predicted to stay 
constant. This is because of the scale-free effect of the network growth as explained in Section 
2.2.3. Each Service Centre maintains an updated list of group members and effectively forwards 
incoming and outgoing messages. Instead of using a flooding type routing and visiting every 
node to forward a message, SEP uses a biased routing in cooperation two Service Centres, which 
act as super nodes.  The messages  This represents the maintenance cost for different topology 
sizes, which determines the efficiency of the network-aware message-forwarding as explained 
in Section 3.2 of the SEP design. 
5.7.3. Experiment 4 (C): The Effect of Topology Management on Maintenance 
In this experiment, we measure the cost enforced application forwarding ALM is a multicast 
application, which broadcasts a message indiscriminately to every member node within the 
network.  
We measure the message-forwarding maintenance for the ALM application and compare it for 
both SEP and NICE. Figure 5.30 shows the average maintenance cost for forwarding routed 
messages when the system has to deal with group leader replacement. 
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Figure 5.30 Maintenance Cost for Application Forwarding with Pareto Churn 
For these experiments, we used the same settings of Experiment 4 (B) regarding the topology 
size. The Service Centre within a group administers the message forwarding efficiently by using 
the cluster co-efficient techniques and maintains the shortest path.  
The maintenance cost within the network is considered as the number of membership update 
messages exchanged within the group, which is calculated as byte counts as explained in Section 
5.1.8. The maintenance cost for application forwarding increases for both systems as the 
network size grows. This is expected as the simulation results indicate that SEP scales better 
with a large number of nodes and is good with partitioning and self-organising of the nodes. We 
achieved two bytes improvement over NICE in case of 1000 nodes. This improvement will have 
larger impact when the number of nodes grows significantly.  
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Figure 5.31 Maintenance Cost Forecast 
As predicted, network maintenance increases as the number of nodes goes up. This is the same 
for both NICE and SEP. In NICE the system maintenance is managed through heartbeat 
messages exchanged with all members by the Rendezvous point. This is similar to a client-
server model, therefore sharing the same characteristics in terms of latency and operation 
overhead. The NICE maintenance cost increases proportionate to the number of nodes. We 
revisit the maintenance cost evaluation demonstrated in Figure 5.31. NICE starts with a 
reasonable maintenance cost for 100 nodes and it follows the same or a lower pattern until the 
network dimension grows. As soon as the number of cluster leaders is increased, the 
maintenance cost jumps up significantly. 
The SEP maintenance cost on the other hand is distributed amongst different Service Centres. 
The autonomy of the groups provides efficient and cost effective membership management. The 
distances for the heartbeat messages are shorter and the latency is less than for NICE. Since the 
maintenance is managed and administered by distributed Service Centres at a local scale, the 
maintenance increase is proportional to the number of Service Centres. This starts with higher 
maintenance cost compared to NICE for smaller topology size, but it stays steady as the k value 
is increased. 
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The maintenance cost includes the node join, leave and fail overhead imposed on the system 
throughout the operation. The cost of leader selection and leaders leaving ungracefully are 
comparable in both NICE and SEP, assuming the leader rejection is not too high in SEP. If the 
leader rejection process occurs more often than expected with the SEP system, it forces many 
negotiations, nominations and exchange of messages. A possible reason for leader rejection is 
where nodes, which hold the majority of the group with, low levels of confidence in the 
nominated Service Centre. Another reason could be misbehaving nodes or malicious nodes 
trying to disrupt the leader selection process. 
5.8. Security & System Resiliency  
When a Service Centre fails or leaves, the system replaces it with a backup Service Centre. The 
effective management of the operation will reduce system recovery time; improve efficiency 
and subsequently, security of the system. We performed experiments with different numbers of 
nodes to evaluate recovery from a Service Centre failure in SEP and compared it against cluster 
leader failure in NICE. When we simulate a Service Centre leaving the network, we do this as 
an ungraceful leave or complete fail, i.e., there is no opportunity to warn other nodes in advance. 
5.8.1. Experiment 5 (A): Reliability – Average Response Count 
When an overlay node ungracefully leaves or fails within a Service Centre, it will have no 
significant impact on the overall topology maintenance or interoperability of the overlay. This 
is because the low degree nodes are not important for system maintenance or operation. 
However, a Service Centre failing or leaving the system may lead to interruption of packet 
delivery, message-forwarding and look up operations as well as failure to manage nodes joining 
and leaving. The topology construction algorithm considers replacing the Service Centre with a 
backup leader once the Service Centre decides to perform a graceful leave. However, an 
ungraceful leave means that the Service Centre fails or leaves without sending a graceful leave 
message as a pre-warning. 
In SEP, the failed Service Centre is proactively replaced with an already nominated backup 
node. The Service Centre exchanges messages between nodes, periodically updating 
membership information and group maintenance on Naming Table. If the heartbeat messages 
are not received from the Service Centre by the scheduled time, the system replaces the Service 
Centre with a backup node and asks member nodes to confirm the appointment. To evaluate 
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system reliability, we measure the level of system capability to recover from Service Centre 
failures.  
To be able to evaluate the topology efficiency, we measure the average response count for the 
queries performed within SEP. When a query is initiated, every recipient acknowledges it. We 
have used GIASearchApp (Chawathe et al., 2003), a Tier 1 application to perform queries and 
observed the number of responses. We compared the statistics to the NICE topology. We 
collected these reply messages and considered their quantity as the response count. Appendix 2 
is the simulation setting to observe and collate the response counts during the simulation. The 
simulation results are presented in Figure 5.32 shows the average value of the response count 
for SEP and NICE.  
  
 
Figure 5.32 Average Query Response Count 
We then perform a regression analysis in order to determine the data trend in the results as shown 
in Figure 5.33. 
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Figure 5.33 Residual Plot - Average Response Count 
The way the residual plot is scattered in Figure 5.33, we can we conclude there is a logarithmic 
relationship between the number of nodes and the average response count for queries in SEP 
and NICE. As shown in Figure 5.30, SEP always receives the highest rate in average response 
counts. The confidence intervals shown on Figure 5.32 also show that this is true 95% of the 
times. From the residual analysis of the data presented an the residual plot, we can see that the 
response count starts with significant increase, stays relatively within lower rate compared to 
the initial experiment and levels out at a steady rate afterwards. Figure 5.34 shows the trend line 
and forecast of the average response count for both SEP and NICE.   
 
Figure 5.34 Trend line of Average Response Count 
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NICE has a three-layer tree-topology construction where a single node is assigned a leadership 
responsibility. A node leader is selected if it is at the centre of a group. A rendezvous node is 
selected from the second layers within the group leaders if the leader is at the centre of the 
leader’s cluster. This means the Rendezvous node on the higher tree layer is the same one who 
is at the centre of its own cluster. This provides an efficient search and broadcasting is achieved 
efficiently. If a cluster leader fails, the system calculates the location of the existing members 
and selects the node which is located in the middle of the cluster as a leader. NICE does not 
consider failure of a Rendezvous point, and treats any leader failure as normal and performs a 
replacement operation using the algorithm. Considering the Rendezvous point is responsible for 
the most of the membership management and interoperability, any failure will have a significant 
impact on the network. Even if the failure is recovered in a timely manner, the distribution of 
the maintenance cost and recovery cost imposes a big overhead to the system. 
SEP on the other hand distributes the overall membership and forwarding responsibility to 
Service Centres with complete autonomy. This means any Service Centre failure will have an 
impact on a local and small scale. For SEP the scale of the security impact will be a fraction of 
that compared to NICE. 
Consider a 1,000-member group, where it is divided into two SEP groups and managed by two 
Service Centres. In NICE the Rendezvous point is responsible for the whole network operation. 
Therefore, the impact will be twice as great as for SEP, assuming the recovery time and 
maintenance cost are comparable. 
The GIASearchApp (Chawathe et al., 2003) was suitable for this experiment as it tries to find 
the highest degree node to forward messages. Upon failure of a super node, the system must 
seek either an alternative route to divert the message or wait until the super node is replaced. 
The latter is the best option for preserving user privacy. This is because the hop-to-live 
implemented by Clarke et al. (1999) prevents a node vising the same node twice ensures 
anonymity within the process.  
SEP maintains membership locally. It is crucial that the Service Centre has enough capacity and 
resources to deal with the maximum number of nodes predicted. The self-healing property of 
SEP in terms of Service Centre replacement, group dimension maintenance and membership 
refinements ensure fault tolerance. 
5.8.2. Experiment 5 (B): Resiliency - Packet Drop Rate 
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In this section, we perform an experiment to test the system resiliency and its ability in repairing 
the scale-free property of the topology under random attacks. We use Scribe as a Tier 1 
application running on top of the SEP and NICE overlay topologies. We plan to apply churn 
engines on the cluster leaders to emulate the attacks on the network, which leads to Service 
Centre failure.  
The packet delivery process fails in two situations namely; the source Service Centre failure and 
destination Service Centre unavailability. We observe the effective delivery of the packets in 
order to evaluate the topology construction algorithm and the design hypothesis where the 
algorithm ensures self-healing of the topology in a timely manner. We collate the number of 
UDP packets and calculate the average packet drop rate for both overlay topologies as a result 
of leader failures or destinations not being available. 
Figure 5.35 shows the average number of UDP packet drops for different network sizes because 
of unavailable node destinations, where network members join and leave as scheduled.  
 
Figure 5.35 Average Number of Packet Drop Rate with No Churn 
The membership change within a group has no significant impact on the communication or 
packet delivery as it is achieved using P2P communication. However, packet drops as a result 
of the destination being unavailable mean that the Service Centre for the destination node is 
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unable to acknowledge and forward the packet due to a failure or ungraceful leave. Figure 5.36 
is the trend line for UDP packet drop rates for both systems. 
 
Figure 5.36 The Trend line for Packet Drop Ratio 
The experimental results indicate that SEP outperforms the NICE topology in terms of effective 
topology recovery. The effective recovery from failures improves successful packet delivery. 
Therefore, not only this improves the integrity of the communications, but it prevents bandwidth 
redundancy.  
In order to emulate the targeted attacks and evaluate the effective recovery of the topology, we 
performed an experiment to systematically remove Service Centres. We used the Pareto churn 
engine for the experiment. In order to evaluate the integrity of the system we compare the 
simulation result t the best known multicast P2P overlay, NICE. Figure 5.37 demonstrates the 
simulation result for both systems.  
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Figure 5.37 The Effect of Service Centre Failure on Packet Drops – Pareto Churn 
As shown in Figure 5.37, SEP outperforms NICE in terms of integrity and interoperability of 
the topology while being targeted by an attack. We can conclude that SEP is much more reliable 
and effective in recovery from a targeted attack comparing to NICE. 
To be able to have a better understanding of the implication of experiment 5 (B), we extracted 
the additional statistics for both topologies as shown in Table 5.6. The table shows the 
comparison of statistics recorded for both systems with an average of 1,000 nodes over a 2,000 
second simulation. 
Table 5.6 The Effect of Service Centre Failure on Packet Delivery Ratio 
  
Mean 
number 
of nodes 
Packet drop due to 
unavailable 
destination 
Time between 
deletes 
Time between 
creates 
Maintenance 
bytes 
SEP 1012.84 22.7881 0.985994 s 0.950398 s 84.93256 
NICE 1018.94 28.60925 1.707631 s 1.711116 s 73.23192 
The statistics show the mean number of packets dropped due to destination nodes being 
unavailable. The result shows that the packet drop is considerably higher in NICE than SEP. 
The difference might not seem statistically significant at first in terms of drop ratio, but the 
average time between creates and deletes is shorter in SEP as shown in Table 5.6. This means 
the drop ratio and subsequently redundant bandwidth will be higher over longer operation time 
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with larger number of nodes. However, the maintenance cost is higher in SEP due to the higher 
number of message intervals sent during the membership change and the housekeeping process. 
We measured the message delivery delay to evaluate the significance of the statistics presented 
in Table 5.6. We measured the message delivery delay within multicast message dissemination 
as a result of Service Centre failure compared it to NICE as shown in Figure 5.38. 
 
Figure 5.38 One-way Latency Time in seconds for Multicasting 
Figure 5.39 shows the trend line analysis of the one-way latency within SEP and NICE. 
 
Figure 5.39 Trend line for Maximum delay 
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The trend line shows that the delay time increases linearly for both systems as the number of 
the nodes within the network grows. However, the average delays for SEP always stay lower 
making it more reliable than NICE in terms of end-to-end communications.  
5.8.3. Experiment 5 (C): Disconnection Ratio 
We performed this experiment to evaluate the aggressiveness of the topology in response to 
random attacks. The topology aggressiveness is the ability of the topology construction 
algorithm to maintain the system integrity by administering the split and merge operation as 
well recovery from a Service Centre failure. We perform an experiment to analyses the topology 
management to maintain the integrity of the group membership and to evaluate the self-healing 
characteristic of the topology to ensure system security and resiliency as explained in design 
rationale, section 4.4.5. 
In this experiment, we measure the average node disconnection ratio to measure the 
aggressiveness of the topology based on the size of the cluster. We define the node disconnection 
as an instance where a node fails to join or register within a group. Apart from a graceful leave, 
a node is disconnected from the network within three distinct operations, namely Service Centre 
failure, group merge or split. We randomly remove Service Centres to emulate the random 
attacks on the network. We observe the average number of disconnected nodes as a result of the 
Service Centre failure. Figure 5.40 shows the average number of disconnections within different 
network sizes. 
 
Figure 5.40 Topology Aggressiveness – Average Node Disconnection Ratio 
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Figure 5.40 shows that even though the confidence interval in SEP fluctuates in comparison to 
NICE, it is more resilient compared to NIC in terms of disconnection ratio of members under 
random attacks. SEP appoints Service Centres proportionate to the number of the nodes. The 
degree distribution in SEP ensures power-law, maintaining a few Service Centres allocates with 
many nodes attached to them. As discussed in Section 2.2.5, such networks are prone to targeted 
attacks but resilient to random attacks. The topology management will ensure that the failed 
Service Centre is replaced by a node with similar characteristics. Considering the autonomy of 
the Service Centres, failing one, will not have significant impact on the other groups or the 
topology as a whole. However, due to complexity of the tasks such as merge, split and 
misbehaving nodes that may cause disruption in leader selection or membership management 
process, the random failures are inevitable. As such, it is vital to analyse the implication of such 
failures on the system security. 
In NICE, the ‘rendezvous’ point is responsible to assign, replace and maintain cluster leaders as 
well as their cluster members. When a cluster leader fails, it is replaced by another node closest 
to it in terms of topological location. The member nodes are redirected to the closest cluster 
leader by the ‘rendezvous’ point. Failure of a cluster leader has only impact on limited number 
of nodes since NICE distribution includes many cluster leaders with few members within each 
cluster. However, when a rendezvous point fails, it affects the whole network and its sub-
modules. In this experiment we did simulate a rendezvous point failure. Therefore we assume 
the topology aggressiveness and the results extracted from the experience does not take into 
account the rendezvous point failure. 
NICE defines network dimensions by setting the maximum number of neighbours a node can 
have. Therefore, the tree can grow exponentially, spreading with high density of population. If 
the leader at the root of the tree fails it will affect the whole population within that cluster. The 
hierarchical-tree design in NICE is vulnerable to targeted attacks as explained in section 2.2.3. 
Since there is no limit to the membership numbers within different sections of the hierarchical 
tree, failing a cluster disconnects all of the members within the tree.  
The experimental results shown in Figure 5.40 demonstrate that SEP handles topology 
aggressiveness better and outperforms NICE in terms of member retention ratio in dealing with 
random attacks. Throughout the experiment, the average disconnection ratio of SEP remains 
lower than that of the NICE topology. The better handling of topology aggressiveness in SEP 
will also have a positive effect on the control overhead of the topology. 
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5.9. Summary  
In this chapter, we presented the results generated from the experiments and carried out analysis 
in line with the system rationales using the performance metrics that were defined in Section 
5.1. Furthermore, we evaluated the experiment results and collated statistics using different 
analysis tools and techniques in order to assess the validity of out design hypotheses and 
accomplishment of research objectives. The generated results then were compared to the most 
effective and reliable unstructured P2P system.    
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6. Conclusion and Future Work 
Ubiquitous Computing has promised that the conventional desktop computer will disappear and 
replaced by tiny, integrated digital interfaces interacting with humans. The advances of the 
Internet and emerging technologies and solutions such as wireless and low cost networking have 
made interconnection of those devices possible. This brings the paradigm of IoT, which leads 
to ubiquitous use of electronic services and data explosion. The interconnection of many 
network infrastructures creates a large-scale or global network with dynamic change of 
members, policies and services. Managing different features within such a large-scale network 
requires pro-active planning and careful feasibility studies to fulfil system requirements as well 
as addressing the emerging challenges. 
Scalability resolutions in P2P networks focus on identifying and mitigating system bottlenecks. 
This includes improving and maintaining system performance using the existing resources after 
the addition of new users or entities. Without an actual network load and implementation, it is 
hard to predict system bottlenecks and plan for mitigation. Moreover, scalability brings different 
issues and new challenges within user oriented systems such as IoT and critical systems. The 
prediction of network growth and operation under different circumstances are achieved using 
probability theories, test beds or simulation environments. In this work, we have utilised an 
abstraction of a large scale unstructured P2P network system to model system security and 
resiliency, performance and interoperability. The outcome is then generalised to the rest of the 
system to validate the proposed framework. 
Within a scalable network, the spread, mobility and granularity of nodes, and the dynamic 
architecture of the network, make resource management and arrangement of nodes complex (Li 
et al., 2010). Topology management should consider cost, time and space as well as privacy, 
fair access, confidentiality, integrity and availability of resources. Managing network resources 
and communications within such distributed systems becomes more complicated, with 
important tasks such as membership management, routing, topology choice, service access and 
state management becoming increasingly challenging. The traditional client-server 
arrangements within centralised systems using low-level protocols have now been replaced by 
autonomous mobile hosts and dynamic protocols over ubiquitous decentralised systems. Using 
these low-level protocols, nodes can communicate with each other and make independent 
decisions of the network management system.  
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The interconnection of autonomous computers and isolated communication networks enables 
new services and applications to form distributed networks (Panda et al., 2011). Despite the 
typical centralised nature of computer networks, a distributed network operates more efficiently 
and effectively over a mix of workstations, LAN servers, wireless networks, regional, Web and 
other servers (Papers et al., 2010). As the size of the distributed network grows, managing 
network resources, access control and security become more complex due to the dynamic and 
rapid change of network structure, state and flexibility. 
Secure communication and confidentiality, efficiency, fault tolerance, availability and integrity 
of the resources are the main concerns of scalable distributed network algorithms. Furthermore, 
they should maintain state consistency, resource consistency, privacy, resiliency and response 
to intrusion as well as functionality and interoperability of the network. 
There are several ubiquitous applications to address the challenges facing scalable ubiquitous 
networks. However, those solutions are not inclusive. In particular, they do not support efficient 
service discovery and performance testing (Edwards & Grinter (2001); Panda et al., 2011; Dixon 
et al., (2011); and Greenberg et al., 2009). Throughout this project, several weaknesses and 
major flaws of scalable ubiquitous systems have been identified within the current frameworks 
and applications (see Chapter 2). Those systems may fulfil the requirements of a ubiquitous 
system environment and address technological challenges to some degree (Edwards & Grinter, 
2001). However, some elements of user-oriented system design and security have been 
overlooked. There is no comprehensive approach to address all of the challenges facing dynamic 
changes of scalable network structure with hundreds of devices and services joining, leaving or 
failing within the system. In addition, the privacy concern in a user-oriented environment has 
been given less attention. We proposed a novel network-aware topology construction and 
membership management scheme to address resiliency and integrity of the scalable unstructured 
ubiquitous systems such as P2P overlays. By enforcing the network to follow a power-law 
distribution of nodes, organising the network members and different entities becomes efficient 
and cost effective (Li et al., 2010). 
The topology management process usually aims at maintaining fairness, but this is not the case 
within the current ubiquitous system developments. Applications and users demand network 
resources in real time without complicated configuration. While the price of storage media has 
gone down significantly within the past few years, we do not deal with a resource-limited 
network. We rather focus on how to allocate those resources to achieve better performance and 
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security. Therefore, the four essential aspects of resource allocation, namely task allocation, 
membership management, anonymous communication and resiliency have been the focus of 
this project. 
The rising cost of data traffic and the need for efficient communications and improved 
management of systems have created pressure to rollout efficient and effective communication 
methods and address dynamic change of members within ubiquitous P2P networks. This work 
uses a novel topology construction and management scheme with network-aware lookup and 
broadcast techniques to initiate efficient communications. We make effective use of the shortest 
paths within the Ubiquitous Computing networks without the need for complex changes to the 
network topology, policy or procedures. A simple mesh-based overlay is proposed to maintain 
minimum hop search and a lookup mechanism using Service Centres. A novel privacy-
concerned leader election algorithm is proposed to preserve user anonymity and communication 
security. Considering the high cost of failed queries within scalable networks, this work 
improves network efficiency and reduces latency. 
The interactions and communications within a ubiquitous computing environment involve 
generating sensitive and personal data. Providing an infrastructure to maintain security and 
efficiency as well as interoperability within such ubiquitous systems has been the focus of 
businesses, service providers, academia and the research community. The development and 
current advances of such broad objectives have been discussed within this work and many 
research questions have been highlighted. Using different modelling techniques, mathematical 
theorems, system and application scenarios and a simulation environment, this work contributes 
to the current knowledge with a novel approach and robust experimental evaluation. The 
approach considers development limitations as well as current advances in the area of ubiquitous 
systems.  
Network overlays add additional layers on top of the existing networks with indirect mapping 
or virtualisation to provide service to a more scalable domain. The proposed framework forms 
several network overlays to address scalability issues within a decentralised P2P system. It 
supports routing, addressing, security and mobility and the dynamic changes in the network such 
as node addition, re-configuration and failures. The proposed scheme is fault tolerant, scalable 
and provides an effective methodology for self-organisation of the nodes. We evaluated the 
proposed methods using experimental analysis and discovered that the developed framework 
  
148 
SEP scales well, offers practical partitioning and is effective in terms of self-healing and self-
organising of resources.  
During this work, many concerns have emerged regarding the efficiency and privacy within 
ubiquitous systems. Privacy is an issue that changes from one environment to another, 
considering cross border laws and legislation as well as many guidelines. Therefore, the 
introduction of a comprehensive standard and guidelines to include every aspect of privacy may 
be a near-impossible task. Nonetheless, this poses a challenge to the future of ubiquitous 
systems.  
6.1. Topology Construction 
The network-aware topology construction is a core element of the SEP design. In this section, 
we present an overview of the topology construction and bootstrapping processes, which 
contribute to system scalability. SEP organises existing members into groups of trusted users 
and nominates a Service Centre to act as a super node to administer routing and forwarding 
tasks. Although this is inspired by the clustering co-efficient property explained in Section 3.6, 
the intention is to leave member nodes to form a community of users who can communicate 
with each other without globally advertising their identity. The user’s anonymity is observed 
from the very basic elements of the system, which is the initialisation phase. Within the 
initialisation phase, member nodes are promoted to vote a trusted member of the community 
with higher processing power and degree distribution as leader, thereby creating a Service 
Centre. If a member node is not happy with the nomination, it can leave the group and join 
another group, which it may have common interests with. Group members are required to 
confirm the election until their confirmation is acknowledged. After the creation of the first 
Service Centre and the registration of group members, they can invite friends into the group to 
expand the group membership. If a group member fails to acknowledge and confirm the 
selection, it will be removed from the group and will need to request to join again if it decides 
to join later. 
Having multiple Service Centres within the P2P network ensures heterogeneity of the design 
with full support for any decentralised system. The experimental results showed effective group 
and membership management and multicast data path reliability by providing additional 
guarantees using alternative routes.  
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In Scribe and NICE, the location information is used to select a cluster leader. A node, which is 
located in the middle of the topological location, is assigned as cluster leader. This means a node 
with lower capacity may become a cluster leader. Such an approach may cause system 
bottlenecks compromising network performance. SEP takes a different approach to this issue by 
including the computational power and available bandwidth as parameters in nominating a 
Service Centre. Furthermore, the conditional preferential attachment in node distribution 
maintains effective node arrangement. In the next section, we explain how this improves 
network balance in terms of resource distribution.  
6.2. Topology Stability and Load Balancing 
As we have mentioned earlier, ensuring a symmetric network topology is a major challenge 
while designing a P2P network. Load balancing is considered for the distribution of network 
traffic and resources amongst the member nodes. Clustering the network is the simplest and 
efficient way of distributing network resources to achieve the best load balancing. The current 
most effective and efficient solutions for unstructured P2P systems include hierarchical 
topology (GIA) and hierarchical-tree topology (NICE).  
The hierarchical-tree topology in NICE is an efficient clustering solution for unstructured P2P, 
which supports multicast applications. It organises the nodes into hierarchical trees, allocating 
the nodes located at the centre of the tree as super nodes shown in Figure 5.12. The cluster 
leader allocation algorithm in NICE is unbiased and only considers the distance vector of nodes 
as a metric when making a decision. 
GIA on the other hand implements different approach and directs the queries over the topology 
to the nodes with higher degree. Although this may provide effectiveness in terms of improved 
communications nonetheless, it may create system bottlenecks by sending overwhelming 
number of requests to particular nodes. Moreover, using the preferential attachment where high 
degree nodes attract more links from other nodes leads to unbalanced networks in terms of node 
distribution as demonstrated in Figure 5.11.    
The power-law distribution of node in SEP as shown in Figure 5.13, maintains scale-free 
property as well as ensuring effective load balancing. This property contributes towards system 
resiliency and low overhead in end-to-end communications.  
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6.3. Topology Scalability 
While designing the distribution topology for a P2P system such as the Internet P2P streaming, 
two architectures are usually utilised: tree-based and mesh-based architectures (Seibert, Fahmy, 
& Nita-rotaru, 2008). In the Tree-based structure, members explicitly choose their parent 
(Hosseini et al., 2007). A Tree-based overlay constructs a hierarchy of nodes, which can be 
administered by their parents. This provides simple routing topology and effective membership 
management. The Tree-based method has many advantages over other methods such as 
selecting a leader with adequate required resources, direct control over the network and, most 
importantly, the members select their leader from the known members in the network (Hosseini 
et al., 2007). However, tree-based overlays cannot scale well. Multi-tree overlays such as 
Chunky-spread (Venkataraman et al., 2006) have been introduced to address this issue. Chunky-
spread uses a random graph with proportionate load target to improve load-balancing issues. 
Each node needs to know information about its neighbour such as maximum load number and 
its neighbouring nodes’ constraints. If a parent node receives 50% more load than anticipated, 
then the node does not transmit any data. This can affect the interoperability of the system. 
On the other hand, in a mesh-based approach, the overlay facilitates the communications in an 
unstructured manner with information about subsets obtained from the membership server 
(Seibert et al., 2008). Mesh-based systems are resilient to membership changes and produce 
high performance with heterogeneous bandwidth capabilities. Seibert et al. (2008) have 
measured – through experiments – that mesh-based overlays perform better than the tree-based 
ones.  
While choosing the best network topology, the SEP framework aims to provide a balance 
between two distinct metrics namely: maintaining the average shortest path and reducing the 
number of hops in lookups, thereby reducing end-to-end delays. Such an approach has not been 
implemented or documented yet (Hosseini et al. 2007). Furthermore, routing data packets using 
Service Centres maintains the anonymity of the P2P communications. To achieve the first 
requirement, SEP uses the clustering method discussed in Chapter 3. The second requirement is 
achieved by using an administered routing protocol with one-hop or minimum-hop 
communication. The routing algorithm in explained in detail later on in this chapter. 
The main advantage of the mesh-based P2P system is efficiency in terms of bandwidth 
consumption (Hosseini et al., 2007 and Seibert, Fahmy, & Nita-rotaru, 2008). Assuming that 
most of the users have an acceptable internet connection, and given the security and privacy 
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considerations, the Tree-based method is similar to the scale-free network in terms of node 
distribution. In SEP, we have implemented a scale-free network, which is a different variation 
of the Tree-based topology management to simplify membership changes and to implement the 
proposed effective routing algorithm for maintaining user privacy. 
Our experiment results show that the SEP protocols is scalable, efficient and resilient to random 
attacks. To validate the components of the system, we tested the system scalability using the 
system’s ability to handle link distress and topology stress. To do this, we measured the topology 
structure using random graphs as explained using the Erdös-Rényi (1959) model. 
The first step in implementing the SEP framework is to construct a scalable overlay topology, 
in order to organise a Gnutella-like unstructured network into a clustered group of users where 
the network overlay can scale to accommodate a network at Internet scales. Topology 
construction includes arrangement of members as groups of nodes with common interests and 
to nominate a Service Centre to act as a group leader. The network starts with the initial 
membership management and constructs a cluster until it reaches its maximum defined capacity. 
It then grows with a similar configuration to accommodate further nodes up to the Internet scale. 
The topology construction algorithm starts bootstrapping the nodes and nomination of Service 
Centres to connect the nodes to the cluster until the initialisation period is completed as shown 
Figure 5.13. The topology construction algorithm follows conditional preferential attachment of 
nodes for membership management and node distribution and degree-proportional probabilistic 
(Fotouhi & Rabbat, 2013) to model the future network growth. 
The topology construction experiment has two stages to evaluate system scalability. It is based 
on a power-law distribution of nodes and the ability to cope with network stretch and 
membership changes within the clustering co-efficient model. Membership change is governed 
by different churns and network stretch is assessed by changing the network size and seeing 
how the network convergence properties are affected by it.   
6.4. Membership Management and System Resilience 
The paradigm shift from client server to distributed scalable P2P ubiquitous systems makes 
cooperation more important and feasible than coordination. As the unstructured P2P network 
becomes an autonomous system, user contribution and cooperation play an important role in 
terms of interoperability of the network. This is considered as a major factor for successful 
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lookup and communication mechanisms in unstructured and scalable P2P systems such as GIA 
and Gnutella. User presence, especially the presence of those with high value attributes such as 
processing power and memory, which may take on the role of being Service Centres, is key to 
the successful operation of SEP. The cooperation and active contribution is not a major issue 
within the SEP framework since the user groups are formed based on trusted relationships and 
friendly associations. Member nodes’ common interests and positive reputation are the basis of 
a group membership. These factors are important parameters in the Service Centre nomination 
and appointment where the majority of members participate in the voting process to select a 
node as a group leader. Therefore, member nodes are expected to make an active contribution 
to the community group to ensure interoperability and availability. 
Nodes within SEP have an affiliation motive to the community group to share information or 
facilitate in the sharing of information. These are the main instincts that drive formation of 
clustered community groups. We can see examples of this motivation in Web communities such 
as Yahoo Groups, Google Groups and chat rooms. Free riders are one of the main obstacles in 
successful and efficient communication in cooperative communities (ADAR et al., 2000). 
However, we almost eradicate the possibility of free riding by assigning administrative roles to 
Service Centres and constantly monitor them using sign in or wake up calls. As such, fault 
tolerant communication and lookup protocol is guaranteed to some extent within the proposed 
system. 
The uptime for a user with high capacity and high degree can have a direct influence on system 
operation. Therefore, the key for success in such systems is client participation. In an 
unstructured system such as Gnutella, the median uptime for clients is 60 minutes (Saroiu et al., 
2002). In the SEP system, the Service Centres play an important role in providing crucial 
services to their group members. However, we assume Service Centres stay active and live for 
a reasonable amount of time and inform the system on graceful leave to reduce inconsistency 
and overhead. 
Generic network-level routing protocols do not address application specific faults and therefore 
only legitimate problems with paths or physical links are considered (Anderson, 2002). The 
integration of the average shortest path and network dimension ensures the efficiency of the 
resource allocation. The integrity and state consistency within the network will maintain the 
interoperability of the system. 
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In this project, the trusted relationships are not formed based on existing Small World network 
theories; on the contrary, it has been treated as a base for building and maintaining a trusted 
community. The trusted relationships within SEP group members not only contributes to 
network interoperability through user cooperation in terms of leader election, but it ensures 
system resiliency and user privacy through contribution in terms of state management.  
6.5. Future Works 
This work is an experiment driven research rather than a pure literature review. Due to the 
inherent limitations of evaluating real world networks and the considerable quantity of reference 
material, we used network simulation to implement our design goals and validate our research 
hypotheses. This provides an understanding of current developments, as well as the challenges 
facing Ubiquitous Computing systems. This research has revealed that current tools and 
technologies do not support privacy within scalable ubiquitous networks. Considering the 
ubiquitous use of the systems that we reviewed, the analysis we carried out and the experiments 
we conducted generated more questions. Considering the ubiquitous use of the P2P applications 
and rising concerns for system security and user privacy, it is crucial to address those issues. 
Given the scope of the project and time limitation, addressing all of the challenges would not be 
possible. Therefore, in the following, we identify the directions for future work following this 
project. 
6.5.1. Multiple Groups Membership 
The main objective of the anonymity proposed in SEP is to maintain user privacy. SEP strives 
to anonymise user’s identity as much as possible without compromising efficiency and 
effectiveness. It includes advertising node state only at a local scale and withholding user’s 
identity from anyone outside the group in search and broadcasting. The topology construction 
algorithm introduced in the SEP framework limits node membership to only one group. In order 
to join a group, a node should make its attributes and affiliation known to its Service Centre. 
The system ensures the correctness of the membership list by comparing the list of nodes to 
detect discrepancies. Unlike declared community groups and attributes publication (Khambatti 
et al., 2002), SEP uses the existing associations to form groups. The advertisement and 
discovery are achieved locally for members of the group. If a member is located outside of the 
group, the communications and message forwarding are administered by the Service Centre, 
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maintaining user anonymity. For future direction, we will look into the possibility of multiple 
group membership and evaluate its effect on network interoperability as well as user privacy. 
6.5.2. Efficient Cryptography & Misbehaving Nodes Solutions 
The additional overhead on the SEP operations is justified with the aim of improving security, 
system resiliency and user privacy. The system uses public key infrastructure. Each Service 
Centre is responsible for providing and distributing the digital certificates to individual users 
after they join a group. For future work, we will be pursuing an efficient key management 
strategy to replace public key encryption mechanism and certificate based key distribution to 
improve efficiency and overhead.  
Misbehaving nodes or sleeping cells may raise privacy and security concerns to SEP system. 
This is one of the main challenges that cannot be completely rectified. This is true in human 
relationships as well. Nodes may change their behaviour as a result of changes in their interests. 
However, the fear of misbehaving or suspicious nodes should not prevent community trust. In 
human relations, it has been established as social norm that we have to be cautious in choosing 
friends. However, a small group of nodes or a high degree node acting maliciously may have 
catastrophic impacts on not only user privacy, but the system operability. For future direction, 
we need to conduct a threat analysis to outline the implications of such scenario and propose 
security mechanisms as well as robust detection and prevention methods.  
6.5.3. Real World Overlay Protocol Deployment 
We plan to implement the SEP framework to be deployed with different real world overlay 
protocols and applications such as Skype. Skype is one of the most efficient applications for 
end-to-end communication that utilises fully distributed resources of its users in order to provide 
improved communications. We would like to include Skype implementation within our 
framework design and use the clustering technique within Skype. This was out of scope of our 
work. In addition, this was not possible due to the unavailability of the Skype documentation 
and source code. However, this can be resolved by inclusion of several machines within different 
locations and setting up Skype nodes in order to evaluate the effect of node and topology stress 
as explained in chapter 4.  
6.5.4. Unicast Protocols with Cache Replacement 
  
155 
Freenet uses cache replacement in order to provide anonymity to the users who share content 
online. The success or even the failure of the performed queries is not guaranteed. We believe 
that, the cache replacement technique may improve the anonymity and at the same time 
improving the efficiency and reduce the control overhead. Although the design limitations and 
lack of scope for better scalability in Freenet prevent ubiquitous deployment of the application, 
the concept of the user privacy within autonomous systems is appealing. Freenet does not assign 
any role or responsibility to a specific user. This provides robustness to the system and makes it 
reliable against targeted attacks at the same time introducing inefficiency. We will consider the 
cache replacement capability within SEP unicast protocol to improve privacy for autonomous 
users and increase the efficiency of the lookup process and end-to-end communications. 
6.6. Summary 
This chapter concludes the thesis with summary of the findings and brief evaluation of the results 
generated from the experiments. It highlights the research challenges we have addressed in this 
work. Furthermore, it presents the future directions that can be taken following our work in this 
project.  
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